b  Isasi 


f^'a  a, 


Mj    "^■5>s,~'- 


GIFT  OF 

SEELEY  W.  MUDD 

and 

GEORGE  I.  COCHRAN    MEYER  ELSASSER 

DR.  JOHN  R.  HAYNES    WILLIAM  L.  HONNOLD 

JAMES  R.  MARTIN         MRS.  JOSEPH  F.  SARTOR! 

to  tkt 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

SOUTHERN  BRANCH 


Digitized  by  tine  Internet  Arcinive 

in  2007  with  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


littp://www.arcliive.org/details/elementsofmilitaOOpettiala 


ELEMEN^TS 


-OF — 


MILITARY  SCIENCE 


HEriSJED    EDITION 


For  the  Use  of  Students  in  Colleges  and 
Universities 


BT 

JAMES  S.    PETTIT 
Captain  First  United  States  Infantry 


NEW   HAVEN: 
THE    TUTTLE,    MOBEHOUSE   &   TAYLOB    PBESS 

1895 


91711 


c«    «<  «  J  ''t 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Introduction — Military  SciJiNCE — Organization  of 
U.  S.  Army — Mobilization — Concentration, 


CHAPTER   II. 


Discipline — Administration — Quartermaster — Com- 
missary— Ordnance — Medical —  Pay  —  Law — 


ti 

^'■ 

^  Engineers — Adjutant-Generals'  and  Inspec- 

tor-Generals'  Departments, 15 

pA.<     CHAPTER  III. 

Logistics — Supply — Camps — Cantonment  —  Bivouac,  29 

2  CHAPTER  IV. 

Advanced  Guards — Rear  Guards,       47 


CHAPTER  V. 
Outposts — Patrols, 65 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Tactics — March   Tactics — Orders — Time    and    Dis- 
tance— Convoys, 83 

CHAPTER   VII. 
Tactical  Employment  of  Field  Artillery,     ...  101 


IV  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  Vm. 

Tactical  Employment  of  Cavalry, 117 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Tactical  Employment  op  Infantry, 133 

CHAPTER   X. 
Elements  of  Strategy, 149 

CHAPTER   XL 
Field  Engineering, 165 

CHAPTER  XII. 

The   Battle — Fredericksburg — Gravelotte — Ross- 
bach — Leuthen — Antietam, 183 


PREFACE. 

Upon  taking  charge  of  the  Department  of  Military  Science  at 
Yale  University,  the  first  difficulty  encountered  was  the  lack  of  a 
suitable  text-book,  one  which  was  elementary  and  progressive,  and 
at  the  same  time  sufficiently  technical  and  advanced  to  appeal  to 
the  interest  and  ability  of  the  students  in  this  Department.  This 
little  work  is  the  result  of  an  effort  to  supply  the  deficiency. 

It  is,  of  course,  largely  a  compilation.  Military  men,  in  com- 
mon with  other  scientific  men,  are  essentially  borrowers,  and  I 
acknowledge  fully  my  indebtedness  to  the  works  and  authors 
mentioned  below  : 

Col.  Maillard — Elements  de  la  Guerre. 

Rustow — La  Petite  Guerre. 

Blum^ — Strategie. 

Prof.  Mercur — Elements  of  the  Art  of  War. 

Col.  Derrecagaix — La  Guerre  Modeme. 

Woolwich — Text-book  of  Fortifications,  2  vols. 

Precis  of  Modem  Tactics — Pratt. 

Field  Artillery— Pratt. 

Col.  Robert — "  Tactique  de  Combat,"  etc.,  2  vols. 

Jomini — Art  of  War. 

Letters  on  Infantry,  Hohenlohe. 

"  Cavalry,  " 

"  Artillery,  " 

Sir  Ed.  Hamley. 

Armies  of  To-day — Harper  Bros, 
Maj.  Henderson. 
Col.  Clerry. 
Col.  Hozier. 
Capt.  Shaw. 
Col.  Dyke. 

Memoirs  of  Gens.  Grant,  Sherman  and  Sheridan. 
U.  S.  Drill  Regulations. 
Capt.  Heusch — Tactique  d'Aujourd'hui. 
Current  Military  Journals  and  Periodicals,  and  to  Lieut.  Alex. 

Dyer,  Fourth  U.  S.  Artillery,  for  valuable  suggestions. 
Col.  Brackenbury. 
Wheeler's  Art  of  War. 
Aide  Memoire  De  I'Officier  d'Infanterie. 


CHAPTER  I. 


INTRODUCTION. 

Before  entering  upon  a  course  of  study  in  any  branch  of  sci- 
ence, it  is  well  to  take  a  preliminary  survey  of  the  subject,  with  a 
view  to  getting  some  idea  of  its  extent,  its  main  subdivisions  and 
ramifications  and  the  sequence  in  which  they  should  be  consid- 
ered. 

In  the  study  of  a  physical  science  we  start  with  the  preliminary 
definitions  ;  we  then  proceed  to  the  elementary  principles  upon 
which  it  is  based,  and  through  these  to  their  combinations,  and 
up  to  the  more  occult  problems,  passing  finally  to  the  application 
of  the  deduced  laws  to  known  phenomena. 

Military  science  should  be  studied  in  the  same  way.  It  is  as 
truly  a  science  as  chemistry  or  philosophy  ;  it  makes  all  of  the 
physical  sciences  its  handmaidens,  and  even  extends  into  the 
domains  of  law,  politics  and  religion — chemistry,  mechanics,  light 
heat,  sound,  electricity  and  hydro-dynamics  are  necessary  in  some 
department  of  military  science, 

I  shall,  then,  endeavor  to  follow  the  methods  employed  in 
instruction  in  other  scientific  studies,  starting  with  elementary 
ideas  and  ending  with  an  illustration  of  the  application  of  the 
principles  in  some  of  the  great  compaigns  or  battles  of  modern 
times. 

MILITARY  SCIENCE. 

The  characteristics  of  a  good  soldier  are,  the  love  of  country, 
subordination,  confidence  in  his  superiors,  fortitude,  temperance 
and  a  robust  constitution. 

An  oflicer  must,  in  addition,  possess  an  accurate  knowledge  of 
military  science,  and  an  intimate  acquaintance  with  the  details  of 
his  own  arm  of  the  service.     He  must  be   ready  to   make   any 


-2— 


personal   sacrifice,  even  to  his  life,  if  the  success  of  his   cause 
demands  it. 

A  general  officer  must  in  addition  to  the  above,  be  familiar 
with  the  capabilities  and  proper  use  of  all  arms  of  the  service 
and  have  a  knowledge  of  the  principles  of  strategy.  The  soldier's 
proudest  possessions  are  his  honor,  his  courage  and  his  unselfish- 
ness. These  are  the  qualities  upon  which  great  nations  are 
founded  ;  war  is  not  wholly  evil,  then,  since  it  fosters  these  noble 
qualities,  and  history  informs  us  that  decay  quickly  comes  upon  a 
nation  that  has  lost  its  love  for  martial  glory  and  the  powers  of 
arms. 

War  is  a  science  and  an  art,  as  a  science  it  organizes  and 
administers  the  affairs  of  armies  and  puts  them  into  action.  The 
art  lies  in  the  application  of  the  principles  laid  down  in  the 
science.  War  is  an  experimental  science  ;  its  rules  are  based 
upon  the  experiences  of  past  wars  and  upon  observations  made  in 
time  of  peace.  Gi*eat  generals  have  furnished  the  facts  upon 
which  lesser  lights  have  based  the  science.  The  study  of  the 
military  history  of  great  campaigns  is  an  absolutely  necessary 
part  of  a  soldier's  education  ;  it  is  the  most  fruitful  of  all  branches 
of  military  knowledge  ;  its  lessons  are  inexhaustible. 

Military  science  comprises  all  knowledge  necessary  to  the 
preparation  for  and  the  carrying  out  of  war. 

Its  subdivisions  are  not  sharply  defined,  but  1  will  assume  the 
following  as  sufficiently  comprehensive. 


[Line 


1  Organization  -j 

[staff     - 

2  Military  administration 

3  Logistics 


/  Artillery. 
•<  Infantry. 
'  Cavalry. 


4  Tactics  of 


Security 
Marches 
Supply 
Camp 
I  Combat 


( Outposts  1 

•<  Advance  Guard  | 
'  Rear  Guard 


5  Strategy 

6  Engineering 


J  Convoys 
1  Escorts 

( Fortification 
I  Reconnaissance 


}-for 


1  Adjutant  general  and  aids. 

2  Quartermaster's  department. 

3  Subsistence  department. 

4  Ordnance  department. 

5  Military  law. 

6  Paymaster's  department. 

7  Engineer  department. 

8  Medical  department. 

9  Signal  corps. 

llO  Inspector  general's  department. 

I  Infantry  j  Separate 

•<  Cavalry     v     and 

'  Artillery  '  Combined. 

( 1  Field  works. 

j  2  Permanent  worlis. 


— 3— 

ORGANIZATION. 

The  power  of  an  army  depends  largely  upon  its  organization, 
that  is,  its  material  power.  There  is  another,  viz  :  moral  power, 
which  cannot  be  overlooked.     It  depends  upon 

1st,  Discipline  ;  2nd,  National  Character  ;  3rd,  Military  Edu- 
cation. 

Jomini  says  :  "  An  army  possesses  in  itself  the  principles  of  its 
superiority  or  inferiority,  by  the  nature  of  its  organization,  its 
spirit  and  the  character  of  its  chiefs."  We  will  at  present  con- 
fine ourselves  to  organization. 

Organization  marks  the  first  great  distinction  between  an 
army  and  an  armed  mob.  Add  discipline  and  we  have  a  com- 
pact body  of  men  subservient  to  the  will  of  the  nation  as  expressed 
through  its  chiefs. 

The  organization  of  an  army  must  be  based  upon  the  following 
considerations. 

1.  The  political  and  social  conditions  of  the  people  which  per- 
mit service  to  be  made  compulsory  or  require  it  to  be  voluntary. 
As  illustrations  of  the  first,  we  have  the  nations  of  Continental 
Europe,  and  of  the  second,  England  and  the  United  States. 

2.  The  Geographical  position,  wealth  and  population  with 
consequent  probability  of  war,  and  vulnerability  to  attack,  which 
would  determine  the  size  of  the  armies  and  to  some  extent  their 
composition. 

Ten  per  cent,  of  the  French  population  is  enrolled  on  the  army 
list,  active  and  reserve.  In  Germany  6.5  per  cent.  In  our  coun- 
try, with  nearly  double  the  population  of  France,  we  have  .0036 
per  cent,  in  our  army.  Our  position,,  removed  from  powerful 
military  nations  diminishes  the  probability  of  our  becoming 
engaged  in  armed  contests.  Our  great  financial  and  numerical 
strength  makes  invasion  improbable,  while  our  long  sea-coast 
lines  dotted  by  great  cities,  being  most  vulnerable,  demand  great 
strength  in  artillery  and  in  engineering  works  to  properly  protect 
them. 

3.  Rapid  mobilization,  dindi  facilities  for  concentrating  troops 
in  zones  of  probable  attack.     An  efiicient  organization  should 


— 4— 

enable  an  army  to  be  prepared  for  war  at  any  moment,  in  fact, 
permanent  preparation  and  rapidity  of  mobilization  stand  forth 
as  the  two  indispensable  conditions  of  every  army  organization." 
The  considerations  mentioned  above  are  largely  questions  of 
national  policy  and  expediency.  These  having  been  adjusted,  we 
may  pass  to  what  may  be  called  the  interior  organization  of  an 
army,  based  upon  the  following  considerations. 

4.  To  properly  secure  com,m,and. 

5.  For  tactical  purposes. 

6.  For  administrative  purposes. 

The  division  into  large  units, — armies,  corps,  divisions  and 
brigades — is  made  to  secure  command.  The  immense  number  of 
men  called  into  service  in  modem  wars  makes  it  necessary  to 
divide  them  into  separate  armies  and  in  making  the  division  we 
must  be  guided  by  the  abilities  of  the  generals  who  are  to  com- 
mand them,  by  the  topographical  features  of  the  zones  of  opera- 
tions, the  projects  of  the  enemy,  and  the  objects  to  be  attained. 
Great  generals  appear  but  seldom  ;  We  must  base  our  subdivision 
on  m,ean  capacity,  an  army  of  150,000  men  may  be  entrusted  to  a 
trained  and  tried  general  of  known  ability. 

It  will  hardly  be  within  the  scope  of  this  work  to  give  at 
length,  the  reasons  for  the  various  subdivisions  of  an  army,  it  will 
suffice  for  the  present  to  say  that  they  ai'e  the  results  of  the  study 
and  experience  of  experts  in  the  art  and  science  of  war.  A 
proper  subdivision  of  an  ai*my  of  150,000  men  would  be,  into  six 
army  corps  of  25,000  men  each.  This  would  give  the  command- 
ing general  six  assistants  of  high  rank.  "Napoleon  said  large 
armies  should  not  contain  more  \\x2iXi.  five  grand  units  "but  the 
facilities  for  exercising  command  have  been  increased  since  his 
day- 
Each  army  corps  is  divided  into  three  divisions,  giving  the 
corps  commander  three  junior  generals  to  whom  he  issues  direct 
orders.  Each  division  would  contain  from  8,000  to  10,000  men. 
With  an  army  of  50,000  men,  the  division  into  corps  might  be 
omitted  as  command  could  be  secured  at  least  equally  as  well  by 
dividing  it  into  five  divisions  of  10,000  men  each.  Divisions  are 
subdivided  into  three  brigades  each. 


— 5— 

The  duties  and  rights  of  every  individual  in  an  army  are  fixed 
by  law.  In  every  group  of  military  men  no  matter  how  large  or 
how  small  there  must  be  one  who  is  beyond  doubt  the  military 
superior,  and  legally  authorized  to  exact  obedience. 

Each  unit  must  have  a  chief  with  a  particular  grade.  When 
several  similar  units  are  brought  together  to  form  an  army,  the 
commander  of  it  should  be  of  a  higher  grade  than  any  of  his  sub- 
ordinates. Although  this  principle  is  well  known  to  military 
men,  it  has  frequently  been  violated,  and  military  history  con- 
tains many  records  of  the  evils  resulting  therefrom. 

"  Even  Napoleon  whose  talent  for  creating  and  organizing  armies 
was  second  only  to  his  skill  in  operating  them,  was  frequently 
annoyed  by  his  marshals  on  questions  of  command.  They  were 
equal  in  grade.  The  most  flagrant  case  was  that  of  Massena  and 
Ney  in  Spain  and  Portugal  in  1811." 

Brigades  are  divided  into  smaller  units  for  purposes  of  admin- 
istration, tactics  and  combat.  In  addition  to  being  drilled  and 
disciplined,  soldiers  must  be  fed,  clothed,  armed,  paid,  and  must 
be  divided  into  units  to  facilitate  administration.  The  regiment 
is  the  adtninistrative  unit  in  all  armies.  Military  men  do  not 
agree  as  to  the  exact  signification  of  the  "  tactical  unit."  "  If  by 
it  is  meant  a  body  that  can  fight  independently  it  would  appear 
that  a  division  is  the  real  tactical  unit  as  it  includes  all  arms  of 
the  service,"  *  *  To  a  general  commanding  an  army,  the  corps 
are  tactical  units  ;  to  a  corps  commander,  divisions  ;  to  a  division 
commander,  brigades,  etc."    (Pratt.) 

"  The  term  is,  however,  generally  applied  to  The  battalion  of 
infantry,  The  squadron  of  cavalry  and  The  battalion  of  artillery. 

Modern  methods  of  warfare  have  made  the  company  the  unit 
of  combat.  It  varies  in  size  from  250  (German)  to  1 00  (United 
States).  The  long  lines  occupied  by  modern  armies  and  the 
extended  order  of  fighting  throw  the  control  of  the  fighting  line 
into  the  hands  of  the  company  commanders.  The  company  has 
consequently  greatly  increased  in  importance  ;  its  commander  has 
greater  responsibilities,  and  he  is  allowed  to  exercise  more  indi- 
viduality than  formerly. 


— 6— 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  U.  S,  ARMY. 

The  military  forces  of  the  United  States  consist  of  : 

1.  The  regular  army  with  a  maximum  strength  of  25,000  men 
under  the  present  laws. 

2.  The  militia  of  the  several  states. 

By  an  old  statute  (1792)  the  latter  consists  of  all  able  bodied 
men  between  the  ages  of  18  and  45  years,  except  such  as  are 
exempted  by  the  laws  of  the  United  States  or  by  the  laws  of  the 
different  states.  By  the  census  of  1890,  as  shown  in  the  last 
army  register,  our  unorganized  militia  numbers  8,567,258  men 
with  ten  states  to  hear  from.  The  organized  militia  numbers 
110,718  officers  and  men. 

The  militia  is  supposed  to  be  organized  into  companies,  battal- 
ions, regiments,  brigades  and  divisions,  "  as  the  legislatures  of  the 
states  may  direct,"  and  be  subject  to  military  duty  for  a  specified 
time. 

The  constitution  of  the  United  States  gives  congress  power  "  to 
provide  for  calling  forth  the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of  the 
Union,  suppress  insurrections  and  repel  invasions."  Congress 
has  given  this  power  to  the  president  under  certain  emergencies. 

In  times  of  war  our  forces  must  be  made  up  from  the  patriotic 
volunteers  who  come  at  their  country's  call. 

When  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  they 
receive  pay  and  allowances  fi*om  the  general  government,  and  are 
subject  to  the  rules  and  articles  of  war.  In  the  event  of  war  it  is 
probable  that  the  president  would  call  for  a  certain  number  of 
volunteers  for  infantry,  cavalry  and  artillery  from  each  state  in 
accordance  with  its  population.  Congress  would  have  to  give 
him  authority  to  do  this.  The  states  would  arrange  them  into 
regiments  and  appoint  the  regimental  officers.  The  United 
States  would  organize  them  into  brigades,  divisions  and  corps 
and  appoint  the  general  and  staff  officers.  They  would  become 
United  States  troops  and  be  called  "  United  States  Volunteers," 
to  distinguish  them  from  "  regulars  "  or  "  militia,"  We  must  note 
one  peculiarity,  viz  :  That  while  the  regulars  and  volunteers  come 
into  the  service  voluntarily  the  militia  can  be  compelled  to  serve. 


Congress  "  raises,  supports,  governs  and  regulates  the  armies  of 
the  United  States,"  so  that  the  duties  and  rights  of  every  individ- 
ual in  the  army  are  fixed  by  law. 

Our  army  is  organized  into  regiments  for  administrative  pur- 
poses. We  have  at  present  25  regiments  of  infantry  of  10  com- 
panies each,  on  paper,  only  eight  being  manned,  but  all  fully 
officered.  Of  cavalry  there  are  ten  regiments  of  12  troops  each, 
with  only  ten  manned.  The  five  regiments  of  artillery  have  each 
12  companies. 

In  time  of  peace  our  army  is  not  organized  into  brigades  or 
divisions. 

Our  constitution  makes  the  president  commander-in-chief, 
but  he  has  never  exercised  this  power  by  taking  active  command 
of  troops  in  the  field.  His  command  is  exercised  through  the 
secretary  of  war,  who  in  turn  promulgates  orders  through  the 
general  commanding  the  army.  He  is  also  in  direct  communica- 
tion with  the  various  heads  of  the  administrative  departments, 
and  it  is  through  his  supervision,  the  funds  of  the  departments 
are  distributed,  and  united  action  is  secured.  Our  administrative 
departments,  are,  unfortunately  separate  bureaus  of  the  war 
department,  instead  of  connected  links  in  a  general  staff  with  a 
permanent  chief. 

We  have  also  an  assistant  secretary  of  war.  The  secretary  and 
his  assistant  are  appointed  from  civil  life,  and  may  or  may  not 
have  had  any  experience  in  military  affairs.  In  time  of  war  we 
may  have  several  separate  armies,  each  army  will  be  divided  into 
corps. 

"  The  corps  consists  of  three  divisions,  one  or  more  regiments 
of  cavalry  and  the  corps  artillery  which  is  in  addition  to  the 
divisional  artillery"  (I.  D,  R.) 

"The  division  consists  of  three  brigades  of  infantry  and  two  or 
more  batteries  of  artillery."     (I.  D.  R.) 

The  brigade  consists  of  three  regiments  of  infantry.  The 
brigade  should  be  commanded  by  a  brigadier-general,  the  divis- 
ion by  a  major-general  and  the  corps  by  a  lieutenant-general. 


INFANTRY. 

Each  regiment  of  infantry  has  one  colonel,  one  lieutenant 
colonel,  and  one  major.  Two  extra  first  lieutenants  are  added  to 
each  regiment  to  fill  the  positions  of  regimental  quartermaster  and 
regimental  adjutant,  to  be  selected  by  the  colonel.  The  infantry 
company  under  our  present  law  (1894)  is  organized  as  follows  : 

1  captain,  1  first  lieutenant,  1  second  lieutenant,  1  first  sergeant. 
4  sergeants,  4  corporals,  2  musicians,  2  artificers,  1  wagoner, 
46  privates.  Our  infantry  organization  has  been  preserved  since 
the  Revolutionary  war,  10  companies  of  100  men  each  making  a 
full  regiment.  Experience  in  recent  wars  has  amply  demonstrated 
the  great  value  of  the  battalion  of  about  four  companies,  both 
for  practical  purposes  and  for  combat. 

CAVALRY. 

The  sphere  of  action  of  cavalry  is  limited,  and  man  for  man  it 
occupies  much  greater  space  than  infantry.  In  most  of  its  duties, 
such  as  advanced  guard  duty,  reconnaissance,  patrol  and  outposts 
it  is  often  separated  from  the  main  body  of  the  army  and  must 
act  alone.  Its  organization  and  tactics  are  very  properly  different 
from  those  of  the  infantry  and  artillery.  "VYe  still  retain  the  reg- 
iment of  12  companies,  three  squadrons  of  four  troops  or  compa- 
nies each,  three  regiments,  one  brigade  ;  three  brigades,  one 
division  ;  three  divisions,  one  corps.  The  Germans  and  the 
French  have,  as  the  result  of  their  experience  in  war,  adopted  the 
regiment  of  five  squadrons  as  the  administrative  unit.  We  have 
also  the  squadron,  "  which  shall  consist  of  not  more  than  four 
troops  nor  less  than  two."  Our  regiments  would  contain  on  a 
war  footing,  43  officers  and  from  900  to  1,200  men. 

The  troop  (U.  S.)  1  captain,  1  first  lieutenant,  1  second  lieu- 
tenant, 1  first  sergeant,  5  sergeants,  4  corporals,  2  trumpeters, 
2  farriers  and  blacksmiths,  1  saddler,  1  wagoner,  44  privates. 

Our  cavalry  is  not  graded.  The  total  strength  of  a  regiment 
for  the  Germans  is  25  ofiicers,  667  men  and  792  horses,  62  of  the 
list  being  oificer's  horses.     The  line  regiments  are  formed  into 


—9— 

brigades  of  from  two  to  three  regiments  each,  which  are  desig- 
nated by  the  numbers  of  the  infantry  divisions  to  which  they  are 
attached.  The  eight  regiments  of  the  Prussian  guards  form  the 
cavalry  division  of  the  guards  and  are  divided  into  four  brigades. 
"  The  German  cavalry  is  also  classified  into  light,  medium  and 
heavy  cavalry,  depending  upon  the  weight  of  horses  and  men. 
The  hussars,  dragoons  and  the  cheveau-l%ers  of  Bavaria  are  the 
light,  the  uhlans  the  medium,  and  the  cuirassiers  the  heavy  cav- 
alry. Men  of  about  146  lbs.  weight  are  taken  for  the  light  cav- 
alry and  of  about  15*7  lbs.  for  the  heavy  cavalry."     (Exner.) 

The  squadron  of  about  135  men  is  the  tactical  unit.  The 
troop  of  about  70  men  is  the  unit  of  combat.  Cavalry  is  very 
expensive  to  equip  and  maintain  and  takes  much  longer  to  train 
than  infantry  ;  this  latter  reason  induces  the  European  conti- 
nental nations  to  keep  their  cavalry  nearly  up  to  war  strength  in 
time  of  peace,  Germany  has  465  squadrons,  Russia,  counting 
Cossacks,  has  581,  and  France  420. 

No  rule  can  be  given  as  to  the  proper  proportion  of  cavalry  in 
an  army.  It  depends  largely  upon  the  nature  of  the  country  in 
the  theater  of  war.  If  the  country  is  open  and  comparatively 
level  the  strength  of  the  cavalry  may  be  greatly  increased.  If  it 
is  closed  and  rough  or  mountainous  the  quantity  of  cavalry 
should  be  reduced. 

•  ARTILLERY. 

Artillery  is  organized  into  light  artillery  and  heavy  artillery, 
the  fonner  including  the  artillery  that  maneuvers  with  the  troops 
in  the  field,  the  latter  is  used  in  the  attack  and  defense  of  fortified 
places. 

Light  artillery  includes  horse  batteries,  in  which  the  can- 
noneers are  mounted  on  horseback,  and  field  batteries,  in  which 
the  cannoneers  march  by  the  side  of  their  pieces  or  ride  on  the 
ammunition  chests,  axle  seats  and  off  horses  ;  it  also  includes 
mountain  batteries,  in  which  light  pieces  are  either  mounted  on 
small  carriages,  or  on  pack  animals.  We  may  also  have  machine 
batteries,  composed  of  Gatling,  Gardner,  Maxim,  etc.,   machine 


—10— 

guns.  In  our  service  batteries  equipped  with  the  3.2  inch  guns 
are  called  light  field  batteries,  those  equipped  with  the  3.6  inch 
guns  are  known  as  heavy  field  batteries. 

The  light  artillery  of  an  army  corps  consists  of  divisional 
artillery  and  corps  artillery. 

"  The  heavy  artillery  of  an  army  in  the  field  consists  of  those 
batteries  which  serve  the  siege  and  position  guns  and  the  artil- 
lery ammunition  and  supply  trains."     (A.  D.  R.) 

The  divisional  artillery  consists  of  two  or  more  batteries 
attached  to  the  division  forming  an  integral  part  of  it.  It  is 
usually  commanded  by  a  field  officer  who  is  styled  chief  of  divi- 
sional artillery  and  is  a  staff  officer  of  the  division  commander. 

The  corps  artillery  consists  of  two  or  more  battalions  of  four 
batteries  each,  and  is  commanded  by  a  colonel. 

All  of  the  artillery  attached  to  a  corps  constitutes  an  artillery 
brigade.  A  battalion  of  horse  artillery  is  attached  to  each  cav- 
alry division. 

The  chief  of  artillery  of  any  army  or  corps  is  a  brigadier  gen- 
eral and  on  the  staff  of  the  corps  commander.  The  chief  of 
artillery  of  the  corps  or  army  assumes  control  of  the  divisional 
artillery  in  action  also,  when  directed  to  do  so  by  the  corps 
commander. 

The  battalion  is  the  tactical  unit.  We  have  the  battalion 
of  two,  three  or  four  batteries,  and  in  common  with  other 
nations  we  keep  the  regiment  as  the  administrative  unit.  A  bat- 
tery usually  contains  six  guns.  In  time  of  peace  six  guns  and 
four  caissons  are  sufficient  for  purposes  of  instruction  ;  on  a  war 
footing  six  guns  and  nine  caissons.  "In  time  of  peace,  four 
officers,  about  80  men  and  66  horses  will  equip  a  battery.  For 
war  purposes,  5  officers,  175  men  and  144  horses  are  necessary." 
(A.  D.  R) 

Light  battery,  U.  S.  *i  Captain,  2  first  lieutenants,  2  second 
lieutenants,  1  first  sergeant,  6  sergeants,  4  corporals,  2  musicians, 
2  artificers,  1  wagoner,  49  privates. 

Foot  Battery  has  one  second  lieutenant,  2  sergeants  and  three 
privates  less,  than  the  light  battery. 


—11— 

Artillery  is  very  expensive  to  equip  and  maintain  and  also 
requires  more  time  for  training  than  infantry. 

A  great  German  military  writer  said  of  artillery  :  "  It  is  worse 
than  useless  off  the  battlefield  but  invaluable  on  it."  Notwith- 
standing these  objections  and  difficulties,  France  and  Germany 
have  been  steadily  increasing  the  number  and  power  of  their 
field  guns,  until  to-day  Germany  has  about  494  batteries,  while 
France  has  484.  The  proportion  of  artillery  in  an  army  is  not 
fixed,  but  is  between  three  and  four  guns  per  tJiousand  of  the 
other  arms. 

ENGINEER  TROOPS. 

Engineer  troops  are  generally  organized  into  companies,  and 
these  companies  attached  to  the  various  divisions,  corps,  etc. 
They  vary  from  100  to  200  men  per  company. 

We  have  an  engineer  battalion  of  five  companies  with  a  total 
of  500  men. 

Etigineer  Company,  TI.  8.  1  captain,  1  first  lieutenant,  1  sec- 
ond lieutenant,  10  sergeants,  10  corporals,  2  musicians,  55  pri- 
vates Ist  class,  55  privates  2d  class. 

Pioneers,  sappers,  miners,  railway  builders  and  pontoneers  are 
included  in  the  organization  of  engineer  troops. 

These  troops  build  roads,  bridges,  field  and  permanent  fortifi- 
<3ations,  railroads,  etc.  They  should  be  trained  to  fight  as 
infantry,  for  in  case  of  need  they  would  be  used  as  infantry. 
The  Germans  have  a  railway  brigade  of  2  regiments  of  2  battal- 
ions each,  and  one  Bavarian  battalion  of  3  companies.  In  time 
of  war  the  regiment  is  broken  up  into  4  companies  of  operatives, 
8  of  construction  and  2  of  workmen.  During  war  the  railway 
troops  are  charged  with  the  construction  of  new  lines,  repairs  to 
old  ones  and  the  destruction  of  them  when  necessary.  In  time 
of  peace  they  are  thoroughly  trained  in  railway  management  and 
construction,  having  entire  charge  of  a  railway  about  33  miles 
long  from  Berlin  to  Kummersdorf.  All  continental  armies  have 
aeronautic  detachments,  with  apparatus  for  operating  balloons. 
As  soon  as  the  problem  of  aerial  navigation  is  solved,  the  balloon 
corps  will  become  a  very  important  part  of  every  army. 


—12— 

The  German  army  has  also  21  train  battalions  of  three  compa- 
nies each,  whose  duty  it  is  to  furnish  the  men  and  horses  for  the 
transportation  of  the  army  trains.  They  are  divided  into  three 
parts,  one  for  transportation  of  the  ammunition  supply,  one  for 
provisions  and  one  for  baggage  and  clothing.  The  sanitary 
detachments  and  field  hospitals  are  also  drawn  from  the  bat- 
talions. 

Every  army  corps  must  have  its  own  train  to  transport  provi- 
sions, ammunition,  clothing,  forage,  pontoon  equipment,  field 
hospitals  and  officers'  baggage.  Trains  are  cumbersome  and 
expensive  and  are  kept  as  small  and  light  as  possible,  but  the 
train  of  a  single  army  corps  reduced  so  as  to  simply  meet  the 
absolute  need  requires  600  wagons  and  3,800  animals. 

A  field  telegraph  and  signal  train  is  also  a  very  necessary  part 
of  the  organization  of  a  modern  army. 

An  important  part  of  the  organization  of  an  army  is  the  staff 
to  which  all  the  details  of  supply  and  administration  must  be 
entrusted.  "  A  good  staff  is  indispensable  for  the  well  being  of 
an  army.  *  *  It  is  to  the  army  what  an  able  minister  is  to  the 
state."  (Jomini.)  General  officers  must  be  free  to  plan  cam- 
paigns, direct  the  movements  of  the  troops  and  fight  the  battles. 
All  questions  of  supply  must  be  left  to  the  heads  of  the  various 
supply  departments,  on  duty  with  the  army.  If  the  men  need 
food  or  clothing  the  general  directs  his  chief  commissary  or  chief 
quartermaster  to  take  steps  to  procure  it.  If  he  desires  a  corps 
or  a  division  to  move  to  a  certain  location  he  instructs  his  chief 
of  staff  to  give  the  necessary  orders  and  the  detailed  instructions. 
They  must  also  keep  the  records  and  obtain  all  possible  informa- 
tion that  may  be  of  use  to  the  commander-in-chief.  This  sub- 
ject will  be  more  fully  treated  under  the  head  of  administration. 

MOBILIZATION. 

Mobilization  means  changing  from  a  peace  to  a  war  organiza- 
tion. The  reserves  must  be  called  in  to  fill  up  the  regiments  of 
the  standing  army  ;  new  divisions  must  be  made  up  from  the 
men  already  assigned  to  them  on  the  records  of  the   district ; 


—  13— 

horses  must  be  requisitioned  for  cavalry  and  for  the  train  service. 
In  Germany  they  know  where  to  find  them  at  once.  It  is  a  try- 
ing time.  Thousands  of  men  must  leave  their  peaceful  occupa- 
tions at  once  and  join  the  colors  to  fight  their  country's  battles. 
You  will  find  the  study  of  the  history  of  the  mobilization  of  the 
German  army  in  1870  very  interesting.  In  the  incredibly  short 
time  of  14  days  after  the  declaration  of  war  the  German  army 
was  fully  mobilized  and  at  the  gates  of  the  French  frontier.  It 
was  a  remarkable  and  successful  test  of  the  thoroughness  of  the 
work  of  the  great  general  staff  in  time  of  peace.  Every  detail 
was  thoroughly  understood  and  provided  for.  The  capacity  of 
every  car  to  transport  men  or  horses  or  artillery  was  known  and 
was  marked  on  it.  Each  wagon  and  cart  was  similarly  marked. 
The  capacity  of  every  department  to  furnish  provisions,  forage, 
horses  and  men  was  accurately  known.  When  war  came  they 
had  simply  to  turn  the  key  and  the  great  machine  started.  It 
ran  smoothly,  and  in  a  few  days  three  vast  armies  were  en  route 
to  the  French  frontier. 

The  mobilization  of  an  army  consists  of  two  essential  things : 
extensive  and  careful  preparation  in  times  of  peace,  and  the 
execution  of  the  scheme  on  the  declaration  of  war. 

Prompt  mobilization  insures  great  advantages  in  the  early  part 
of  the  campaign,  for  the  army  ready  first,  can  assume  the  offensive, 
and  by  gaining  the  first  victory  gain  greatly  in  morale.  It  also 
has  choice  of  the  theater  of  operations.  The  French  intended  to 
invade  Germany  in  1870,  but  their  attempt  to  mobilize  rapidly 
developed  many  lamentable  weaknesses.  After  the  Germans  had 
concentrated  their  large  armies  along  the  Rhine  it  was  too  late  to 
talk  of  invading  Germany,  and  the  French  army  was  forced  into 
a  defensive  campaign.  To  insure  rapid  mobilization,  the  corps  to 
be  mobilized  should  have  all  of  the  men  and  horses  and  material 
they  need  in  their  own  districts,  so  it  will  be  available  at  once. 
In  Germany,  each  ai'my  corps  has  its  particular  district  in  which 
it  is  stationed  and  from  which  it  draws  its  reserves  of  men  and 
horses.  The  reserves  are  called  in  by  written  summonses  from 
the  district  commanders.  They  are  kept  always  ready  and  every 
man  liable  to  service  is  pledged  to   obey  without  delay.     The 


— u— 

order  to  mobilize  comes  from  the  Emperor,  and  is  made  known  at 
once  to  all  military  and  civil  authorities,  as  well  as  to  the  people. 

The  concentration  follows  the  mobilization.  The  zone  of  con- 
centration will  depend  upon  the  configuration  of  the  frontier  and 
the  projects  of  the  enemy.  If  the  enemy  is  preparing  to  invade 
any  portion  of  our  territory,  the  concentration  must  be  made  so 
as  to  protect  it. 

Concentration  comprises  two  acts.  1st,  The  transportation  of 
the  troops.  2nd,  The  strategical  deployment.  The  transporta- 
tion will  necessitate  the  use  of  the  full  powers  of  the  railroad 
lines.  As  the  troops  must  be  fed  during  the  pei'iods  of  transpor- 
tation and  concentration,  depots  must  be  established  in  the  zone 
of  concentration,  before  the  movement  of  the  troops  begins,  or  in 
other  words,  in  time  of  peace.  The  situations  of  these  depots 
can  only  be  determined  by  a  careful  study  of  the  strategical 
features  of  the  frontiers  in  connection  with  all  possible  move- 
ments of  the  enemy.  The  Germans  have  kept  these  points  in 
view  in  constructing  railroad  lines  along  both  their  French  and 
Russian  frontiers.  During  peace,  tables  of  march  are  prepared 
to  cover  all  different  hypotheses  of  concentration,  so  that  when 
war  comes,  all  that  is  necessary  is  to  give  the  order,  and  every- 
thing moves  on  lines  already  prepared.  As  Von  Moltke  said, 
when  war  came,  it  brought  him  rest,  for  his  work  was  done  in 
time  of  peace,  and  it  only  remained  for  others  to  execute  the 
work  laid  out  for  them  by  the  great  general  staff. 


CHAPTEE    11. 


DISCIPLINE. 

Discipline  is  the  bone  and  sinew  of  an  army  and  the  basis  of 
its  strength.  It  has  won  more  victories  than  all  other  features 
combined,  and  when  victory  is  not  possible  it  prevents  rout  and 
destruction. 

A  soldier  is  well  disciplined  when  he  cheerfully  and  willingly 
obeys  every  proper  order  of  his  superior,  even  to  the  sacrifice  of 
his  life.  The  obedience  should  also  be  coupled  with  a  desire  to  do 
all  in  his  power  to  further  the  wishes  of  his  superior,  and  thus 
carry  out  the  spirit  of  the  order  as  well  as  the  letter.  Good  dis- 
cipline does  not  admit  any  discussion  as  to  the  propriety  of  the 
order.  No  officer  or  soldier  is  expected  to  obey  a  manifestly 
illegal  order.  He  must,  of  course,  be  absolutely  certain  of  the 
illegality  of  any  order  he  refuses  to  execute.  It  places  the  sol- 
dier between  Scylla  and  Charybdis,  for  if  he  obeys  an  illegal  order 
he  is  liable  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  civil  authorities;  if  he 
refuses  to  obey  a  legal  order  the  military  authority  will  un- 
doubtedly punish  him.  If  there  is  any  ground  for  doubt  it  is 
safest  for  him  to  obey  the  order  and  obtain  redress  afterwards. 
An  officer  fit  to  hold  a  commission  will  never  place  an  inferior  in 
siich  a  position.  Gen.  Blondel  says:  "All  the  virtues  of  the 
soldier  are  combined  in  two — disci^yline  and  coxtrageP 

Discipline  is  a  condition  of  heart  and  is  the  result  of  proper 
instruction.  A  well  disciplined  soldier  shows  it  in  every  position 
in  which  he  is  placed  and  it  does  not  require  the  immediate  pres- 
ence of  his  officer  to  make  him  perform  his  duty  faithfully.  It 
is  the  crowning  virtue  of  the  soldier,  and  no  soldier  can  ever 
become  truly  great  without  it. 

Small  minded  men  often  think  that  obedience  is  sort  of  an 
admission  of  inferiority,  and  that  insubordination  is  a  sign  of 
independence  and  strength  of  character. 


—  16— 

To  such  men  a  soldier's  career  would  bring  no  honors.  I  might 
remark  also  that  this  is  one  of  the  attributes  of  youth,  but  I  hope 
none  of  you  young  gentlemen  have  any  such  ideas.  Respect  for 
proper  authority  is  inherent  in  a  well-ordered  mind,  and  every 
man  who  lives  to  middle  age  condemns  the  follies  of  his  youth. 

INSTRUCTION. 

The  seat  of  instruction  in  discipline  is  the  company  and  the 
company  commander  is  responsible  for  the  discipline  of  his  men. 
Good  discipline  is  only  obtained  by  thorough,  constant  work;  its 
base  is  the  respect  of  the  junior  for  his  superior,  and  it  is  evi- 
dently the  duty  of  the  senior  to  so  conduct  himself  as  to  compel 
this  respect  personally,  aside  from  his  official  capacity.  He  must 
be  just  in  all  his  dealings  with  his  inferiors;  he  must  be  fully 
acquainted  with  his  duties  and  must  take  a  kindly  interest  in  the 
welfare  of  those  under  him.  One  of  the  greatest  destroyers  of 
discipline  is  familiarity.  There  is  necessarily  a  strong  line  of  de- 
markation  between  the  soldier  and  his  officer.  The  needs  of  dis- 
cipline make  it  absolutely  necessary.  It  is  essential  that  an  officer 
should  at  all  times  maintain  the  dignities  and  privileges  of  his  rank. 

About  all  that  a  good  soldier  cares  to  know  about  his  com- 
mander is,  that  he  is  brave,  just,  efficient  and  honorable. 

There  are  four  ways  of  instilling  discipline  into  armies. 

1st.  By  arousing  a  feeling  of  patriotism  and  devotion  to  the 
cause. 

This  is  undoubtedly  the  most  desirable  kind  of  discipline.  The 
volunteer  who  hastens  to  the  defense  of  his  country  from  a  sense 
of  duty  or  a  feeling  of  patriotism  has  already  acquired  discipline 
in  his  heart,  and  needs  but  to  be  told  his  duty  to  perform  it. 

2nd.  By  instruction. 

Careful  drill  and  guard  duty  are  the  principal  means  of  creat- 
ing and  maintaining  discipline.  At  drill,  men  become  accustomed 
to  obeying  the  orders  of  their  officers,  without  hesitation,  and 
obedience  becomes  a  habit. 

The  success  in  this  method  depends  largely  upon  the  character 
of  the  instructing  officer.     He  must  be  firm,  just,  and  patient. 


—17— 

3rd.  By  rewards. 

The  rewards  usually  offered  good  soldiers  are  promotion  in 
grade,  increased  pay  for  long  and  faithful  service,  transfer  to 
staff  corps,  or  assignment  to  special  duty  carrying  increased  pay. 
There  are  also  many  ways  by  which  an  officer  can  signify  his  ap- 
proval of  a  painstaking  and  well  disciplined  man,  A  good  soldier 
does  not  expect  to  be  rewarded  for  doing  his  duty.  His  daily 
reward  is  in  the  inner  satisfaction  he  feels  when  he  has  done  his 
best.  Marked  rewards  should  only  be  given  for  especially  gal- 
lant and  meritorious  service. 

Jfth.  By  punishment. 

This  is  the  most  undesirable  method  of  maintaining  discipline, 
but  it  must  be  resorted  to  when  other  methods  have  failed. 
Punishments  should  not  be  cruel  or  unjust.  They  promote  dis- 
cipline only  when  they  are  restraining  and  corrective  and  not 
revengeful.  They  should  be  promptly  given,  and  should  leave 
no  doubt  in  the  soldier's  mind  as  to  whether  the  pleasure  he 
experienced  in  his  breach  of  discipline  was  equal  to  and  compen- 
sated for  the  pain  and  mortification  experienced  in  his  punish- 
ment. No  military  duty  should  be  degraded  by  using  it  as  a 
punishment. 

A  wise  officer  studies  the  natures  of  his  men  as  a  father  studies 
children.  No  two  are  exactly  alike,  and  each  one  may  be  ap- 
pealed to  in  the  way  most  likely  to  draw  out  his  good  points  and 
suppress  the  bad  ones.  "  In  all  periods  of  war,  the  moral  forces 
which  affect  armies  have  been  great  determining  factors  of  vic- 
tory and  defeat.  Discipline  will  establish  morale  when  genius  is 
lacking,  but  discipline  aided  by  Napoleon's  magnetism  creates  an 
enthusiastic  morale  which  is  irresistible." 

ADMINISTRATION. 

"  We  cannot  consider  the  soldier  as  a  simple,  active  agent  des- 
tined to  accomplish  a  specified  work,  we  must  also  consider  him  as 
a  human  being  endowed  with  a  great  many  wants." — (Rustow.) 
"  In  addition  to  his  personal  wants,  there  are  many  natural  things 
required  in  wars,  such  as  arms,  ammunition,  wagons,  etc.  The 
2 


-18-  ^ 

duty  of  providing  these  is  left  to  especially  trained  bodies  of  men, 
who  form  the  administrative  departments  of  an  army. 

QUARTERMASTER'S  DEPARTMENT. 

The  soldier  must  have  clothing,  also  shelter  from  the  inclement 
weather  ;  he  must  also  have  transportation  for  his  baggage,  extra 
ammunition,  etc.;  hence  we  have  one  branch  of  the  supply  de- 
partment called  the  quartermaster's  department,  whose  business 
it  is  to  look  after  these  wants.  It  furnishes  all  the  clothing, 
horses,  wagons,  tools,  transportation  generally,  builds  all  of  our 
posts  and  keeps  them  in  repair,  purchases  forage  and  fuel  and 
countless  smaller  things.  At  its  head  is  a  brigadier  general, 
called  the  quartermaster  general,  appointed  by  the  president 
from  the  officers  in  the  quartermaster's  department.  He  holds 
office  until  he  is  retired  for  age,  at  64.  He  has  four  assistants, 
nine  quartermaster  generals  with  the  rank  of  colonel,  eight 
deputy  quartermaster  generals  with  the  rank  of  lieutenant  colonel, 
14  quartermasters  with  the  rank  of  major,  and  30  assistant  quar- 
termasters with  the  rank  of  captain.  In  addition  to  these  there 
is  a  regimental  quartermaster  for  each  regiment  in  the  army  and 
a  post  quartermaster  for  each  post,  making  about  100  more. 
Each  military  division  has  its  assistant  quartermaster  general, 
and  each  department  its  chief  quartermaster.  All  are  bound  by 
the  army  regulations  and  orders  from  the  war  department. 

Every  article  belonging  to  the  government  must  be  accurately 
accounted  for,  no  matter  how  trifling  its  value  may  be.  There  is 
but  one  way  to  learn  quartermaster's  papers  and  business,  and 
that  is  to  serve  an  apprenticeship  at  them. 

SUBSISTENCE    DEPARTMENT. 

The  soldier  must  be  fed,  for  you  cannot  get  any  more  work 
out  of  him  than  you  put  into  him.  He  must  be  fed  intelligently, 
that  is,  his  rations  must  have  the  proper  dietetic  proportions  of 
nitrogen  and  carbon.  With  him,  food  must  accomplish  three 
things.     1.  It  must  keep  up  the  animal  heat.     2.  It  must  main- 


—19— 

tain  the  body  in  a  good  state  of  repair.  3.  It  must  provide  for 
the  muscular,  nervous  and  mental  work.  The  feeding  of  the 
soldier,  then,  in  field  and  in  gai'rison  is  quite  a  science,  and  a 
very  important  one,  as  the  food  for  an  army  costs  an  enormous 
amount  of  money,  and  great  labor  in  hauling,  issuing,  cooking, 
etc.  Every  army  has  its  administrative  department,  devoted  to 
this  phase  of  the  soldier's  wants.  Ours  is  called  the  subsistence 
department.  Its  head  is  a  brigadier  general,  called  the  commis- 
sary general  of  subsistence.  He  has  25  subordinates  of  various 
grades  down  to  captain,  who  are  as  a  rule  appointed  from  lieuten- 
ants of  the  line.  Each  division  and  department  has  its  chief  com- 
missary, who  is  a  member  of  the  staif  of  the  commanding  general 
of  the  department  or  division.  Each  post  has  its  acting  commis- 
sary of  subsistence,  usually  a  lieutenant,  and  a  commissary  ser- 
geant, who  manage  the  subsistence  affairs  at  the  post,  under  the 
direction  of  the  commanding  officer.  It  is  the  business  of  the 
subsistence  department  to  purchase,  inspect  and  issue  all  food 
supplies  for  the  army.  They  also  provide  the  soldier  with  to- 
bacco, toilet  soaps,  blacking,  metal  polish,  towels,  brushes  and 
dozens  of  little  articles  which  are  sold  to  him  at  cost  price,  with 
just  sufiicient  added  to  cover  losses  by  breakage,  etc.  I  wish  to 
say  here  that  our  soldiers  are  better  fed — very  much  better — than 
any  others  in  the  world. 

MEDICAL  DEPARTMENT. 

The  soldier  will  get  sick  and  footsore,  and  he  is  also  quite  likely 
to  get  wounded  in  action;  so  we  must  provide  a  medical  corps  to 
look  after  his  aches  and  to  fit  him  up  again  after  he  has  been  dis- 
abled, for  we  may  want  him  to  fight  another  day,  to  say  nothing 
of  feelings  of  humanity.  The  medical  corps  must  have  good 
physicians  and  surgeons.  Also  a  hospital  corps  to  provide  nurses 
and  attendants  and  stretcher  bearers.  It  must  also  have  a  field 
hospital  service,  with  train,  ambulances  and  transpoi'ts  for  medi- 
cine for  the  sick,  etc. 

Our  medical  department  has  a  surgeon  general,  with  the  rank 
of  brigadier  general,  with  nearly  200  assistants  of  various  ranks. 


—20— 

from  colonel  to  lieutenant.  It  has,  in  addition,  126  hospital 
stewards,  62  acting  hospital  stewards  and  605  privates  in  the 
hospital  corps  who  are  instructed  in  hygiene,  bearers'  drill  and 
first  aid  to  the  wounded.  The  medical  corps  buys  all  medicines 
and  hospital  supplies,  keeps  the  records  of  all  sick  and  wounded 
which,  in  view  of  the  enormous  pension  business  likely  to  follow 
our  wars,  is  very  important  and  very  necessary  work.  They  re- 
port upon  the  hygienic  condition  of  the  post  and  camp,  and  pur- 
chase and  issue  disinfectants,  recommend  quarantine,  excuse  men 
from  duty,  etc. 

PAY. 

No  government  seeks  to  entice  men  into  the  military  service  by 
offering  large  pay.  A  true  soldier  does  not  adopt  his  profession 
because  of  financial  inducements,  nor  in  the  hope  of  securing  a 
competency  for  life.  He  is  actuated  by  higher  motives.  A  medal 
of  honor  is  more  valuable  to  him  than  gold. 

The  soldier  is'  human  and  has  many  wants  and  needs  not  sup- 
plied by  issues  of  clothing  and  rations.  To  meet  these  wants, 
our  government  gives  him  fair  pay.  He  gets  $13  a  month  for 
the  first  two  years,  $14  the  third,  $15  the  fourth,  and  $16  the 
-fifth.  If  he  re-enlists  he  gets  $18  a  month,  and  $1  per  month 
more  for  each  subsequent  re-enlistment.  A  corporal  gets  $15, 
$15,  $16,  $17  and  $18  first  enlistment  and  $20  second  enlistment. 
A  sergeant  gets  $17,  $17,  $18,  $19  and  $20  first  enlistment,  and 
$22  second  enlistment.  In  the  engineer,  ordnance  and  signal 
corps  the  pay  is  higher.  If  he  is  a  mechanic,  he  may  have  an 
opportunity  to  get  50  cents  a  day  extra  pay  for  every  day's  work 
of  eight  hours,  and  the  government  will,  if  he  desires,  take  his 
money  on  deposit  and  pay  him  interest  on  it  until  his  time  ex- 
pires. If  he  does  not  draw  all  of  his  clothing,  he  gets  the  balance 
in  money,  and  many  careful  men  leave  the  service  at  the  end  of 
five  years  with  very  nice  little  bank  accounts  to  start  civil  life 
with.  The  military  idea  underlying  this  is  to  relieve  the  soldier's 
mind  from  all  anxiety  as  to  his  material  wants,  so  he  can  devote 
his  entire  time  and  energies  to  the  service.     To  further  this  idea. 


—21— 

if  he  serves  faithfully  for  30  years  he  is  put  on  the  retired  list. 
If  he  is  disabled  in  the  line  of  duty  he  is  pensioned. 

We  have  a  pay  corps  of  35  commissioned  officers,  one  brigadier 
general,  two  colonels,  three  lieutenant  colonels  and  29  majors, 
whose  duty  it  is  to  pay  the  officers  and  soldiers  once  a  month. 

ORDNANCE   DEPARTMENT. 

The  most  important  administrative  department  in  an  army  is 
the  one  that  controls  the  manufacturing  of  its  arms  and  equip- 
ments. An  army  may  have  the  best  possible  organization  and 
discipline,  but  give  it  poor  weapons  and  faulty  ammunition  and 
it  is  half  beaten  before  a  shot  is  fired.  The  officers  of  this  de- 
partment should  have  a  thorough  scientific  education.  It  reaches 
into  every  branch  of  physics — mechanics,  chemistry,  metallurgy, 
heat,  light,  sound  and  electricity  are  constantly  used  in  devising, 
manufacturing  and  testing  weapons  and  material  of  war.  As 
they  are  to  be  used  by  men  and  transported  by  horses  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  powers  of  man  and  horse  is  also  necessary. 

We  must  have  a  corps  of  trained  men  to  superintend  and  direct 
this  very  important  work.  We  find  them  in  our  ordnance  de- 
partment, which  consists  of  one  chief  of  ordnance,  with  the  rank 
of  brigadier  general,  three  colonels,  four  lieutenant  colonels,  10 
majors,  24  captains  and  12  first  lieutenants  —54  in  all.  They  do 
duty  at  the  steel  works,  inspecting  the  f  orgings  and  testing  them  ; 
at  the  gun  factory,  superintending  the  assembling,  boring,  turn- 
ing and  gauging  of  the  gun  ;  at  the  powder  works,  watching  the 
interests  of  the  government ;  at  thp  proving  grounds,  firing  and 
testing  completed  work,  determining  ranges,  initial  velocities, 
pressures  and  penetrations,  and  at  the  arsenals,  manufacturing 
ammunition  and  ammunition  belts,  small  arms,  saddles,  harness, 
caissons,  tools,  meat  ration  cans,  bayonets,  scabbards,  canteens 
and  dozens  of  other  things  necessary  for  the  full  equipment  of 
the  soldier.  It  is  absolutely  necessary  that  all  material  and  work- 
manship should  be  of  the  very  best. 


—22— 

JUDGE  ADVOCATE  GENERAL'S  DEPARTMENT. 

Infractions  of  the  articles  and  rules  of  war  frequently  occur 
even  in  the  best  disciplined  armies,  and  laws  and  regulations  must 
be  adopted  to  meet  such  emergencies.  A  system  of  military 
courts  is  therefore  necessary  in  the  administration  of  the  affairs 
of  any  army.  It  is  also  frequently  necessary  to  suspend  the 
operations  of  the  civil  law  in  a  hostile  country  and  to  declare 
martial  law.  Legal  questions  are  constantly  arising  between  the 
civil  and  military  authorities,  and  we  must  have  men  skilled  in 
both  civil  and  military  law  to  determine  the  right.  Our  govern- 
ment has  organized  the  judge  advocate  general's  department  to 
conduct  the  law  business  of  the  army.  It  has  eight  officers,  one 
brigadier  general,  one  colonel,  three  lieutenant  colonels  and  three 
majors.  It  is  their  duty  to  act  as  judge  advocate  of  courts  mar- 
tial in  important  cases,  to  examine  the  records  of  cases  forwarded 
to  the  headquarters  of  the  department,  to  see  if  all  legal  require- 
ments have  been  complied  with  in  the  trial  and  record,  and  to 
give  the  commanding  general  of  the  department  or  army  such 
assistance  as  he  may  require  from  time  to  time. 

Officers  can  be  tried  only  by  general  courts,  composed  of  offi- 
cers senior  to  them  in  rank,  if  from  the  same  arm  of  the  service. 

In  our  country,  all  officers  and  soldiers,  whether  on  the  active 
or  retired  lists,  Indian  scouts  and  cadets  at  the  military  academy 
are  subject  to  the  rules  and  articles  of  war,  and  to  trial  hy  court 
martial.  For  most  offenses  limiting  punishments  have  recently 
been  prescribed  by  the  president  of  the  United  States,  and  the 
power  of  courts  martial  in  this  respect  vary  from  dismissal  and 
confinement  in  penitentiary  to  a  reprimand.  Military  courts  can- 
not inflict  the  death  penalty  in  times  of  peace.  Courts  mar- 
tial are  maintained  as  aids  to  discipline  and  the  punishments 
given  should  be  corrective  in  nature.  All  unusual,  cruel  punish- 
ments are  forbidden  by  army  regulations.  The  most  usual  pun- 
ishment for  soldiers  is  confinement  in  the  post  guard  house  at 
hard  labor  for  various  periods,  with  or  without  stoppage  of  por- 
tions of  pay;  for  officers,  suspension  from  rank  and  command  for 
various  periods,  with  forfeiture  of  part  or  all  of  their  pay. 


—23— 

There  is  no  appeal  from  the  judgment  of  a  military  court,  but 
the  reviewing  authority  may  disapprove  or  mitigate  the  sentence 
imposed  by  the  court. 

CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS. 

In  the  military  policy  of  every  country  the  question  of  fortifi- 
cation occupies  a  prominent  position.  Great  cities,  especially  on 
the  seaboard,  and  important  strategic  points  must  be  strengthened 
by  permanent  fortifications,  supplied  with  the  best  modern  artil- 
lery. The  great  destructive  power  of  modern  weapons  has  also 
increased  the  importance  of  field  fortifications  and  they  will  be 
very  extensively  used  in  future  wars.  Their  construction  is 
based  on  scientific  principles,  and  in  every  army  there  must  be 
officers  especially  educated  for  this  work  ;  all  officers  are  supposed 
to  have  an  elementary  knowledge  of  field  fortifications,  but  it  is 
rare  that  an  dfficer  has  either  time  or  opportunities  lor  perfecting 
himself  in  all  of  the  details  of  every  branch  of  the  service.  The 
construction  of  fortifications  is  therefore  entrusted  to  the  en- 
gineer corps,  who  are  especially  fitted  for  the  work  by  practical 
and  theoretical  training  in  time  of  peace.  Our  engineer  corps 
consists  of  one  chief  of  engineers  with  the  rank  of  brigadier  gen- 
eral, and  116  other  officers  of  all  gi'ades  down  to  second  lieuten- 
ant. In  time  of  peace,  they  are  fortunate  in  having  in  charge 
the  civil  engineering  work  of  the  government.  In  time  of  war 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  engineers  to  repair  roads,  build  bridges,  lay 
pontoon  bridges,  construct  field  and  permanent  fortifications, 
make  reconnoisances  and  maps,  and  conduct  the  siege  of  fortified 
places.  Each  commanding  general  of  an  army  or  a  separate  army 
<5orps  has  an  engineer  officer  attached  to  his  staff  and  known  as 
his  chief  engineer,  who  is  placed  in  charge  of  such  work  as  is 
mentioned  above. 

SIGNAL  CORPS. 

Military  signaling  has  become  very  important  in  time  of  war. 
Information  must  be  transmitted  long  distances  in  short  time. 
This  is  effected  by  using  the  field  telegraph -telephone  train,  by 


—24— 

signaling  from  point  to  point  with  flags  or  the  heliograph,  and  at 
night  with  torches  or  lanterns.  It  is  also  probable  that  balloons, 
both  captive  and  free,  will  be  used  in  making  observations  of  the 
enemy's  movements,  and  a  well  equipped  balloon  train  is  deemed 
a  necessary  part  of  the  equipment  of  an  army. 

ADJUTANT  GENERAL  AND  AIDES. 

All  the  parts  of  the  great  machine  having  been  assembled  and 
oiled  and  fuel  supplied  to  furnish  the  energy  to  run  it,  it  needs  but 
the  controlling  hand  of  the  master  to  direct  it  at  will  and  make 
it  subservient  to  his  wishes.  An  army  is  such  a  machine.  Its 
usefulness  depends  upon  the  skill  with  which  its  movements  are 
directed  and  the  ease  and  certainty  with  which  its  commander 
can  make  his  presence  felt  and  have  his  orders  obeyed.  There 
must  be  in  every  well  organized  army  a  body  of  highly  trained 
officers  whose  duty  it  is  to  prepare  and  transmit  the  orders  of  the 
chief,  not  merely  as  clerks,  but  with  a  full  and  accurate  knowl- 
edge of  the  intentions  of  the  chief  and  an  understanding  of  the 
plan  of  campaign  in  all  of  its  details.  Their  knowledge  should 
extend  into  every  domain  of  military  science.  They  must  be 
thoroughly  familiar  with  the  organization  and  administration  of 
the  army,  with  logistics  and  tactics  of  all  three  arms  and  with  the 
principles  of  the  art  of  war.  They  are  often  called  upon  to  issue 
orders  in  the  name  of  the  chief  without  opportunity  for  previous 
consultation  with  him.  You  can  readily  understand  what  pro- 
fessional skill  and  training  would  be  necessary  to  properly  fit  an 
oflicer  for  such  duty.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  adjutant  general  of 
an  army  to  keep  its  records,  make  the  details  for  outpost  duty, 
advanced  guards,  rear  guards,  escorts,  convoys,  to  issue  and  trans- 
mit orders,  to  regulate  the  order  of  march  of  the  various  bodies 
and  their  arrangement  in  column,  designate  the  hours  for  start- 
ing, the  order  of  encampment  and  to  relieve  his  commander  of  all 
details.  He  must  also  be  able  to  give  his  chief  prompt  and  accu- 
rate information  on  all  that  pertains  to  the  army,  its  members, 
condition,  positions  of  the  various  units,  etc.  The  thoroughness 
of  the  work  of  the  great  general  staff  of  the  German  army  in  the 


war  of  18 70- VI  has  won  the  admiration  of  every  military  man. 
It  was  created  by  Von  Moltke,  and  is  an  everlasting  monument 
to  his  military  genius.  In  the  field  it  attends  to  all  matters  con- 
cerning the  movement,  quartering  and  engagement  of  troops,  and 
drawing  up  orders.  In  peace  it  is  kept  at  work  at  the  great  gen- 
eral staff  building  in  Berlin,  compiling  information,  studying  mili- 
tary history,  foreign  armies  and  railway  work.  Part  of  the  gen- 
eral staff  officers  are  also  detailed  to  the  army  corps  and  divisions, 
others  are  engaged  in  surveying  and  mapping  the  empire.  An 
appointment  to  this  staff  is  not  permanent,  and  after  a  few  years' 
service  officers  are  returned  to  their  corps.  The  details  are  made 
by  selection  and  rigid  examinations.  Officers  especially  recom- 
mended for  ability  and  zeal  are  admitted  to  the  academy  in  Ber- 
lin after  passing  an  examination.  After  they  have  finished  a 
three  years'  course  of  instruction  in  military  science  they  are 
qualified  for  duty  on  the  general  staff  or  as  aide-de-camp.  You 
will  at  once  perceive  that  this  system  carried  out  with  the  thor- 
oughness characteristic  of  the  Germans  in  military  affairs,  gives 
them  an  administrative  ability  not  obtained  in  any  other  army  of 
the  world.  In  the  adjutant  general's  department  we  have  17 
officers — one  adjutant  general,  with  the  rank  of  brigadier  general; 
four  assistant  adjutant  generals,  with  the  rank  of  colonel;  six 
with  the  rank  of  lieutenant  colonel  and  six  with  the  rank  of 
major.  Each  major  general  is  allowed  three  aides-de-camp,  and 
each  brigadier  general  (except  the  bureau  chiefs)  is  allowed  two, 
selected  from  the  captains  and  lieutenants.  In  time  of  war  the 
number  would  be  largely  increased.  A  general's  aides  form  his 
personal  and  confidential  staff  and  perform  all  duties  he  may  see 
fit  to  assign  to  them.  In  times  of  peace  these  duties  are  not  very 
burdensome,  but  in  war  they  become  very  important  and  de- 
mand great  energy,  good  judgment  and  bravery  in  their  execu- 
tion. 

INSPECTOR  GENERAL'S   DEPARTMENT. 

We  have  now  come  to  the  last,  but  by  no  means  the  least  im- 
portant depai'tment  of  military  administration,  viz.,  the  inspector 


—26— 

general's  department.  Its  duties  are  indicated  by  its  name,  and 
are  similar  to  those  of  inspectors  in  any  other  profession.  It  is 
through  his  inspector  a  chief  expects  to  learn  of  the  condition  of 
his  troops  ;  their  discipline,  clothing,  arms  and  equipments,  food, 
drill,  efficiency  of  officers,  how  the  records  are  kept  and  how  the 
funds  have  been  expended  ;  and  in  general,  how  carefully  the 
laws  and  regulations  are  administered  in  all  branches  and  depart- 
ments of  the  military  service.  It  is  evident  that  an  officer  of  this 
department  must  have  great  professional  knowledge  to  properly 
perform  his  duties.  He  must  be  thoroughly  familiar  with  the 
regulations  for  the  army,  the  drill  of  the  different  arms,  the  sys- 
tems of  accounts  in  all  of  the  administrative  departments,  the 
construction,  use  and  care  of  all  arms  and  equipments,  the  quality 
and  quantity  of  food,  and  all  the  details  of  the  interior  economy 
and  administration  of  regiments  and  companies  ;  he  must  also 
have  a  good  knowledge  of  horses,  for  he  must  inspect  cavalry, 
artillery  and  transportation  and  be  able  to  determine  the  defects 
in  animals  and  material.  They  are  alpo  frequently  required  to 
make  special  inspections  and  investigations  on  matters  of  conduct 
and  discipline  for  the  infoi'mation  and  guidance  of  their  chiefs. 
Their  reports  are  confidential,  and  are  likely  to  have  great  weight 
with  the  commander  to  whom  they  are  submitted  ;  it  is  therefore 
important  that  an  inspector  should  be  a  man  of  good  judgment, 
quick  perception,  strict  impartiality  and  undoubted  integrity, 
qualifications  rarely  found  in  one  man. 

As  the  sole  object  of  maintaining  armies  in  time  of  peace  is  to 
be  prepared  for  war,  the  principal  duties  of  the  inspectors  should 
be  to  determine  how  thoroughly  and  correctly  this  preparation 
for  war  is  being  made. 

■  RESUME. 

The  administration  of  the  affairs  of  an  army  covers  : 

1.  The  preparation  of  all  material  for  equipping  the  army  and 
putting  it  in  motion,  which  includes  arms,  ammunition,  clothing 
and  transportation. 

2.  The  subsistence  of  the  army  in  quarters  and  in  the  field. 


—27— 

3.  The  drawing  up  and  delivering  of  all  orders  for  the  numer- 
ous enterprises  an  army  may  undertake,  and  the  precautions  for 
the  proper  execution  of  them  ;  regulating  the  service  of  security 
by  giving  proper  strength  and  composition  to  the  advanced 
guards,  rear  guards  and  outposts,  arranging  the  marches  of  the 
various  units  in  accordance  with  the  desires  of  the  commanding 
general  and  superintending  the  movements  of  the  trains  of  bag- 
gage, provisions,  ammunition,  hospitals,  pontoons,  etc. 

4.  The  establishment  of  camps  and  the  adoption  of  regulations 
for  their  police  and  safety.  In  continental  armies  the  billeting 
of  troops  on  the  inhabitants  belongs  to  an  administrative  depart- 
ment. 

5.  The  payment  of  the  troops. 

6.  All  medical  care  and  attendance  and  the  management  of 
hospitals. 

7.  The  construction  of  fortifications,  field  and  permanent ;  the 
making  of  maps  and  reconnoissance,  the  building  of  bridges,  rail- 
roads and  superintending  the  employment  of  the  men  in  the 
trenches  and  in  siege  operations  generally. 

8.  The  punishment  of  officers  and  men  for  infractions  of  dis- 
cipline, the  declaration  of  martial  law  and  the  administration  of 
the  affairs  of  the  disti'ict  under  this  law. 

9.  The  inspection  of  all  troops,  animals  and  material  of  war  to 
determine  their  fitness  for  duty. 

A  great  battle  may  be  fought  in  a  few  hours.  It  may  decide 
the  fate  of  a  nation.  It  should  be  the  desire  of  the  commander 
to  bring  his  troops  to  the  field  in  the  very  best  of  physical  con- 
dition, and  to  have  the  best  arms  and  equipments  obtainable, 
with  plenty  of  ammunition.  He  must  trust  largely  to  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  administrative  departments.  Battles  occur  only  at 
wide  intervals  of  time,  but  the  administrative  officers  do  not  often 
get  opportunities  to  lead  troops  or  do  daring  deeds  on  the  field. 
Their  duties  are  none  the  less  important  because  less  hazardous 
than  those  imposed  on  their  brother  officers  in  the  line. 


CHAPTER  III. 


LOGISTICS. 

Logistics  in  its  broadest  interpretation,  embraces  all  of  the 
operations  of  moving  and  supplying  armies,  such  as  marches 
camps,  transportation  of  troops  and  supplies,  orders,  in  fact  most 
of  the  field  duties  of  the  administrative  departments.  "It  has 
an  influence  on  strategy  and  even  encroaches  on  the  domain  of 
tactics." 

Under  the  head  of  logistics  I  shall  only  include  transportation, 
supply,  and  camps,  with  a  separate  chapter  on  marches,  referring 
you  to  the  works  of  Jomini,  Hamley  and  Clausewitz  for  a  careful 
study  of  the  subject. 

Troops  may  be  moved  in  the  following  ways  :  1  By  marches, 
2  By  railroads,  3  By  boats. 

Large  armies  move  slowly,  and  require  an  immense  weight  of 
supplies  daily.  One  day's  field  rations  for  10,000  men  will  weigh 
nearly  30,000  lbs.,  and  will  require  15  six-mule  teams  for  trans- 
portation. It  will  take  40  wagons  to  haul  100  rounds  extra 
ammunition  per  man.  In  addition  we  must  have  wagons  for 
baggage,  for  artillery  ammunition,  for  tools,  pontoon  train,  field 
hospitals  and  ambulances.  It  will  take  nearly  500  wagons  to 
carry  five  days'  supplies  for  a  single  army  corps  of  25,000  men. 
You  will  perceive  that  it  is  an  enormous  task  to  supply  an  army 
of  150,000  men  for  even  so  short  a  period  as  one  month.  As  an 
illustration  of  how  this  was  accomplished  30  years  ago,  I  quote 
from  General  Sherman's  memoirs. 

"  The  value  of  railroads  is  also  fully  recognized  in  war  quite  as 
much  as,  if  not  more  so  than  in  time  of  peace.  The  Atlanta 
campaign  would  simply  be  impossible  without  the  use  of  rail- 
roads from  Louisville  to  Nashville,  185  miles,  from  Nashville  to 
Chattanooga,  151  miles,  and  from  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta,  137 
miles.     Every  mile  of  this  single  track  road  was  so  delicate  that 


—so- 
one  man  could  in  a  minute  have  broken  or  removed  a  rail,  but 
our  trains  usually  carried  along  the  tools  and  means  to  repair 
such  a  break.  .  .  .  Our  trains  from  Nashville  forward  were 
operated  under  military  rules,  and  ran  about  10  miles  an  hour  in 
gangs  of  four  trains  each  of  ten  cars  each.  Four  such  groups  of 
trains  dailj'^  made  160  cars  of  10  tons  each,  which  exceeded  the  abso- 
lute necessity  of  the  army.  .  .  .  That  single  stem  of  railroad  473 
miles  long,  supplied  an  army  of  100,000  men  and  35,000  animals 
for  196  days.  To  have  delivered  regularly  that  amount  of  food 
and  forage  by  ordinary  wagons  would  have  required  36,800 
wagons  of  six  mules  each,  allowing  each  wagon  to  have  hauled 
two  tons  20  miles  each  day." 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  supplied  for  many  months  by  a 
single  track  road  from  Alexandria  through  Manassas  Junction. 

It  will  take  a  regiment  of  infantry  almost  seven  hours  to 
march  20  miles  ;  it  could  be  put  on  a  train  and  carried  that  dis- 
tance in  about  one  hour.  An  army  corps  can  march  about  15 
miles  in  seven  hours,  but  it  could  not  be  carried  that  distance, 
with  its  animals  and  impedimenta,  by  ordinary  railroads,  in  any- 
thing like  that  time.  In  1863  Hooker's  corps  of  23,000  men  was 
transported,  with  its  baggage,  artillery  trains  and  animals,  from 
the  Rapidan  to  Stevenson,  Ala.,  1,192  miles,  in  seven  days.  It 
would  have  taken  it  about  three  months  to  march  an  equal  dis- 
tance. There  is  evidently  a  ratio  between  numbers  and  distance, 
which  if  exceeded  will  cause  a  loss  in  time.  "  As  a  result  of  the 
experience  of  the  Franco-German  war,  it  was  found  that  troops 
could  not  move  faster  by  railroad  than  by  marching  when  the 
number  of  men  exceeded  435  per  mile  of  distance  to  be  travelled, 
even  upon  double  track  continental  roads."     (Soady.) 

"  In  estimating  the  number  of  cars  required  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  troops,  the  following  may  be  taken  as  a  basis  : 

"  One  passenger  car  will  seat  about  60  men  comfortably,  but 
for  short  distances  more  may  be  crowded  in. 

"  One  sleeper  will  berth  about  28  comfortably  or  52  crowded. 

"  One  box  car  contains  about  50  cubic  yards  and  will  carry 
from  10  to  20  tons  of  freight. 


—31— 

"  One  flat  car  will  carry  same  amount,  or  two  army  wagons 
loaded,  with  other  stores  between,  or  two  field  guns  with  their 
caissons  and  limbers. 

"A  horse  car  carries  from  15  to  17  horses.  One  infantry  reg- 
iment (1,000  men),  would  require  16  to  18  passenger  cars,  two 
box  cars  for  its  baggage  and  rations,  and  if  it  carried  its  wagon 
trains  it  would  need  from  10  to  12  cars  for  horses  and  wagons, 
making  in  all  a  train  of  30  cars,  which  a  good  engine  could  prob- 
ably haul  20  miles  an  hour,  depending  upon  the  condition  of  the 
road  and  the  rolling  stock.  A  good  deal  of  time  is  necessarily 
consumed  in  loading  and  unloading,  especially  when  the  railroad 
companies  do  not  have  large  platform  facilities  for  loading  many 
freight  cars  at  the  same  time. 

"  Water  transportation  is  the  best  when  there  is  but  little 
chance  of  being  molested  en  route,  and  the  men  certainly  are  in 
better  condition  when  they  land.  All  of  the  stores,  baggage,  etc., 
are  put  aboard  first  and  the  troops  last.  McClellan's  army  of 
122,000  men  and  74,592  animals,  44  batteries,  with  wagons,  pon- 
toon train,  etc.,  was  carried  from  Washington  to  Fort  Monroe, 
nearly  200  miles,  in  16  days."     (Mercur.) 

In  a  future  lecture  I  shall  take  up  the  subject  of  march  tactics, 
so  will  not  dwell  on  it  here. 

Marshal  Saxe  laid  it  down  as  an  axiom  that  "  military  success 
resided  in  the  legs  of  his  soldiers,"  and  military  history  has  amply 
sustained  his  statement.  Smce  the  marshal's  time  we  have  pro- 
vided many  ways  of  expediting  the  movements  of  the  soldier 
when  he  has  to  make  long  distances.  Riding  on  a  modern  rail- 
road train  or  boat  is  much  more  comfortable  and  satisfactory 
than  wearily  trudging  along  a  dirty  or  a  muddy  road. 

To  be  effective,  railroads  must  be  especially  prepared  for  this 
work.  They  must  have  plenty  of  cars,  side  tracks,  embarking 
and  disembarking  stations.  On  a  single  track  road  skillful  manip- 
ulation is  necessary  to  thoroughly  utilize  all  its  powers. 

Many  questions  are  involved  in  railroad  and  water  transporta- 
tion. The  troops  must  be  kept  in  strict  discipline,  the  convey- 
ances must  be  kept  in  good  sanitary  condition,  men  must  not  be 


—as- 
separated    from    their  arms   and   ammunition  ;    plenty   of   side 
tracks  must  be  provided  and  also  facilities  for  loading  horses. 

Trains  must  as  a  rule  remain  under  the  charge  of  the  railroad 
conductor.  The  only  exception  would  be  in  the  enemy's  country 
where  there  would  be  danger  of  an  attack. 

If  a  delay  should  occur  to  make  it  impossible  to  carry  out  the 
original  intinerary  the  chief  officer  with  the  troops,  and  the  rail- 
road representative  should  confer  as  to  the  future  movements  of 
the  train. 

The  details  of  the  movements  of  troops  by  railroad  or  boat  are 
generally  in  the  hands  of  an  officer  of  the  quartermaster's  depart- 
ment. The  officer  ordering  the  movement  simply  specifies  the 
number  of  men,  the  destination  and  time  of  moving.  His  quar- 
termaster has  the  cars  provided  with  water  and  ready  for  the  occu- 
pation of  troops.  If  they  are  to  be  many  hours  on  the  way,  he 
must  provide  water  and  feed  for  the  animals,  and  the  men  should 
be  allowed  to  disembark  for  exercise  and  luncheon,  for  an  hour  if 
possible,  about  the  middle  of  the  day. 

"  Navigable  rivers  are  great  aids  in  the  transportation  and  sup- 
ply of  troops,  when  conveniently  located." 

"  At  sea,  troops  are  usually  carried  on  transports  or  troop 
ships  especially  fitted  for  that  purpose,  and  convoyed  by  men  of 
war,  when  there  is  any  danger  of  attack.  The  embarkation  takes 
place  in  the  following  order  :  1  Baggage  and  vehicles,  2  Horses 
and  mules,  3  Troops.  The  men  and  animals  are  taken  aboard  as 
short  time  before  sailing  as  is  possible.  If  the  voyage  is  to  be  a 
long  one  the  arms  should  be  placed  in  boxes,  and  ammunition, 
harness,  saddles,  etc.,  should  be  packed  in  barrels.  Horses  should 
be  shod  on  all  four  feet.  The  ship  should  be  .thoroughly  cleaned 
and  disinfected  before  the  embarkation  begins. 

The  English  government  has  made  ample  provision  for  the 
transportation  of  its  armies,  by  granting  subsidies  to  all  the  large 
steamship  lines  sailing  from  its  ports,  with  the  provision  that  the 
government  is  to  have  the  use  of  them  in  case  of  war,  either  for 
cruisers  or  transport  ships.  With  all  of  these  magnificent  vessels 
at  their  disposal,  they  could  quickly  carry  a  large  force  to  a  dis- 
tant port. 


—33  — 

Wagon  trains  are  very  necessary  encumbrances  to  every  army. 
On  an  active  campaign  they  are  reduced  to  the  smallest  possible 
number.  They  must  haul  rations,  ammunition,  forage,  clothing 
and  baggage.  We  also  must  have  trains  for  field  hospitals,  bridge 
and  pontoon  trains  and  field  bakeries. 

During  the  latter  years  of  the  war  of  the  rebellion  one  wagon 
to  two  companies  was  usually  found  suflScient.  To  be  sure,  the 
companies  were  greatly  reduced  in  numbers,  and  the  men  had 
learned  to  take  care  of  themselves  and  economize  in  clothes  and 
provisions. 

The  duty  of  arranging,  directing  and  superintending  the  trains 
fall  to  the  lot  of  the  quartermaster. 

The  quartermaster  must  inspect  his  train  daily  to  see  that  his 
wagons  and  animals  are  in  the  best  possible  condition.  Horses 
must  be  shod,  harness  put  in  order,  wagons  greased  and  spare 
parts  provided.  He  should  have  a  wagon  master  to  every  20  or 
25  wagons,  and  one  or  two  assistants. 

Wagon  trains  must  be  moved  so  as  not  to  interfere  with  the 
progress  .of  troops  ;  where  troops  and  trains  come  in  contact  the 
latter  must  invariably  get  out  of  the  way.  If  it  is  possible  for 
the  troops  to  march  alongside  of  the  road,  they  should  leave  it 
for  the  trains. 

In  the  transportation  of  men  and  material  all  the  details  must 
be  arranged  in  a  systematic  way.  The  troops  must  be  drawn  up 
in  line  facing  the  train.  The  adjutant  beginning  at  the  right  of 
the  line  divides  it  into  sections  according  to  the  capacities  of  the 
cars.  Each  section  is  then  placed  opposite  its  car,  and  at  a  signal 
ordered  by  the  commanding  officer,  the  troops  file  into  the  cars 
and  take  their  seats  in  regular  order.  Eight  men  should  be 
allowed  ten  seats  when  possible,  the  two  vacant  ones  to  be  filled 
with  the  knapsacks.  Each  man  should  keep  his  rifle  and  ammu- 
nition belt  beside  him.  No  man  should  be  allowed  to  leave  the 
car  without  permission  from  the  officer  or  non-commissioned 
officer  in  charge.  Details  must  be  made  to  assist  in  loading  the 
horses  and  wagons  before  the  men  are  put  aboard.  Horses  should 
be  unharnessed  or  unsaddled,  as  the  case  may  be,  before  they  are 
put  aboard.     They  should  be  left  untied  and  a  man  should  be 


—34— 

stationed  in  each  end  of  the  car  to  quiet  them  when  frightened. 
When  chests  are  removed  from  caissons,  and  wheels  taken  oflf  to 
facilitate  loading,  all  the  parts  should  be  plainly  marked  so  they 
can  be  quickly  assembled  after  disembarkation.  A  guard  must 
be  detailed  for  each  train  to  take  charge  of  prisoners  and  to  assist 
in  enforcing  police  regulations.  Detailed  insti'uctions  for  the 
transportation  of  field  artillery  both  by  land  and  by  water  will  be 
found  in  the  new  drill  regulations  for  field  artillery. 

When  the  train  arrives  at  its  destination  the  troops  are  disem- 
barked at  a  signal  from  the  commanding  officer,  ranks  are  quickly 
formed,  the  battalions  form  line,  stack  arms  and  unsling  knap- 
sacks. The  details  to  assist  in  unloading  animals  and  baggage 
are  marched  to  the  train  and  reported  to  the  quartermaster  or 
officer  charged  with  that  duty.  If  the  enemy  is  thought  to  be 
in  the  neighborhood,  patrols  and  outposts  must  be  established 
before  arms  are  stacked  and  ranks  broken  ;  it  would  be  well  to 
keep  all  but  the  necessary  unloading  detail  under  arms  in  a  good 
defensive  position  until  satisfactory  reports  have  been  received 
from  the  patrols. 

Supply  trains  moving  in  the  theater  of  operations  should  have 
guards.  If  the  inhabitants  are  hostile  a  pilot  engine  should  pre- 
cede the  train  three  or  four  miles  to  keep  a  lookout  for  hostile 
detachments,  and  damages  to  the  track.  They  should  have  tools 
and  men  to  repair  slight  defects,  remove  obstructions,  etc.,  as 
General  Sherman's  troops  did  in  the  case  mentioned  in  the  fore 
part  of  this  lecture.  On  April  8,  1865,  General  Custer  detailed 
two  regiments  of  cavalry  to  make  a  detour  to  strike  the  railroad 
between  Appomatox  and  Lynchburg  and  destroy  enough  of  it  to 
prevent  the  escape  of  four  trains  of  supplies  for  Lee's  army. 
They  set  off  at  a  gallop  and  soon  destroyed  enough  of  it  to  pre- 
vent the  escape  of  the  trains  which,  being  unprotected,  fell  an 
easy  prey.  Their  loss  at  this  time  was  a  severe  blow  to  Lee's 
ai'my,  and  necessarily  hastened  its  surrender. 

At  the  close  of  their  day's  march,  the  wagon  trains  are  parked, 
generally,  in  lines  facing  the  road.  K  there  is  danger  of  an 
attack,  they  are  parked  either  in  squares  or  circles,  with  the 
animals  inside. 


—as- 
Pack  mules  have  been  used  a  great  deal  in  the  mountainous 
portions  of  our  great  west,  and  in  that  country  they  are  invalua- 
ble. They  will  carry  from  150  to  250  pounds  over  almost  any 
kind  of  road.  Ten  of  these  faithful  little  animals  will  carry  ten 
days'  rations  for  fifty  men,  a  couple  of  boxes  of  ammunition  and 
the  necessary  cooking  utensils. 

Most  of  the  European  armies  have  train  organizations  which 
have  to  furnish  men  and  horses  for  the  transportation  system  of 
the  entire  army.  "The  German  army  has  21  train  battalions. 
Each  battalion  includes  a  company  composed  entirely  of  bakers. 
In  peace  times  they  are  employed  in  the  bakeries  at  the  large 
garrisons.  At  mobilization  they  are  attached  to  the  field  baker- 
ies, and  each  army  corps  has  its  own  train.  They  comprise 
ammunition  trains,  provision  trains,  the  pontoon  train,  the  field 
bakery,  a  depot  of  remounts,  and  the  field  hospitals."  A  full  dis- 
cussion of  this  subject  would  require  an  extensive  dissertation  on 
all  of  the  duties  of  the  various  staff  departments.  The  extent  of 
the  course  only  permits  me  to  give  you  a  general  view  of  the  very 
important  question  of  transportation. 

With  small  commands  the  question  of  supply  becomes  a  very 
simple  one.  The  trains  carrying  rations,  forage  and  clothing, 
and  possibly  tentage,  march  just  in  rear  of  the  command  and  are 
usually  in  camp  a  few  minutes  after  the  troops.  If  the  enemy  is 
near,  however,  the  soldier  must  carry  two  or  three  days'  rations 
in  his  haversack,  and  the  trains  are  left  well  in  rear.  In  modern 
battles  the  expenditure  of  ammunition  is  enormous,  and  the  ques- 
tion of  ammunition  supply,  especially  on  the  field  of  battle,  is  one 
of  the  most  perplexing  things  military  men  have  to  contend  with. 
A  soldier  may  be  hungry  and  do  good  work,  but  a  soldier  with- 
out ammunition  is  about  as  valuable  as  an  engine  without  fuel. 

Experience  has  shown  that  the  best  Avay  to  transport  ammuni- 
tion is  in  two-wheeled  carts.  They  can  be  drawn  over  very 
rough  ground  and  can  quickly  reach  any  portion  of  the  field. 
They  also  take  up  but  little  room  in  the  line  of  march. 

The  enormous  increase  in  railroad  facilities  in  our  country  since 
the  war  of  the  rebellion  has  somewhat  simplified  the  question  of 
supply,  so  far  as  the  permanent  and  temporary  depots  are  con- 


— se- 
cerned, but  an  army  in  the  field  must  Btill  expect  to  depend  upon 
its  wagon  trains.  A  great  many  military  men  claim  "  that  bases 
of  operation  no  longer  exist ;  that  they  have  been  replaced  by 
railroad  lines."  It  is  true  that  railroad  lines  have  modified  the 
use  of  bases,  but  the  principle  still  exists  and  was  used  by  the 
Germans  in  1870.  Before  assembling  on  the  French  frontier  they 
established  depots  of  supplies  along  the  Rhine  at  the  principal 
railroad  centers,  such  as  Cologne,  Coblentz,  Bingen,  Mayence, 
etc.  The  great  supply  magazines  were  established  at  other 
railroad  centers  with  lines  leading  to  various  points  on  the 
Rhine,  so  provisions  could  be  shipped  to  points  near  the  army 
depending  upon  its  movements.  As  soon  as  the  defensive  atti- 
tude of  the  French  was  apparent  the  Germans  modified  the 
arrangement  of  their  depots  and  formed  new  ones  at  Trevres, 
Kreuznach,  Alzay  and  Worms. 

In  a  rich  agricultural  country  an  army  can  obtain  many  sup- 
plies by  foraging  and  requisitions  on  the  inhabitants,  but  this 
source  is  not  to  be  depended  upon  for  any  considerable  length  of 
time.  The  Germans  estimated  that  even  the  rich  provinces  of 
the  Rhine  could  not  furnish  supplies  for  the  great  armies  con- 
centrated in  them  for  more  than  two  or  thi'ee  days. 

Caesar  said  that  "  war  should  support  war,"  and  as  we  have  no 
authentic  information  as  to  the  method  of  supply  of  his  armies,  it 
is  believed  that  be  put  his  precept  into  execution.  In  making 
requisitions  on  the  country,  the  people  must  not  be  left  destitute  ; 
supplies  that  cannot  be  used  must  not,  however,  be  allowed  to 
fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and  if  the  army  is  forced  to 
retreat,  supplies  that  cannot  be  removed  must  be  destroyed. 
During  the  war  of  the  rebellion  the  rich  Shenandoah  valley  was 
a  favorite  zone  of  operations  for  the  confederate  cavalry,  and  to 
diminish  its  value  to  the  enemy  General  Sheridan  was  ordered  to 
overrun  it  and  destroy  or  carry  off  all  supplies  which  might  be 
of  use  to  the  enemy. 

Compulsory  demands  on  the  inhabitants  are  made  in  one  of 
two  ways.  1  By  ^^requisitions''''  specifying  supplies  in  kind. 
2  By  "  contributions "  in  money.     In  the  enemy's  country  the 


—37— 

demand  is  made  by  right  of  power,  and  is  enforced  in  the  manner 
the  commander-in-chief  finds  most  convenient.  In  one's  own 
country  receipts  are  given  for  all  funds  or  supplies  in  kind,  and 
are  redeemed  by  the  government  at  the  close  of  the  war.  In 
1870  the  Germans  gave  vouchers  for  voluntary  offerings  of  sup- 
plies from  French  citizens. 

You  are  all  familiar  with  the  way  in  which  General  Sherman 
supplied  his  army  of  60,000  men  in  his  famous  march  to  the  sea. 
When  we  think  of  the  great  difficulty  and  expense  of  supplying 
modern  armies  of  200,000  or  300,000  men,  with  all  of  our  increased 
facilities,  it  becomes  interesting  to  imagine  how  the  vast  armies 
of  Xerxes  and  Darius,  and  the  vast  hordes  of  barbarians  that 
overran  Europe  were  supplied.  *'  Their  wants  in  the  matter  of 
clothing  and  ammunition  were  of  course  not  very  great,  but  how 
they  lived,  especially  in  countries  which  now  support  a  very 
meagre  population,  is  an  interesting  question.  They  plundered 
and  pillaged  at  will,  and  gleaned  the  country  of  everything,  but 
it  is  still  difficult  to  understand  how  they  subsisted." 

Jomini  says  :  "  That  i'n  fertile  and  populous  regions,  not  hos- 
tile, an  army  of  100,000  to  120,000  men,  when  so  far  distant  from 
the  enemy  as  to  be  able  to  safely  cover  a  considerable  extent  of 
territory,  may  draw  its  resources  from  it  during  the  time  occupied 
by  any  single  operation."  In  collecting  provisions  from  either 
friend  or  foe,  the  local  authorities  should  be  used,  if  they  are  in 
the  country,  so  as  to  make  the  burdens  fall  uniformly.  All  pro- 
visions collected  must  be  turned  over  to  the  proper  officers  for 
distribution  to  the  troops.  Plundering  or  pillaging  is  forbidden 
and  severe  punishments  are  given  for  violations  of  orders  against 
pillaging. 

Enough  has  been  said  to  give  you  an  idea  of  the  great  work  of 
supplying  an  army  and  of  the  importance  of  having  it  well  done. 
A  general  commanding  a  separate  army  has  many  things  to 
worry  him,  fully  as  much  as  the  enemy.  If  his  men  are  hungry 
they  are  not  averse  to  letting  it  be  known.  If  they  have  no 
clothes  they  will  also  complain,  and  sickness  and  disease  will  rap- 
idly thin  the  ranks  ;  much  more  rapidly  than  the  bullet. 


S1711 


—38— 

In  view  of  the  large  size  of  modern  armies,  the  enoi'mous 
amount  of  supplies  required,  the  vast  number  of  sick,  wounded, 
and  recruits  to  be  transported,  it  is  well  to  have  an  officer  of  high 
rank  and  of  known  executive  ability  and  experience  in  charge  of 
the  "  communications  "  to  be  known  as  general  commanding  com- 
munications. An  experienced  railroad  manager  with  some  mili- 
tary knowledge  ought  to  be  selected.  In  the  German  army  one 
department  of  the  war  ministry  is  charged  with  this  duty,  and  the 
general  commanding  in  the  field  is  relieved  of  much  labor  and 
anxiety.  He  is  enabled  to  give  his  entire  attention  to  operations 
in  the  field. 

Gen.  Sherman  says  :  "  The  '  feeding '  of  an  army  is  a  matter  of 
the  most  vital  importance,  and  demands  the  earliest  attention  of 
a  general  intrusted  with  a  campaign.  To  be  strong,  healthy  and 
capable  of  the  largest  measure  of  physical  effort,  the  soldier 
needs  about  three  pounds  gross  of  food  per  day,  and  the  horse  or 
mule  about  20  pounds.  When  a  general  first  estimates  the  quan- 
tity of  food  and  forage  needed  for  an  army  of  50,000  or  100,000 
men  he  is  apt  to  be  dismayed,  and  here  a  good  staff  is  indis- 
pensable, though  the  general  cannot  throw  off  on  them  the 
responsibility." 

Some  writers  give  logistics  a  wide  range  and  assign  to  it 
nearly  all  of  the  duties  of  the  staff,  but  I  am  in  favor  of  the  view 
entertained  by  many  recent  French  writers,  of  increasing  the 
domain  of  tactics  and  narrowing  that  of  logistics  to  the  lodging, 
supplying  and  transportation  of  troops.  The  duties  of  even  a 
single  staff  department,  if  given  in  detail,  would  fill  a  large  vol- 
ume ;  it  hardly  seems  reasonable  to  try  to  include  the  duties  of 
all  the  staff  departments  in  a  single  work. 

CANTONMENT. 

There  are  three  ways  in  which  the  soldier  is  allowed  to  repose 
in  war,  viz:  in  catnp,  in  cantonment  or  in  bivouac. 

"When  they  are  sheltered  in  houses  or  in  huts  they  are  in  can- 
tonment. Sickness  is  the  great  destroyer  of  armies,  we  must  guard 
against  it  in  every  way.     Sleeping  on  the  damp  ground  or  out 


—39— 

in  the  open  air  in  inclement  weather,  without  nourishing  food 
and  protection  from  the  cold  night  blasts,  is  the  most  fruitful 
source  of  sickness. 

"  The  worst  possible  cantonment  is  better  than  the  best  bivouac." 
Repose  is  very  necessary,  and  we  ought  to  provide  it  in  the  best 
possible  manner.  The  French  regulations  direct  that  the  troops 
be  cantoned  in  every  possible  case. 

Article  62.  "  Troops  ought  to  bivouac  only  when  one  is  obliged 
to  concentrate  them  in  positions  where  it  is  impossible  to  put 
them  in  cantonment,  or  when  the  army  being  in  proximity  to  the 
enemy,  we  ought  to  occupy  defensive  positions  or  establish  our- 
selves for  a  short  time  in  favorable  places  from  which  to  attack 
the  enemy's  positions." 

They  even  authorize  the  reserve  of  the  advanced  guard  to  be 
put  in  cantonment.  The  cantonment  of  the  troops  in  Europe 
means  the  billeting  of  them  on  the  inhabitants  of  the  towns  and 
villages. 

In  those  densely  populated  countries  where  the  villages  are 
numerous  and  close  together,  billeting  becomes  possible,  but  in 
our  country  it  would  usually  be  impracticable.  No  provision  is 
made  in  our  regulations  for  quartering  the  troops  either  on  friend 
or  foe.  There  are  some  objections  to  the  system  of  cantonment, 
viz:  It  scatters  the  troops  over  large  areas  and  consequently  is 
prejudicial  to  rapid  concentration.  Again,  portions  of  the  com- 
mand are  obliged  to  march  several  miles  after  the  close  of  their 
day's  journey,  to  find  the  quarters  assigned  them  by  the  billeting 
officer. 

It  gives  an  active  enemy  an  opportunity  to  surprise  and  defeat 
certain  portions  of  your  command.  During  the  early  part  of  the 
Franco-German  war,  the  Germans  bivouacked  very  frequently, 
which  probably  accounts  for  a  great  deal  of  their  percentage  of 
sick,  the  most  prevalent  diseases  being  fevers,  malaria,  rheuma- 
tism, bowel  complaints  and  pulmonary  troubles,  all  of  which  may 
readily  be  contracted  by  exposure  and  sleeping  on  damp  ground. 
This  seems  to  be  a  proper  place  to  call  your  attention  to  the 
advisability  of  wearing  a  heavy  flannel  bandage  around  the  abdo- 


—40— 

men  when  on  field  service,  a  common  practice  in  continental 
armies,  but  not  yet  thoroughly  appreciated  in  our  service. 

The  German  general  staff  in  its  report  states  "  that  from  the 
beginning  of  September  until  the  close  of  the  campaign  the  rigor 
of  the  season  forced  us  to  shelter  our  men,  at  least  during  the 
night,  which  necessitated  an  extension  of  cantonments,  and  a 
march  to  the  combat  on  a  very  extended  front,  the  direction  of 
which  became  very  difficult." 

Fortunately  for  them,  their  enemy  was  already  beaten  before 
they  adopted  an  extended  order  of  cantonment.  In  the  presence 
of  an  active,  resolute,  unbeaten  opponent  the  cantonment  of 
troops  in  villages  widely  separated  would  be  a  hazardous  experi- 
ment. 

BIVOUAC. 

A  bivouac  is  generally  a  hasty  and  temporary  disposition  of 
troops,  in  which  they  are  compelled  to  sleep  on  the  ground,  with 
only  such  protection  as  may  be  afforded  by  shelter  tents  or  acci- 
dents of  the  vicinity. 

The  bivouac  is  usually  the  result  of  tactical  considerations^ 
which  require  the  troops  to  be  held  in  readiness  for  combat,  and 
the  troops  must  then  be  located  in  the  order  in  which  they  are 
expected  to  fight.  The  service  of  security  if  well  conducted  will 
allow  enough  dispersion  of  the  troops  to  secure  a  good  place  for 
the  bivouac. 

It  ought  to  be  on  dri/  ground,  convenient  to  wood  and  water 
and  forage  for  the  animals. 

The  commander  of  the  army  indicates  to  the  corps  commanders 
the  positions  to  occupy.  The  corps  commanders  locate  their 
divisions,  and  so  on  through  the  various  units. 

The  German  regulation  says  :  "  JEven  when  it  is  necessary  to 
keep  the  troops  united  and  in  hand,  they  ought  to  he  placed  so 
they  can  profit  by  the  shelter  offered  in  their  localities.'''' 

Certain  tactical  conditions  ought  to  be  kept  in  view  in  selecting 
positions  for  bivouac. 

1.  They  ought  to  be  concealed  from  the  enemy  to  prevent  him 
from  discovering  the  positions  and  numbers  of  the  various  units. 


—  41— 

Col.  Maillard  says  :  "If,  on  the  l7th  of  August,  the  German 
cavalry  had  maintained  contact  with  the  right  wing  of  the  French 
army  they  would  have  discovered  its  position  from  its  bivouac 
fires,  which  extended  to  St.  Privat,  and  they  would  not  have 
hesitated  so  long  in  opening  the  battle." 

2.  They  ought  to  permit /Vee  movement  of  the  troops  in  every 
direction. 

Bivouac  having  been  ordered  on  the  supposition  that  the  enemy 
is  near,  the  troops  must  be  ready  to  either  fight  or  march  at  short 
notice.  "  The  position  should  be  carefully  reconnoitered  and,  if 
necessary,  roads  should  be  prepared  towards  the  battle  position 
or  in  the  direction  of  march." 

3.  The  bivouac  should  be  behind  the  probable  line  of  battle,  so 
the  troops  must  move  forward  to  occupy  it. 

This  rule  is  followed  even  on  the  night  of  the  battle  when  dark- 
ness has  put  an  end  to  the  struggle  without  deciding  it ;  the  troops 
are  moved  to  the  rear  for  rest  and  refreshment,  and  the  ground 
occupied  during  the  day  must  be  held  by  a  strong  line  of  advanced 
posts. 

4.  Avoid  low  and  damp  grounds  and  those  that  would  be 
washed  by  a  rain. 

"  Such  a  bivouac  causes  greater  loss  than  a  bloody  battle." 
The  German  rule  advises  bivouacking  m  the  woods,  because  the 
troops  are  concealed  and  readily  find  material  for  constructing 
shelter.  They  are  also  warmer  than  on  the  open  plain.  One 
great  objection  is  that  they  do  not  permit  freedom  of  movement, 
which  must  be  provided. 

Infantry  may  bivouac  in  two  ways,  either  in  line  or  in  colutnn. 
The  bivouac  in  column  takes  less  room. 

The  French  regulation  says  :  "  Whenever  circumstances  and 
the  terrain  permit,  the  infantry  will  bivouac  in  line  of  battalions 
in  double  column,  because  the  troops  are  in  combat  formation." 
The  concentration  facilitates  superintendence  and  the  transmis- 
sion of  orders. 

A  battalion  (French)  of  1,000  men,  bivouacked  in  double  col- 
umn, requires  a  space  of  140  m.  front  by  140  m.  in  depth,  in  line 
340  m.  front  and  80  in  depth. 


—42— 

Fig.  1  illustrates  the  French  method  of  bivouac  for  the  bat- 
talion in  line  : 

Figure  i. 


Stcic^s 


giiHiiiiiii«iM/ijn   imiiiiiiHimiiiiii 

nnnnnniMiB    nnDmnnnnni!!     nnnnmnnini      mniiiiiiimiiii 

Officers^  ^  ^ 

I'll       %.f7  "■"■ 


Our  new  drill  regulations  for  infantry  state  :  "  In  the  presence 
of  the  enemy  the  troops  bivouac  in  position  ;  if  safety  permit, 
tents  may  be  pitched  immediately  in  rear  of  the  line  of  stacks." 

In  the  artillery  :  "  The  men  bivouac  at  a  convenient  distance 
in  rear  of  the  park,  each  detachment  opposite  its  section  ;  the 
guard  is  in  one  flank  and  to  the  leeward  ;  the  cook  fires  are  near 
the  guard."  Artillery  should  never  bivouac  alone.  The  duties 
of  the  police  guard  in  camp  are  to  preserve  order,  prevent  men 
from  leaving  camp  without  authority,  to  keep  silence  at  night 
and  such  other  duties  as  the  commanding  officer  of  the  camp  may 
assign  to  them. 

I  have  gone  into  the  subject  of  "  bivouacs  "  at  some  length  as 
it  is  the  most  prevalent  system  with  us.  It  is  doubtful  if  the 
system  of  cantoning  or  billeting  troops  would  be  viewed  favor- 
ably by  our  people.  While  they  are  willing  to  extend  a  bounteous 
hospitality  to  their  soldiers,  they  prefer  it  should  be  voluntary. 
If  we  were  in  an  enemy's  country  we  should  not  care  much 
whether  the  inhabitants  liked  it  or  not,  but  even  in  that  case,  we 
should  bear  in  mind  the  experience  of  the  French  quoted  above, 
that  it  is  both  difficult  and  dangerous  to  attempt  to  canton  troops 
in  war,  when  they  have  not  had  any  experience  in  time  of  peace. 
Our  country  is  relatively  so  thinly  populated  that  it  would  not  as 


—43— 

a  rule  offer  proper  facilities  for  cantoning  very  large  armies. 
We  do  not,  however,  expect  to  do  much  fighting  in  our  own 
territory. 

When  an  army  goes  into  winter  quarters,  or  a  long  armistice 
has  been  agreed  to,  every  possible  preparation  is  made  to  shelter 
the  troops  and  secure  their  repose.  In  a  wooded  country  huts 
may  be  built.  Our  soldiers  frequently  built  a  framework  of  logs 
and  put  a  canvas  roof  on  it,  and  banked  up  the  outside  with  earth, 
excavated  the  interior,  and  built  mud  fireplaces  and  chimneys. 
The  bunks  were  then  arranged  in  tiers,  and  many  old  veterans 
can  recall  many  happy  hours  spent  in  these  improvised  homes. 

CAMPS. 

The  shelter  tent  is  a  very  excellent  and  a  very  necessary  pro- 
tection when  the  country  is  so  very  thinly  settled  that  other  pro- 
tection cannot  be  had.  The  one  used  in  our  war  was  made  in  two 
parts  which  could  be  buttoned  together.  A  stick  resting  on  a 
couple  of  low  forks  answered  for  a  ridge  pole.  They  resembled 
an  inverted  V ;  were  open  front  and  back. 

In  1870-71,  the  French  army  of  the  east  abandoned  their  shel- 
ter tents  during  the  winter.  They  fixed  them  up  as  shelters 
against  the  wind,  and  bivouacked  with  their  feet  to  the  fire. 
Napoleon  said,  "  Tents  are  not  healthy,  it  is  better  for  the  soldier 
to  bivouac,  because  he  sleeps  with  his  feet  to  the  fire,  which  soon 
dries  the  ground  on  which  he  is  sleeping,  and  some  bushes  or  a 
little  straw  will  shelter  him  from  the  wind."  It  is  impossible  for 
an  army  to  carry  much  tentage.  It  is  too  bulky  and  heavy  and 
would  require  too  much  additional  transportation.  In  our  service 
on  the  frontier,  in  cold  weather,  we  usually  carry  a  wall  tent  for 
officers  and  the  regulation  "  A  "  tent  for  the  men,  and  assign  two 
company  officers  to  each  wall  tent,  and  from  two  to  four  privates 
to  each  "  A  "  tent.  They  close  up  tightly  and  when  ditched  and 
banked  they  furnish  excellent  protection  against  the  weather. 
The  "  Sibley  "  tent  has  also  been  used.  It  is  a  conical  tent  with  a 
low  wall,  and  will  shelter  about  16  men  very  comfortably. 


—44— 

During  the  Apache  campaign  of  '85-6,  when  our  men  were 
camped  along  the  Mexican  border  for  many  months,  they  devised 
many  novel  methods  of  house  building,  and  with  a  little  canvas 
and  maguey  poles  and  grass  they  constructed  some  very  com- 
fortable quarters.  Some  places  they  built  little  "  adobes,"  in  other 
places  they  seemed  to  fancy  "  dug-outs."  The  variety  of  the 
structures  was  only  limited  by  the  number  of  men  who  were  ta 
live  in  them. 

The  United  States  soldier  soon  learns  to  take  good  care  of 
himself  and  is  very  skillful  in  adapting  himself  to  his  surround- 
ings. 

Figure  2. 
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Co  MP.  KITCHCN9 


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orrRs  SINKS. 

Fig.  2  illustrates  the  usual  method  of  camping  of  a  regiment 
of  infantry  of  three  battalions.  This  may  be  modified  at  the 
pleasure  of  the  commanding  officer. 

It  is  very  important  that  a  camp  should  be  selected  near  good 
water,  and  that  it  be  easy  of  access  to  all  of  the  troops.  Large 
commands  are  usually  camped  near  streams  of  running  water. 
All  washing,  and  watering  of  animals,  should  take  place  helow  the 
points  from  which  water  for  drinking  and  cooking  purposes  is 
obtained.  Sentinels  should  be  placed  over  the  water  to  see  that 
it  is  not  contaminated.  Impure  water  is  very  disastrous  to  the 
health  of  an  army.     When  the  enemy  is  near,  the  position  should 


—45— 

at  once  be  prepared  for  defence  ;  emplacements  should  be  made 
for  the  batteries,  all  buildings  or  villages  that  might  serve  as 
points  of  support  should  be  prepared  for  defence,  and  infantry 
intrenchments  should  be  thrown  up,  following  the  custom  of  our 
troops  during  the  war  of  the  rebellion.  Latrines  should  be  dug  ; 
all  offal  and  dead  animals  should  be  buried.  Fuel  for  the  prepa- 
ration of  warm  food  is  of  course  a  necessity  and  must  be  consid- 
ered in  selecting  a  camping  place.  If  straw,  dried  leaves  or  light 
brushwood  can  be  gathered  for  the  men  to  sleep  on,  it  will  add 
much  to  the  healthf  ulness  of  the  camp. 

It  is  especially  incumbent  upon  us  to  use  diligence  and  care  in 
obtaining  protection  for  our  men  when  in  repose,  as  the  great 
body  of  our  troops  will  be  drawn  suddenly  from  their  occupations 
in  civil  life  and  will  be  totally  unprepared  for  the  exposure  nec- 
essary in  a  campaign,  and  the  sick  list  is  liable  to  be  very  large 
even  under  the  most  favorable  conditions  of  weather. 

The  following  table  taken  from  the  records  of  the  war  of  1870-1 
shows  how  sickness  may  decimate  an  army  in  an  unusually  healthy 
campaign,  and  an  army  in  which  the  hospital  service  was  as 
thoroughly  organized  as  the  great  general  staff  of  Vop  Moltke's 
creation  could  organize  it  : 

Killed  or  died  of  wounds,        .         .         .         28,628 

"Wounded,  84,000 

Sick,         . 400,000 

This  covers  the  short  period  of  about  nine  months. 

The  company  officers  should  see  that  their  men  observe  the 
common  laws  of  health  ;  that  the  food  is  wholesome  and  well 
cooked.  Men  should  have  opportunities  for  bathing,  and  for 
washing  their  clothes  as  frequently  as  possible.  The  tents  and 
ground  about  them  should  be  kept  clean  ;  a  little  trench  should 
be  dug  around  each  tent  to  carry  off  the  water.  In  bright,  sunny 
weather  the  bedding  and  clothing  should  be  placed  in  the  sun, 
and  the  tents  should  be  taken  down  to  permit  the  warm  sunlight 
to  dry  and  purify  the  ground.  Men  should  not  be  allowed  to  be 
out  of  their  tents  at  night  without  being  warmly  clad. 


—46— 

We  have  not  found  a  perfectly  satisfactory  army  shoe,  and 
many  men  become  useless,  temporarily,  from  blistered  feet.  If 
the  men  are  required  to  bathe  their  feet  in  cold  water  and  to  put 
on  dry  socks  as  soon  as  possible  after  getting  into  camp,  this  evil 
may  be  greatly  diminished.  General  De  Brack  says  :  "  It  requires 
more  skill  to  keep  men  in  condition  to  fight  than  to  conduct  the 
fight." 

As  a  supplementary  course  to  the  foregoing  lectures  I  suggest 
study  of  the  following  works  : 

"  Duties  of  the  General  Staff,"     .  Von  Schellendorf. 

"  Armies  of  To-day,"        .         .        .  Harper  Bros. 

"  Art  of  War,"     ....  Jomini. 

"War," Clausenitz. 

"  Elements  of  the  Art  of  War,"  .  Prof.  Mercur. 
"United  States  Infantry,  Cavalry  and 

Artillery  Drill  Regulations." 

"  The  Nation  in  Arms,"   .         .         .  Von  der  Goltz. 

"  Precis  of  Modern  Tactics,"        .  Pratt. 


CHAPTEE  IV. 


ADVANCED  GUARDS. 

An  advanced  guard  is  a  detachment  thrown  forward  to  secure 
the  march  of  the  main  body.     Its  duties  are: 

(1)   To  cover  the  movements  of  the  main  body. 

{2)   To  gain  information  of  the  enemy. 

{3)  When  the  enemy  is  met,  to  retard  his  progress  until  the 
main  body  can  be  prepared  for  combat. 

(4)  To  repair  the  roads  and  bridges  and  remove  any  ob- 
stacles to  the  progress  of  the  mahi  body. 

Its  duties,  then,  are  usually  twofold :  reconnoitering  and  fight- 
ing. If  the  front  and  flanks  of  the  army  are  well  covered  by  the 
cavalry,  the  first  of  the  above-mentioned  duties  will  practically 
disappear,  in  which  case  it  need  only  be  a  small  compact  column 
of  all  arms  ready  to  fight  on  short  notice  and  in  any  direction. 

STRENGTH. 

During  the  war  of  1870-71  advanced  guards  were  frequentlj"- 
long  distances  ahead  of  the  main  body,  and  brought  on  engage- 
ments by  assuming  the  offensive.  These  engagements  were  not 
always  begun  at  the  places  and  times  desired  by  the  commanding 
general.  It  will  at  once  become  evident  that  such  engagements 
might  be  very  hazardous  to  the  safety  of  an  army,  and  even 
modify,  if  not  entirely  change,  the  nature  of  the  campaign.  In 
view  of  these  facts  many  modern  writers  claim  that  the  role  of 
the  advanced  guard  should  be  purely  defensive.  In  common 
with  most  of  the  military  questions  of  to-day  it  admits  of  some 
discussion,  and  we  find  writers  who,  with  some  reason,  take  an- 
other view.  The  weight  of  authority  is  toward  the  view  that 
the  defensive  role  is  imposed  on  the  advanced  guard,  except 
where  the  offensive  is  especially  ordered  by  the  commander  of 


—48— 

the  main  body.  It  is  evident  that  the  first  thing  to  do  with  the 
enemy,  if  possible,  is  to  restrain  his  freedom  of  movement  and 
choice  of  position  and  to  create  a  free  zone  of  manoeuvre  for  the 
main  body.  This  is  the  base  of  every  movement,  strategical  or 
tactical.  To  do  this  the  advanced  guard  must  drive  before  it  the 
detachments  of  the  enemy  and  take  possession  of  the  strong 
points  on  the  field  to  permit  the  artillery  to  come  into  action.  In 
other  words,  "it  forces  entrance  into  the  field  and  installs  itself 
there."  A  feeble  advance  guard  will  fail  in  audacity  and  lack 
enterprise,  it  will  be  insufficient  to  cover  the  artillery  and  will  be 
in  danger  of  being  rolled  up.  On  the  contrary,  a  strong  advanced 
guard  will  be  able  to  install  itself  solidly  on  the  ground,  easily 
cover  the  artillery  and  form  a  solid  base  behind  which  the  main 
body  can  manoeuvre. 

These  are  some  of  the  arguments  advanced  by  the  advocates  of 
strong,  aggressive  advanced  guards  : 

The  objection  to  this  view  is  that  it  would  place  the  selection 
of  time  and  field  almost  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  command- 
ants of  the  advanced  guard,  and  would  really  require  the  com- 
mander-in-chief to  march  with  the  advanced  guard,  which  would 
be  very  undesirable.  The  difficulties  have  arisen  through  the 
action  of  ambitious  commanders  of  advanced  guards,  who  have 
taken  on  themselves  to  assume  some  of  the  functions  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief. 

Admitting,  then,  the  good  points  of  the  offensive  idea,  we  are 
convinced  that  the  defensive  view  is  safest. 

The  strength  of  an  advanced  guard  depends  upon  : 

(i)   The  force  it  is  cover  itig. 

{2)   The  object  for  which  it  is  organized. 

If  its  commander  is  instructed  to  engage  the  enemy  whenever 
found,  its  strength  should  be  at  least  one-fourth  of  the  entire 
command. 

If,  however,  he  is  only  directed  to  delay  the  enemy's  advance 
to  give  the  main  body  time  to  deploy,  it  should  be  as  small  as  is 
consistent  with  this  duty — for  a  large  force,  from  one-sixth  to 
one-eighth  will  suffice. 


—49— 

During  the  war  of  1870-71  the  German  advanced  guards  on 
occasions  reached  a  strength  of  one-half  the  entire  command. 

(3)    On  the  nature  of  the  country. 

(^)   The  character  of  the  enemy. 

{5)   The  distance  it  is  required  to  precede  the  main  hody. 

We  can  safely  say  that  its  strength  should  never  exceed  one- 
third  of  the  command  and  rarely  be  diminished  below  one-sixth. 

The  strength  of  advanced  guards  would  be  as  follows  : 

1  Battalion  of  infantry,  4  companies,  .     .     .  |^  to  1  company. 

1  Regiment  of  infantry,  12  companies,  .     .    2  to  3  companies. 

1  Brigade  of  infantry,  36  companies,    .     .     .  6  to  10  companies. 

A  division  consisting  of — 

3  Brigades  of  infantry, 2  Regiments  of  infantry. 

3  Batteries  of  artillery,       ....     1  Battery  of  artillery. 

1  Regiment  of  cavalry, 2  Battalions  of  cavalry. 

1  Company  of  engineers,    .     .     .     .     ^  Company  of  engineers. 

One  of  the  important  duties  of  the  army  commander  is  to  de- 
termine the  strength  and  composition  of  his  advanced  guard,  and 
he  must  bear  in  mind  many  things  in  addition  to  those  already 
mentioned. 

(1)  If  the  enemy  is  near,  the  duty  will  be  arduous. 

(2)  That  detachments  from  the  main  body  may  impair  its 
strength  at  a  critical  moment. 

(3)  That  an  ambitious  officer  finding  himself  in  command  of  a 
strong  force  may  unwisely  become  involved  with  a  stronger  one, 
and  thus  force  his  chief  to  deploy  the  main  body  to  extricate  his 
advanced  guard. 

He  must  also  remember  that  the  defensive  powers  of  small 
bodies  have  been  increased  by  improvements  in  fire-arms. 

OKDEE    OP   MARCH. 

The  division  of  the  advanced  guard  in  depth  corresponds  to 
the  actual  conditions  of  combat. 

First  comes  the  vanguard,  which  is  divided  into  the  advanced 
party  and  support;  second,  the  reserve  or  main  body.  The 
strength  of  the  reserve  is  from  one-third  to  one-half  of  the  whole. 
4 


—50- 


In  the  vanguard  about  one-third  is  in  the  advanced  party  ;  the 
remainder  in  the  support.  There  are  no  fixed  rules,  and  the 
values  given  you  are  the  usual  ones. 


Figure  3. 


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Fig.  3  illustrates  acceptable  formations  for  advanced  guards  as 
indicated. 


—51— 

The  vanguard  is  composed  of  cavalry,  infantry  and  sometimes 
artillery.  The  composition  will  of  course  depend  largely  on  the 
nature  of  the  country.  In  open  country  the  cavalry  may  be 
increased.  In  rough  mountainous  country,  with  poor  roads,  the 
bulk  of  the  work  would  have  to  be  done  by  infantry.  Sufficient 
infantry  must  always  be  attached  to  support  the  artillery  and 
cavalry. 


?7?arcZ. 


Figure  4. 


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Fig.  4  explains  the  tactical  idea  governing  the  arrangement 
of  the  advanced  guard  in  depth.  On  halting  at  night  the 
advanced  party  and  its  flankers  naturally  become  the  sentinels  of 
the  outposts.  The  remainder  of  the  vanguard  would  furnish 
pickets  and  supports,  and  the  reserve  would  still  be  the  reserve 
of  the  outposts.  In  formation  for  combat  they  naturally  became 
scouts,  chain,  supports  and  reserve,  to  be  modified  at  the  will  of 
the  commander-in-chief. 

The  duties  of  the  vanguard  are  : 

(j?)  To  thoroughly  examine  the  ground  and  remove  all  obstruc- 
tions from,  the  road. 


—52— 

(2)  To  gain  information  of  the  enemy,  especially  when  the  cav- 
alry division  is  not  in  advance. 

(3)  To  drive  back  or  capture  any  detachments  of  the  enemy 
they  may  find,  or  hold  the  ground  until  they  can  receive  rein- 
forcements. 

As  the  principal  duty  of  the  vanguard  is  reconnoitering,  it 
should  be  largely  composed  of  cavalry. 

The  duty  of  the  reserve  is  to  fight,  and  it  would  naturally  be 
composed  of  infantry  and  artillery. 

The  remainder  of  the  unit  from  which  the  advance  guard  is 
taken  ought,  when  convenient,  to  march  at  the  head  of  the  main 
body.  The  place  for  the  commander  of  the  advance  guard  is 
with  the  reserve. 

In  the  open  country  the  scouts  and  flankers  should  operate  at 
considerable  distances  from  the  column,  and  connecting  files 
should  be  placed  as  indicated  to  insure  rapid  communication. 


THE  DIFFERENT  ARMS. 

CAVALRY. 

Cavalry  must  lead  the  vanguard  and  furnish  scouts  and  flank- 
ers when  the  country  permits.  It  can  move  with  great  rapidity, 
can  examine  places  at  a  distance  and  quickly  regain  its  place 
without  delaying  the  march.  It  must  push  forward  boldly  and 
keep  well  in  advance.  It  must  furnish  the  regular  patrols  and 
detachments  to  examine  lateral  roads.  The  role  of  the  cavalry  is 
reconnoissance,  but  as  it  may  meet  with  obstacles  to  its  progress, 
such  as  detachments  of  the  enemy's  infantry,  villages,  defiles  and 
roads,  it  must  be  accompanied  by  infantry,  to  which  these  duties 
must  be  assigned.  The  cavalry  may  ride  around  a  village  or 
small  wood  and  examine  the  outside,  but  it  should  not  enter  until 
they  have  been  explored  by  the  infantry.  While  the  infantry  is 
engaged  in  the  examination,  cavalry  patrols  should  be  sent  on  the 
roads  beyond  on  the  lookout  for  the  enemy.     Defiles,  ravines  and 


—53— 

rough  country  generally  must  be  examined  by  the  infantry.  As 
all  kinds  of  country  are  apt  to  be  found  in  a  day's  march,  the 
advanced  party  and  flankers  must  not  be  cavalry  alone.  It  is 
impossible  to  give  a  general  rule  as  to  the  proportions  of  the 
various  arms. 

The  duty  of  carrying  information  to  various  parts  of  the  col- 
umn and  all  orderly  duty  falls  to  the  cavalry. 

The  commander  of  the  advanced  guard  usually  keeps  a  small 
detachment  of  cavalry  with  him  for  such  duties  as  he  may  see  fit 
to  assign  to  it. 

The  French  and  German  regulations  in  reference  to  the  use  of 
the  cavalry  are  practically  the  same. 

Art.  116  (F).  "A  column  on  the  march  is  always  covered  and 
guarded  by  detachments  taken  from  the  troops  which  compose 
it."     Their  role  is: 

First.  "  To  explore  the  country  in  front,  to  get  contact  with 
the  enemy  and  preserve  it  constantly. 

Second.  "  To  establish  around  the  troops  a  service  of  security 
in  the  first  line  under  the  protection  of  which  the  large  elements 
of  the  army  can  move  or  camp. 

"These  two  missions,  confided  to  the  cavalry,  constitute  the 
service  of  exploration  and  service  of  security.^'' 

Art.  117.  "The  service  of  exploration  falls  particularly  on  the 
cavalry  divisions.  The  service  of  security  comes  in  rear  of  the 
service  of  exploration.  It  falls  especially  on  the  brigades  of  the 
army  corps." 

Art.  122.  "The  cavalry  charged  with  the  service  of  security 
precedes  the  troops  it  is  covering  by  about  half  of  a  day's  march. 
It  marches  in  the  roads  the  columns  ought  to  follow,  and  repairs 
them  ;  it  explores  the  country.  When  it  becomes  assured  of  the 
enemy's  presence  it  watches  him." 

These  regulations  give  you  in  outline  the  duties  of  the  cavalry 
in  front  of  an  army  as  prescribed  by  the  foremost  military  nations 
of  the  world.  The  German  cavalry  lost  touch  with  the  French 
army  several  times,  but  with  those  exceptions  its  work  was  mag- 
nificent. What  it  would  have  been  had  the  work  of  the  French 
cavalry  been  anything  like  eflicient  we  can  only  conjecture. 


—54— 

It  is  not  always  safe  to  draw  conclusions  from  a  one-sided 
struggle. 

The  duty  of  furnishing  couriers  and  connecting  files  between 
the  various  sub-divisions  of  the  column  falls  to  the  cavalry. 

AETILLEEY. 

The  mobility  and  the  offensive  and  defensive  powers  of  modern 
field  artillery  have  become  so  great,  that  it  is  now  assigned  an 
important  place  in  the  advanced  guard  in  country  favorable  to  its 
movements.  As  it  must  come  into  action  early,  some  pieces  are 
frequently  attached  to  the  support  and  the  remainder  of  the  bat- 
tery or  batteries  march  with  the  reserve.  A  division  would  have 
one  battery  with  the  advanced  guard,  two  pieces  to  march  at  the 
rear  of  the  support,  and  the  other  pieces  behind  the  first  battalion 
of  the  reserve.  The  limber  chests  should  be  filled  with  ammuni- 
tion, and  the  caissons  be  left  in  the  rear,  out  of  the  way.  It  can 
assist  in  dislodging  the  enemy  from  the  villages,  buildings,  woods 
and  bridge  heads. 

Col.  Maillard  says  :  "We  think  the  battles  of  the  future  will 
generally  be  preceded  by  a  concentration  similar  to  that  of  the 
German  armies  on  the  17th  of  August,  at  least  for  the  corps  of 
the  first  line.  There  is  nothing  to  prevent  placing  the  corps  artil- 
lery in  the  advanced  guard  if  the  situation  is  strong  and  well 
known.  No  inconvenience  will  result,  for  when  this  artillery  is 
called  to  participate  in  the  combat  it  will  take  the  trot,  and  leave 
vacant  the  interval  between  the  advanced  guard  and  the  main 
body  for  the  zone  of  manceuvre.  In  immediate  contact  with  the 
enemy,  the  advanced  guard  must  form  a  curtain  of  exploration 
with  its  skirmishers  and  advanced  parties,  while  the  main  line  of 
resistance  must  be  formed  from  the  reserve.  The  masses  will 
march  in  the  rear  of  the  advanced  guard.  The  disposition  will 
depend  upon  the  ground  and  the  intentions  of  the  chief — the 
important  thing  is  that  the  artillery  find  the  ground  free  in  its 
front."  The  artillery  has  also  a  reconnoissance  role  in  connection 
with  the  cavalry,  for  with  its  long  range  it  can  assist  in  searching 
by  its  fire,  places  unapproachable  to  the  cavalry. 


—55— 

INFANTEY. 

The  r&le  of  resistance  belongs  to  the  infantry,  as  it  is  essen- 
tially the  fighting  arm  in  the  combination.  Its  mobility  imposes 
upon  it  also  the  duty  of  assisting  the  cavalry  in  reconnoissance 
work  and  of  covering  the  artillery.  The  more  artillery  in  the 
advanced  guard  the  more  infantry  it  must  have.  In  rough  country 
the  service  of  exploration  and  the  advanced  guard  duty  will  fall 
almost  entirely  upon  the  infantry.  In  the  combat  with  the 
enemy's  advanced  guard  the  infantry  must  advance  quickly  to 
protect  its  artillery  and  to  seize  and  hold  the  ground  ;  when  the 
ground  will  admit  it  ought  to  take  position  500  or  600  yards  in 
front  of  the  artillery,  to  protect  it  from  the  enemy's  infantry  fire. 
We  may  say  that  all  of  the  duties,  which  from  the  nature  of  their 
organization  the  cavalry  and  artillery  cannot  perform,  fall  to  the 
lot  of  the  infantry.     Its  role  is  "  to  conquer  and  to  preserve." 

A  light  bridge  train,  and  some  engineer  troops  should  also 
be  assigned  to  the  advanced  guard  to  bridge  streams,  destroy 
obstacles  and  repair  roads  for  the  progress  of  the  main  body. 

THE    COMMANDEE. 

When  the  enemy  is  near  the  selection  of  a  commander  for  the 
advance  guard  is  very  important.  He  must  combine  boldness, 
activity  and  knowledge  with  good  judgment,  and  be  so  well  dis- 
ciplined as  to  subordinate  his  actions  to  carrying  out  the  wishes 
and  instructions  of  the  commander-in-chief,  and  avoid  bringing 
on  engagements  through  his  own  desire  for  distinction. 

He  is  responsible  for  the  proper  arrangement  of  the  various 
parts  and  that  each  faithfully  performs  its  particular  function. 
He  must  see  that  information-  obtained  as  to  the  strength,  posi- 
tion or  movements  of  the  enemy  is  promptly  and  accurately  trans- 
mitted to  the  commander-in-chief. 

Before  assuming  command  of  the  advanced  guard  he  reports 
to  his  chief  for  instructions.  If  they  are  verbal,  he  should  write 
them  in  his  note  book  and  have  them  verified.  He  should  quickly 
inspect  his  command,  divide  it  into  the  proper  parties  and  give 
his  subordinate  chiefs  their  general  instructions  before  the  march 
is  begun. 


—se- 
lf attacked  he  must  do  one  of  three  things,  viz: 
(1)  Move  forward  and  drive  the  enemy  from  his  position. 
{2)  Assume  a  defensive  position  and  hold  it  until  he  can  be 
rein  forced  from,  the  main  body. 

(3)  Or,  if  outnumbered,  retire  slowly  on  the  main  body,  vising 
every  device  to  check  the  progress  of  the  enemy  tcntil  the  main 
body  can  be  formed. 

He  usually  marches  at  the  head  of  the  reserve,  but  may,  of 
course,  go  wherever  his  presence  is  necessary.  If  the  enemy  is 
signaled,  or  the  vanguard  engaged,  he  must  give  orders  for  the 
deployment  of  the  reserve,  and  hasten  to  the  front  to  reconnoiter. 
He  will  not  usually  have  much  time  for  deliberation,  and  he  may 
well  bear  in  mind  the  words  of  Napoleon  :  "  An  officer  in  com- 
mand on  the  march  should  constantly  be  asking  himself  what 
disposition  he  would  make  of  the  command  if  attacked."  This  is 
especially  applicable  to  the  commander  of  an  advance  guard.  It 
is  a  position  of  great  responsibility,  for  the  safety  of  the  entire 
army  may  be  compromised  by  an  ill-advised  step  on  his  part. 

THE  COMMANDER  OF  THE  VANGUARD. 

To  him  is  generally  intrusted  the  duties  : 

[1)    Of  seeing  that  the  proper  road  is  followed. 

{%)  Of  giving  instructions  to  the  non-commissioned  officers  of 
the  advanced  party  and  flanJcers. 

{3)  Of  verifying  the  reports  of  these  parties  before  sending 
inform,ation  to  the  rear. 

{J/)  He  must  send  special  patrols  to  examine  distant  objects, 
personally  direct  the  examination  of  villages  and  doubtful  locali- 
ties, and  so  expedite  the  work  of  the  scouts  and  advanced  parties 
as  to  prevent  unnecessary  halts  and  delays  in  the  progress  of  the 
main  body  of  the  advanced  guard. 

(5)  JETe  must  repair  the  roads. 

He  should  have  the  best  military  maps  procurable.  If  there  is 
any  doubt  about  the  route  he  must  procure  a  guide.  If  in  a  hos- 
tile country  and  a  willing  guide  cannot  be  obtained,  he  must 
compel  an  intelligent  inhabitant  to  act  as  guide  on  pain  of  death 


—57— 

if  he  leads  the  command  astray.  He  must  leave  a  soldier  at  the 
cross-roads  to  indicate  the  direction  to  the  reserve,  while  the 
reserve  must  perform  a  similar  duty  for  the  main  column.  He 
should  also  be  provided  with  good  field  glasses,  a  pocket  com- 
pass, note-book  and  pencil  and  a  watch.  In  fact,  every  officer 
should  be  required  to  provide  himself  with  those  articles  before 
going  on  field  service. 

THE    DETAIL. 

The  detail  is  made  by  the  adjutant  general,  under  the  authority 
of  the  commander-in-chief. 

He  should  keep  a  roster  for  such  duty,  but  should  it  become 
advisable,  he  may  select  the  best  troops,  and  the  most  capable 
commander. 

The  troops  detailed,  should  be  formed  in  line  in  front  of  the 
camp,  the  detail  should  be  verified  by  the  adjutant-general  and 
be  turned  over  to  the  commander.  After  he  has  inspected  it  and 
assigned  the  various  units  their  positions  the  march  is  begun  by 
the  advanced  party.  When  it  has  gained  its  distance,  the  sup- 
port follows  and  finally  the  reserve.  The  scouts  and  flankers 
need  not  be  thrown  .out  until  the  outer  line  of  outposts  is  reached. 

DISTANCE    FEOM     HEAD    OF   COLUMN. 

The  distance  to  be  maintained  between  the  head  of  the  ad- 
vanced guard  and  the  head  of  the  main  body  cannot  be  laid 
down  accurately,  as  it  varies  in  the  changing  nature  of  the 
country  and  the  size  of  the  command. 

A  general  rule  is,  that  this  distance  should  be  equal  to  one  and 
a  half  times  the  length  of  the  main  column,  on  a  single  road.  The 
longer  the  column  the  longer  the  time  it  will  require  to  deploy, 
and  the  enemy  must  be  held  by  the  advanced  guard  until  the 
deployment  is  completed. 

This  rule  answers  very  well  for  large  commands  ;  for  small 
ones  the  head  of  the  advanced  guard  ought  to  be  at  a  distance 
from  the  head  of  the  main  column  greater  than  the  effective 
range  of  field  artillery.     The  advanced  guard  should  never  get 


—58— 

80  far  ahead  of  the  main  body  as  to  be  in  danger  of  being  cut  oflE 
from  it. 

The  breadth  of  country  to  be  covered  by  the  advanced  parties 
and  flankers  is  equally  indefinite  and  will  vary  with  the  topog- 
raphy. If  one  flank  of  the  column  is  protected  by  a  river  or 
mountain  range,  we  need  not  explore  beyond  them  with  the 
advanced  guard  parties. 

In  open  country  the  exploration  becomes  easier  and  we  get 
more  extended  views.  When  the  divisional  cavalry  is  scouring 
the  country  in  front,  the  range  of  investigation  of  the  advanced 
guard  may  be  diminished  ;  it  should  not,  however,  be  permitted 
to  relax  in  the  thoroughness  of  its  work. 

If  the  army  is  marching  on  pai*allel  roads  communication  should 
be  maintained  between  the  advanced  guards  of  the  columns.  The 
Germans  usually  kept  strong  advanced  guards  in  front  of  their 
columns,  even  when  the  strong  cavalry  divisions  were  covering 
the  country  in  front.  In  the  advance  of  the  two  armies  from  the 
Rhine  to  the  Seine,  the  four  or  five  cavalry  divisions  were  four 
marches  in  front  of  the  army.  They  were  supported  in  rear  by 
strong  advanced  guards  of  a  division  behind  each  wing.  The 
cavalry  spread  over  a  front  of  twenty-five  miles. 

The  advanced  guard  should  push  forward  steadily,  so  as  not 
to  delay  the  progress  of  the  main  body  and  cause  unnecessary 
halts. 

ADVANCED    PARTIES    AND    PATROLS. 

They  should  be  formed  from  the  most  experienced  men — they 
must  search  carefully  every  place  that  might  offer  cover  to  the 
enemy,  such  as  ravines,  woods,  villages,  farms.  The  search  must 
be  made  rapidly,  so  as  not  to  delay  the  progress  of  the  main 
body.  If  the  places  that  need  investigation  are  quite  distant, 
they  must  be  examined  by  special  patrols. 

They  must  take  advantage  of  all  commanding  points  to  observe 
the  country,  and  should  creep  up  the  crest  and  aim  to  see  as 
much  as  possible  without  being  seen.  Any  information  obtained 
should  be  speedily  transmitted  to  the  column  by  preconcerted 


—59— 

signals  to  the  connecting  files,  or  by  courier.  They  should  pro- 
ceed quietly  and  observe  the  rule,  *'  To  see  everything  and  not 
to  be  seen,"  and  not  lose  communication  with  the  vanguard. 

The  main  body  of  the  advanced  guard  should  never  enter  a 
village,  defile  or  wood  until  it  has  been  thoroughly  reconnoitered. 
Should  the  advanced  guard  be  attacked  on  debouching  from  a 
defile  while  the  main  body  is  in  it,  it  must  hold  its  ground  and 
fight  to  the  last.  On  approaching  a  river  the  passages  must  be 
carefully  examined,  and  if  necessary,  repaired  for  the  main  body. 
The  vanguard  should  cross  quickly  and  select  a  position  for 
defence,  which  will  cover  the  bridge  or  ford  from  an  enemy's  fire. 
At  night  distances  between  posts  are  diminished,  and  the  scouts 
and  flankers  are  drawn  closer  to  the  columns  which  are  made 
more  compact. 

It  is  impossible  to  give  rules  of  action  for  every  case.  General 
rules  alone  can  be  given,  and  their  application  to  particular  cases 
must  be  left  to  the  judgment  of  the  officer  in  command. 

The  army  commander  should  inform  the  commander  of  the 
advanced  guard  where  he  intends  to  halt  for  the  night.  The 
advanced  guard  must  be  halted  in  position  to  cover  the  camping  of 
the  army.  If  it  has  had  a  little  or  no  fighting  during  the  day,  it 
may  perform  the  outpost  duty  for  the  night.  When  darkness 
sets  in,  the  cavalry  must  be  withdrawn  to  the  main  body.  If  the 
advanced  guard  is  not  to  furnish  the  outposts,  it  must  keep  out 
patrols  and  hold  the  ground  until  the  outposts  are  in  place. 

IN    RETREAT. 

When  the  army  is  retreating  the  duties  of  the  advanced  guard 
are  not  very  arduous,  and  it  need  not  be  very  strong. 

A  battalion  of  infantry,  with  a  troop  of  cavalry,  would  be  suffi- 
cient for  an  army  corps.  It  must  repair  roads  and  remove  ob- 
stacles. If  the  enemy's  cavalry  should  succeeed  in  getting  around 
the  flanks  of  the  army,  the  advanced  guard  must  push  ahead  and 
hold  the  bridges,  defiles  and  villages  on  the  line  of  retreat.  If 
the  inhabitants  are  hostile,  it  may  be  necessary  for  the  advanced 
guard  to  prevent  them  from  opposing  any  obstacle  to  the  progress 
of  the  command. 


—60— 


REAR    GUARDS. 


When  the  army  is  advancing,  the  duties  of  the  rear  guard  are 
tiresome  and  annoying,  but  not  dangerous.  It  is  generally  com- 
posed of  a  few  companies  of  infantry  and  a  troop  or  detachment 
of  cavalry.  It  marches  like  an  advanced  guard  reversed,  the  re- 
serves nearest  the  main  body.  It  marches  in  rear  of  the  trains^ 
picks  up  stragglers,  assists  in  repairing  wagons  that  have  broken 
down,  and  must  of  course  keep  a  good  lookout  for  any  detach- 
ments of  the  enemy.  In  its  march  it  gets  all  of  the  dust  and 
arrives  in  camp  late,  after  all  the  others  have  made  themselves 
comfortable. 

If  there  is  but  little  glory  attached  to  duty  with  the  rear  guard 
while  the  army  is  advancing,  it  is  very  different  in  retreat,  espe- 
cially just  after  a  defeat.  Ney  added  many  laurels  to  his  already 
great  name  by  the  masterly  and  heroic  manner  in  which  he 
covered  the  disastrous  retreat  from  Moscow.  "No  higher  compli- 
ment can  be  paid  an  officer  than  to  assign  to  him  the  command 
of  the  rear  guard  after  defeat.  The  safety  of  the  entire  army 
rests  in  his  hands.  It  may  be  necessary  to  place  the  lives  of  his 
entire  command  against  hopeless  odds  to  gain  a  few  hours'  respite 
for  the  main  body." 

It  marches  as  an  advanced  guard  reversed  as  in  Fig.  pg.  52.  It 
has  no  reconnoitering  duties  in  front,  but  in  rear  it  must  recon- 
noiter  and  at  the  same  time  keep  up  the  progress  forward.  It 
must  prevent  the  enemy's  cavalry  from  gaining  the  flanks  of  the 
army,  ward  off  sudden  attacks,  and  prevent  the  enemy's  patrols 
from  gaining  information.  It  must  destroy  bridges  and  roads, 
and  place  every  possible  obstacle  to  the  enemy's  advance. 

It  should  be  composed  of  the  freshest  troops,  preferably  from 
the  general  reserve,  if  it  has  not  been  used  up  in  the  fight.  As 
a  rule  the  victor  is  more  or  less  exhausted  by  the  struggle,  and 
for  various  reasons  cannot  or  does  not  pursue  promptly.  The 
great  fruits  of  an  active  pursuit  as  expressed  theoretically,  are 
seldom  reaped  practically.  McClellan  with  two  corps  practically 
intact  and  fresh,  allowed  Lee  to  take  his  army  safely  across  the 
Potomac   after   Antietam.     A  vigorous   pursuit   of  Lee's   army 


—61— 

after  Gettysburg,  if  it  was  possible,  would  have  had  great  in- 
fluence on  the  future  progress  of  the  rebellion.  The  failure  of 
Roseerans  to  pursue  the  beaten  Confederates  after  luka,  deprived 
us  of  the  richest  fruits  of  victory.  The  strength  of  the  rear 
guard  will  depend  upon  the  vigor  of  the  pursuit,  and  may  be 
from  one-sixth  to  one-third  of  the  army.  It  fights  under  great 
difficulties  ;  the  morale  of  the  ti'oops  is  affected  by  the  movement 
in  retreat,  their  progress  is  slow  as  it  is  regulated  by  the  rear  of 
a  column  of  exhausted  men.  Continual  fighting,  to  fall  back  at 
the  first  favorable  opportunity,  is  very  demoralizing,  reinforce- 
ment cannot  be  expected  from  the  main  body,  and  there  is  but 
little  chance  for  rest  or  refreshment. 

THE    THREE    ARMS. 

The  roles  of  the  arms  are  not  changed.  The  cavalry  which  is 
in  rear  must  keep  contact  with  the  enemy  ;  it  must  cover  the  rear 
guard  and  the  flanks  of  the  main  column  and  prevent  the  enemy's 
cavalry  from  gaining  them.  If  it  can  fight  on  foot  it  can  ma- 
terially assist  in  retarding  the  progress  of  the  enemy  by  its  fire 
from  behind  chosen  positions.  Then  it  can  quickly  remount  and 
gain  others  in  rear.  This  was  quite  common  with  our  cavalry 
during  the  late  war,  and  also  with  the  Turks  in  ISYY.  The  long 
range  of  the  artillery  enables  it  to  fight  at  grea^  distances.  It 
can  force  the  deployment  of  the  enemy's  columns,  and  thus  gain 
time  for  the  main  column.  Limbering  up  quickly  under  cover  of 
the  infantry  it  seeks  new  positions  in  rear. 

COMPOSITION. 

The  composition  of  the  rear  guard  will  depend  somewhat  on 
that  of  the  pursuing  forces.  If  the  enemy  is  strong  in  cavalry 
and  artillery  the  rear  guard  should  also  be  strong  in  those  arms. 
The  nature  of  the  country  will  also  exercise  a  great  influence  on 
the  proportion  of  the  various  arms. 

In  a  close,  rugged  country  the  bulk  of  the  rear  guard  must  be 
infantry.  In  open  country  the  proportions  of  cavalry  and  artil- 
lery may  be  increased. 


—62— 


ACTION. 


The  combats  of  the  rear  guard  are  essentially  defensive.  It 
may,  however,  assume  the  defensive  even  to  its  sacrifice. 

In  the  "School  of  the  Battalion,"  French,  Art.  171,  we  read  : 
"  The  rear  guard  can  sometimes  take  the  offensive,  when  it  is,  for 
example,  charged  with  guarding  a  defile  which  contains  the  main 
body,  or  in  defending  the  opening  of  a  passage  through  which 
the  enemy  is  obliged  to  debouche." 

If  the  enemy's  artillery  is  in  a  position  to  beat  the  entrance  to 
the  defile  with  its  fire,  the  rear  guard  must  dislodge  it  if  possible. 
Marshal  Bugeaud  says  :  "  The  morale,  always  so  easily  weakened 
in  troops  in  retreat,  is  elevated  by  a  vigorous  offensive  move- 
ment. It  also  gives  the  enemy  a  high  opinion  of  their  bravery." 
The  moment  of  withdrawal  from  combat  is  a  very  trying  one.  The 
various  units  are  withdrawn  successively,  leaving  the  artillery 
and  some  infantry  to  the  last.  A  second  position  must  be 
selected  and  occupied  by  the  reserves.  The  artillery  should  then 
retire  quickly  to  this  position,  leaving  the  last  echelons  of  the 
infantry  to  cover  the  movement.  The  rear  guard  must  hold  this 
position  until  the  army  is  well  on  the  road. 

The  distance  to  be  kept  between  the  rear  guard  and  the  main 
body  cannot  be  given,  but  from  two  to  four  miles  will  generally 
be  sufficient.  If  the  enemy  is  not  pursuing  vigorously  the  dis- 
tance given  in  advanced  guards  will  suffice. 

It  must  not  delay  unnecessarily  to  keep  touch  with  the  enemy. 
That  can  be  left  to  the  cavalry.  It  is  not  the  business  of  the  rear 
guard  to  seek  unnecessary  engagements,  and  it  must  not  run  the 
risk  of  being  cut  off  by  the  enemy. 

The  exhausting  duties  of  the  rear  guard  make  its  relief  neces- 
sary before  it  is  entirely  worn  out  and  exhausted.  This  can  be 
most  readily  effected  at  a  defile.  The  new  rear  guard  is  detailed 
and  placed  in  position  to  hold  the  defile  ;  the  main  body  con- 
tinues its  march  and  the  old  rear  guard  passes  through  the  new 
and  joins  the  main  column. 

A  good  knowledge  of  the  tactical  value  of  the  ground  is  essen- 
tial to  the  successful  command  of  the  rear  guard.    Positions  must 


—63— 

be  chosen  that  will  give  a  clear  field  of  fire  to  the  front,  with  a 
zone  of  manoeuvre  in  rear,  and  which  will  permit  a  withdrawal  in 
echelon. 

Modem  weapons  have  made  frontal  attacks  so  destructive  and 
so  uncertain  that  it  is  doubtful  if  they  are  worth  the  sacrifice 
they  cost  when  used  against  the  rear  guard  of  an  enemy  already 
in  retreat.  It  is  probable  then  that  the  enemy's  efforts  will  be 
directed  towards  turning  the  flanks  of  the  rear  guard  and  in 
efforts  to  gain  the  flanks  of  the  retreating  column.  The  increased 
ranges  of  modern  weapons  will  enable  the  rear  guard  to  force  the 
enemy  to  make  long  detours  to  gain  the  flank  ;  it  may  thus 
accomplish  its  task,  which  is  to  delay  the  enemy  without  much 
hard  fighting.  Vigorous  work  by  the  rear  guard  for  a  few  hours 
ought  to  insure  the  safety  of  the  army.  If  the  enemy's  progress 
can  be  kept  below  one  mile  an  hour  while  the  army  is  making 
two  and  one-half  or  three  miles  per  hour  in  retreat  it  must  in  a 
few  hours  reach  a  position  of  comparative  safety,  where  it  can  at 
least  protect  itself  from  annoyances  by  detachments  of  the  enemy. 
A  detachment  of  engineers  should  be  attached  to  the  rear  guard 
to  destroy  the  bridges  as  soon  as  crossed.  The  French  were 
grossly  neglectful  of  this  precaution  in  their  retreats  from  the 
frontier.  A  rear  guard  must  use  all  available  means  of  defense. 
It  should  be  skilled  in  constructing  hasty  field  works,  and  in 
destroying  roads  ;  if  necessary,  houses,  woods  and  even  villages 
may  be  set,  on  fire  to  retard  the  progress  of  the  enemy.  Even 
the  smallest  advantages  over  the  enemy  assist  the  cause  by  rais- 
ing the  morale  of  the  men. 

No  more  arduous  or  honorable  duty  can  be  assigned  to  oflicers 
or  men  ;  it  offers  many  opportunities  to  show  zeal  and  ability,  as 
well  as  patriotism  and  devotion. 


OHAPTEE  Y. 


OUTPOSTS. 


DEFINITION    OF    DUTIES. 


Outposts  are  detachments  of  troops  thrown  out  from  the  main 
body  for  the  following  purposes  : 

(a)  To  protect  it  against  surprise  and  thus  secure  the  repose  of 
as  many  men  as  possible. 

(b)  To  gain  information  of  the  enemy's  location  and  move- 
ments, and  of  the  ground  between  the  armies. 

(c)  To  prevent  the  enemy  from  gaining  information  a^  to  the 
number  and  disposition  of  our  troops. 

Outposts  may  be  divided  into  two  classes  : 

(jf)  March  outposts — Those  thrown  out  at  the  close  of  the  day's 
march  to  cover  the  command  until  the  following  morning  when 
the  march  is  to  be  resumed. 

(2)  Stationary  outposts — Those  placed  from  day  to  day  when 
the  command  is  in  camp  or  cantonment. 

The  general  principles  are  the  same  in  both  kinds,  and  if  the 
march  is  finished  in  time  to  admit  of  a  careful  examination  of  the 
ground  before  night,  a  regular  system  of  outposts  may  be  estab- 
lished ;  but  if  the  advanced  guard  and  cavalry  patrols  have  done 
their  duty,  the  enemy  can  know  but  little  of  the  situation  or  con- 
dition of  the  troops,  and  a  regular  system  of  outposts  will  not 
be  necessary,  as  he  will  probably  confine  his  operations  to  the 
roads. 

March  outposts  should  consist  of  detachments  thrown  forward 
on  the  roads,  and  on  the  flanks,  to  hold  important  points,  such 
as  bridges,  defiles,  cross-roads,  clumps  of  woods,  and  small  vil- 
lages. 

They  should  be  far  enough  forward  and  of  sufficient  strength 
to  give  timely  warning  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy  and  to 
arrest  his  progress  until  the  main  body  can  be  placed  in  position. 
5 


—66— 

The  detachments  should  send  stationary  patrols,  of  a  non-com- 
missioned officer  and  three  or  four  men,  to  the  front  along  the 
roads.  These  stationary  patrols  should  conceal  themselves  near 
the  edge  of  the  road,  in  positions  to  see  as  much  as  possible  with- 
out being  seen. 

Each  detachment  must  keep  a  sentinel  on  duty  to  protect  itself, 
and  must  maintain  lateral  connection  with  the  detachments  on  its 
flanks  by  frequent  patrols.  The  ground  between  the  detach- 
ments should  at  no  time  be  left  without  a  patrol. 

During  the  night  these  duties  must  be  done  by  infantry.  In 
the  day  time  the  patrol  duty  may  be  done  by  the  cavalry. 


STRENGTH. 

No  absolute  rule  can  be  given,  but  from  one-fourth  to  one- 
sixth  of  command  will  generally  suffice  for  this  duty. 

This  may  be  reduced  to  one-eighth,  or  even  one-tenth — 

(1)    When  the  command  is  small  and  can  form  quickly. 

{2)  When  the  main  body  is  camped  in  a  strong  defensive  posi- 
tion. 

{3)    When  the  enemy  is  known  to  be  distant  or  retreating. 


COMPOSITION. 

In  a  mixed  command  the  detail  should  contain  both  infantry 
and  cavalry.  The  cavalry  to  do  the  patrol  and  vedette  duty  dur- 
ing the  day,  but  to  be  replaced  at  night  by  infantry.  The  cav- 
alry may  furnish  the  pickets  during  the  day,  but  the  supports 
should  always  be  infantry.  When  defiles  are  to  be  defended, 
or  bridges  held,  light  artillery  may  be  added  to  the  detail,  but  it 
must  never  be  left  without  an  infantry  support.  Sufficient  cav- 
alry must  always  be  detailed  to  furnish  couriers,  or  orderlies  for 
the  pickets,  supports,  and  reserves.  If  bridges  or  roads  are  to  be 
destroyed,  or  constructed,  a  detachment  of  engineers  may  be  sent 
to  the  commander  of  the  outpost  for  this  duty  alone. 


-67— 


THE    COMMANDER    OF    THE    OUTPOSTS. 

He  should  be  an  officer  of  experience,  and  of  activity  and  vigi- 
lance. He  should  not  be  detailed  simply  by  roster,  nor  should 
this  duty  come  to  him  in  a  general  way,  because  he  happens  to 
be  field  officer  of  the  day.  He  should  be  selected  by  the  com- 
manding officer  for  his  known  efficiency.  In  any  army  worthy 
of  the  name  there  will  be  a  sufficient  number  of  competent  offi- 
cers to  prevent  the  duty  from  becoming  oppressive. 

Before  assuming  command,  he  must  report  to  the  commanding 
officer  for  instructions. 

If  the  instructions  are  given  verbally,  he  should  immediately 
write  them  in  his  note  book,  and  read  them  to  the  commanding 
officer  to  see  if  they  are  correct. 

The  commander  should  communicate  to  him — 

(1)  All  he  knotos  of  the  enemy'' s  numbers  and  position. 

{2)  The  line  to  he  occupied  hy  our  own  troops  in  case  of  an 
attack. 

{3)    Whether  he  must  in  case  he  is  attached,  hold  his  line  of ' 
resistance  at  all  hazards,  or  simply  delay  the  enem,y''s  progress 
until  the  main  body  can  be  formed  and  then  fall  back  on  it. 

{Jf)  He  may  also  indicate  on  the  map,  or  point  out  on  the 
ground  the  positions  for  the  reserve,  supports,  pickets  and  sentinels , 
but  if  he  has,  as  he  should  have,  confidence  in  the  judgment  of  the 
officer  he  has  selected  for  this  duty,  he  will  leave  the  details  to  him, 
and  give  only  general  instructions,  with  the  intention  of  riding 
over  the  ground  later  to  observe  the  dispositions  and  make  such 
changes  as  he  may  deem  necessary. 

The  post  of  the  commander  of  outposts  is  with  the  reserve, 
when  there  is  one.  If  there  is  no  reserve  he  should  be  with  the 
central  support,  or  he  may  select  some  position  nearly  equally 
distant  from  all  points  of  the  line  of  pickets,  and  which  should 
be  made  known  to  all  the  officers  on  this  duty. 

If  he  leaves  his  post  for  any  purpose,  he  should  inform  his 
junior  of  his  intention,  when  he  will  return,  and  where  he  will  be 
found. 

This  rule  is  general,  and  applies  to  commanders  of  supports 
and  pickets. 


—68  — 

If  he  commands  march  outposts,  he  should  visit  the  detach- 
ments as  soon  as  possible  after  they  are  posted  to  see  if  they  have 
chosen  proper  locations  and  are  vigilant.  He  should  enquire  of 
the  commanders  what  dispositions  they  have  made  for  defense, 
where  they  have  placed  their  standing  patrols,  how  often  lateral 
patrols  are  sent  out,  and  what  they  have  learned  of  the  country 
in  the  vicinity.  He  should  then  give  the  detachment  commander 
any  new  knowledge  he  may  have  acquired,  as  to  the  enemy's 
movements  or  position,  make  any  changes  he  deems  necessary  in 
the  detachment,  and  inform  him  of  any  changes  that  have  been 
made  in  the  positions  of  other  detachments,  or  in  the  general 
scheme  of  defense. 

If  he  commands  stationary  outposts,  he  must  make  a  careful 
inspection  of  the  ground  ;  select  the  lines  of  resistance  (if  not 
already  selected  by  the  commander  of  the  armj^),  and  familiarize 

Figure  5. 


himself  with  the  ground.  He  should  visit  each  support  and 
picket  shortly  after  they  are  posted,  make  any  changes  he  desires, 
see  if  their  commanders  have  clear  ideas  as  to  their  duties  in  case 
of  an  attack,  give  them  any  additional  information  or  orders  he 
may  think  necessary.  He  should  also  visit  the  line  of  sentinels 
once  during  the  day. 

Upon  his  return  to  his  station,  he  should  send  a  report  to  his 
commanding  officer,  with  a  sketch  showing  the  positions  of  the 
various    detachments  and    sentinels,   and   accompanied   by  any 


—69— 

information  he  may  have  obtained  as  to  the  enemy  oi*  country 
since  he  went  on  duty. 

The  duties  of  detachment  commanders,  sentinels  and  patrols  in 
march  outposts  are  the  same  as  those  of  the  commanders  of 
pickets,  sentinels  and  patrols  in  stationary  outposts  to  be  given 
later. 

STATIONARY    OUTPOSTS. 

Large  bodies  of  troops  in  camp  or  cantonment  require  an 
extensive  system  of  outposts,  when  menaced  by  an  active 
antagonist. 

It  is  the  most  arduous  and  important  duty  the  soldier  has  to 
perform,  and  it  should  be  impressed  upon  him  that  the  lives  of 
his  comrades  and  the  safety  of  the  entire  army  may  depend  upon 
his  vigilance  and  zeal  in  its  performance. 

Severe  punishment  should  be  given  for  negligence  or  disregard 
of  instructions  while  on  this  duty. 

Figure  6. 


%1r 

Stationary  outposts  are  composed  of  : 

(1)  Sentinels. 

(2)  Pickets. 


— vo— 

(3)  Supports. 

(4)  Reserves. 

(5)  Patrols  and  detached  posts. 

The  above  figure  represents  the  general  geometrical  scheme 
for  stationary  outposts  in  which  a  regiment  of  infantry  and  two 
pieces  of  artillery  have  been  detailed  for  the  duty.  Eight 
companies  form  the  supports  and  pickets.  The  remaining  four 
companies  and  the  artillery  form  the  reserve. 

A  judicious  application  to  the  ground  of  the  principles  illus- 
trated in  this  figure  will  properly  cover  the  front  of  an  army. 

Distances  and  intervals  cannot  be  accurately  given. 

In  the  figure  the  larger  numbers  represent  the  distances  that 
ought  not  to  be  exceeded.     No  inferior  limits  can  be  given. 

The  line  of  observation  (sentries)  should,  for  small  bodies,  be 
far  enough  to  the  front  to  protect  the  main  body  against  infantry 
fire  and  the  sudden  attack  of  cavalry  ;  from  1000  to  1500  yards 
will  be  suflicient. 

When  the  main  body  is  large  the  line  of  supports  or  the  main 
line  of  resistance  should  not  be  nearer  the  main  body  than  the 
effective  range  of  field  artillery,  or  about  3500  yards. 

The  distances  must  not  be  so  great  as  to  place  the  outposts  in 
danger  of  being  cut  off,  or  make  the  resistance  too  prolonged. 

They  must  not  be  so  small  as  to  admit  of  the  outposts  being 
driven  in  before  the  main  body  can  be  formed,  or,  in  case  of  a 
large  force,  to  allow  it  to  be  shelled  by  the  enemy. 

It  will  become  evident  by  inspecting  the  figure  that  the  farther 
the  line  of  sentinels  is  thrown  to  the  front,  the  greater  the  num- 
ber it  will  require  to  efficiently  cover  the  same  sector. 

SYSTEMS. 

Two  systems  of  outposts  are  advocated  by  various  military 
men,  viz  :  (1)  The  Cordon  system — which  is  intended  to  pre- 
vent individuals  from  passing  through  the  lines.  (2)  The  patrol 
system,  which  aims  to  prevent  large  bodies  from  entering  the 
lines. 

The  Cordon  system  is  almost  a  necessity  in  open  country,  and 
must  be  adopted  if  the  enemy  is  near  and  active. 


—71— 

The  Cordon  system  requires  many  sentinels,  especially  at  night, 
and  is  objectionable  on  that  account. 

The  patrol  and  detached  post  system  is  ample  for  march  out- 
posts, but  it  would  scarcely  prevent  an  active  enemy  from  gaining 
all  the  information  he  desired  of  the  numbers  and  positions  of  the 
various  troops. 

The  geometrical  scheme  (see  figure,  page  69)  in  connection 
with  reconnoitering  patrols  offers  the  greatest  security. 

Sentinels  may  be  either  double  or  single,  or  "  Cossack  posts  " 
of  one  non-commissioned  officer  and  three  privates  may  be  estab- 
lished. One  sentinel  is  posted  in  an  advantageous  position,  while 
the  others  remain  near  by,  concealed  from  view.  They  must 
keep  the  sentinel  in  view,  and  their  arms  in  hand.  The  sentry 
may  be  relieved  each  hour,  and  the  post  every  three  or  six  hours. 

SENTINELS. 

Location — In  daytime  they  should  be  placed  on  commanding 
points,  so  as  to  get  a  good  view  of  the  ground  in  front. 

They  should  also  see  the  sentries  on  their  right  and  left ;  when 
this  is  impossible  connection  must  be  secured  by  patrols. 

They  should  be  concealed  from  the  enemy. 

They  should  be  plainly  visible  from  their  pickets. 

They  should  be  mounted  on  the  same  posts  during  their  tours. 

In  villages,  woods  or  defiles,  they  should  be  posted  at  the  edge 
nearest  the  enemy. 

As  hearing  is  more  important  than  sight,  in  the  dark,  they 
should  not  be  posted  at  night  near  noisy  places,  such  as  mill-dams, 
or  noisy  streams. 

If  the  night  is  bright  and  clear  they  should  be  posted  on  low 
ground  so  as  to  see  approaching  objects  against  the  sky-line,  but 
if  it  is  dark  and  cloudy  or  foggy,  they  should  be  left  on  the  high 
ground. 

Double  sentinels  at  intervals  of  from  100  to  400  yards,  depend- 
ing upon  the  nature  of  the  country,  give  the  greatest  security.  If 
anything  unusual  occurs,  one  can  carry  warning  to  the  picket, 
while  the  other  remains  to  observe. 


—72— 

If  the  post  is  surprised,  one  at  least  may  be  able  to  give  the 
alarm. 

Sentinels  should  be  relieved  every  two  hours  in  good  weather, 
and  every  hour  in  stormy  or  very  cold  weather. 

Duties  of  sentinels — One  must  at  all  times  keep  a  vigilant  look- 
out to  the  front,  while  the  other  should  patrol  towards  the  neigh- 
boring sentries  when  he  can  do  so  without  being  observed. 

They  must  not  lie  down  or  take  off  their  accoutrements,  nor 
allow  their  arms  to  be  out  of  their  hands. 

They  must  keep  their  pieces  loaded,  but  must  be  extremely 
careful  to  avoid  giving  false  alarms  by  firing.  They  should  fire 
only  when  attacked  or  when  it  is  certain  the  enemy  is  advancing. 

The  commander  of  the  army,  the  commander  of  outposts,  the 
commander  of  pickets  and  supports,  in  addition  to  the  patrols,  are 
the  only  persons  the  sentinels  must  allow  to  pass  the  line. 

All  citizens,  spies,  deserters,  flags  of  truce,  approaching  a  sen- 
tinel, must  be  halted  at  forty  or  fifty  yards  from  him,  and  directed 
to  the  nearest  post  of  examination. 

He  should  challenge  every  one  approaching  his  post  between 
darkness  and  broad  daylight.  If  the  person  approaching  is 
mounted  he  must  be  ordered  to  halt  and  dismount  before  coming 
near.  Not  more  than  one  man  of  a  party  should  be  allowed  to 
approach  his  post  until  he  is  satisfied  they  are  friends. 

If  a  challenged  party  refuses  to  halt  after  a  second  order  the 
sentinel  should  fire  at  them. 

He  should  not  have  his  bayonet  fixed  in  bright  weather,  nor 
have  anything  shiny  on  his  person.  After  night  and  in  foggy 
weather  the  bayonet  should  be  fixed. 

Striking  matches  or  making  any  light  on  post  is  forbidden. 

He  must  not  fall  back  on  the  picket,  unless  he  is  attacked,  and 
should  then  move  towards  one  flank  of  the  picket,  so  as  to  mislead 
the  enemy  and  give  the  picket  an  opportunity  to  surprise  and 
attack  the  enemy  in  flank. 

If  deserters  approach  a  post  they  must  be  ordered  to  throw 
down  their  arms  and  be  directed  to  a  post  of  examination.  If 
they  do  not  throw  down  their  arms  when  ordered  they  must  be 


—73— 

fired  on.  If  followed  by  troops  of  their  own  army  the  alarm 
should  be  given. 

Deserters  should  not  be  allowed  to  pass  the  line  at  night. 

In  a  hostile  country  the  inhabitants  should  never  be  permitted 
to  pass  the  lines. 

When  it  is  known  that  a  bad  spirit  exists  in  the  enemy's  army 
and  desertions  en  masse  are  expected,  special  preparations  should 
be  made  to  receive  them  at  some  point  of  the  line,  either  by  mak- 
ing a  special  detail,  or  by  strengthening  the  pickets  and  supports 
near  this  point. 

The  bearer  of  a  flag  of  truce,  with  a  written  communication, 
or  a  request  for  a  personal  interview  with  the  army  commander, 
should  be  halted  by  the  sentinel  as  far  from  his  post  as  he  can 
communicate  with  him,  and  be  ordered  to  dismount  and  turn  his 
back  toward  the  line  until  the  picket  can  be  notified,  and  an  ofii- 
cer  be  obtained  to  ascertain  his  mission. 

All  members  of  the  outposts  should  be  forbidden  to  engage  in 
any  conversation  with  the  messenger.  If  he  has  simply  a  written 
message  for  the  commanding  officer,  he  should^  not  be  allowed  to 
enter  the  chain.  An  officer  should  take  the  papers,  giving  a 
receipt  for  them,  and  should  require  the  messenger  to  depart  at 
once  by  the  same  route  he  came. 

If  he  has  verbal  statements  to  deliver  to  the  army  commander, 
he  must  be  blindfolded  or  conducted  to  a  spot  from  which  noth- 
ing can  be  observed  until  the  wishes  of  the  commander  have  been 
obtained. 

Sentinels  on  outpost  duty  pay  no  compliments,  and  when 
engaged  in  authorized  conversations,  they  should  still  keep  a 
good  lookout  to  the  front. 

PICKETS. 

Infantry  pickets  should  be  numbered  from  right  to  left,  and  be 
from  100  to  500  yards  in  rear  of  the  line  of  observation,  near  the 
centres  of  their  own  sectors.  With  cavalry  the  distances  may  be 
increased. 


—74— 

As  a  rule,  the  distance  from  a  picket  to  either  flank  of  its  line 
of  sentinels,  from  thence  along  the  line  to  the  other  flank,  and 
from  the  latter  to  the  picket  should  not  exceed  one  mile. 

(1)  They  should  keep  their  own  sentries  in  view. 

(2)  They  should  be  concealed  from  the  enemy. 

(3)  They  should  be  in  a  favorable  position  for  defense,  and 
should  connect  with  the  pickets  on  the  right  and  left  when  extended 
for  combat. 

{4)  They  must  be  sufficiently  strong  to  furnish  the  necessary 
sentinels  and  at  least  two  patrols,  each  of  three  men  and  a  non- 
commissioned officer.  The  patrols  should  be  made  up,  even  at 
the  expense  of  the  number  of  sentinels. 

The  following  strength  would  be  necessary  to  furnish  two 
double  sentinel  posts  : 

2  Double  sentinels,  3  reliefs,  -  -  -  -  12 

1  Sentry,  over  arms,  3  reliefs,     -  -  -  -       3 

2  Sentries  to  connect  with  flank  pickets,  3  reliefs, 

(may  be  made  by  patrols)         ...  q 

5  Non-commissioned  officers,  ....  6 

3  Patrols  of  three  men  each,            ...  9 
1  Mounted  orderly,            -  -           -           -           -  1 

Total, 36 

About  half  of  one  of  our  companies  of  100  men  after  the  sick, 
special  duty  men  and  casualties  have  been  deducted. 

A  picket  should  have  a  good  line  of  retreat  to  its  supports.  At 
defiles,  bridges,  etc.,  the  pickets  should  be  posted  in  rear  with 
the  sentries  thrown  to  the  front. 

If  the  line  of  pickets  is  also  the  line  of  resistance,  orders  should 
be  given  for  them  to  strengthen  their  positions  by  throwing  up 
hasty  intrenchments,  so  as  to  hold  the  enemy  until  the  supports 
can  be  brought  up. 

Fires  should  only  be  lighted  by  permission  of  the  commander 
of  the  outposts,  and  they  should  be  screened  from  the  enemy's 
view.  The  arms  should  be  stacked,  and  a  sentinel  placed  over 
them. 


—75— 

The  patrol's  arms  should  be  stacked  together. 

When  an  attack  is  expected  the  men  should  be  required  to 
sleep  on  their  arms,  and  a  portion  of  the  picket  should  be  kept 
under  arms  throughout  the  night. 

If  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  day  positions  of  our 
pickets  are  known  to  the  enemy,  night  positions  should  be  chosen 
and  be  occupied  just  after  dark.  The  day  positions  can  be 
resumed  at  daybreak. 

A  picket  should  place  its  fire  (when  one  is  allowed)  between  it 
and  the  enemy  and  on  one  flank. 

If  the  supports  are  along  the  line  of  resistance,  it  will  scarcely 
be  necessary  for  pickets  to  intrench. 

Bugles  and  drums  must  not  be  used  at  the  pickets,  except  to 
sound  the  alarm. 

Rations  for  the  outposts  should  be  drawn  by  the  reserve,  and 
the  cooking  should  be  done  at  the  reserve  fires  when  the  enemy 
is  near. 

But  a  few  men  of  a  picket  should  be  allowed  to  eat  at  the  same 
time. 

If  a  neighboring  picket  is  attacked,  our  picket  must  be  formed 
and  a  patrol  sent  to  ascertain  its  nature  and  extent. 

The  cavalry  will  not  unsaddle  and  will  only  unbridle  to  feed 
and  water,  and  even  then  a  few  at  a  time. 

The  line  of  retreat  of  a  picket  should  be  chosen  so  as  not  to 
mask  the  fire  of  the  support. 

These  are  general  instructions,  and  may  be  changed  at  the 
pleasure  of  the  commanding  officer  of  the  troops.  They  should 
be  made  to  meet  the  necessities  of  the  case. 

COMMANDER    OF   A   PICKET. 

(1)  He  should  provide  himself  with  a  note  book  and  pencil^  a 
watch,  field  glasses,  a  magnetic  compass,  and  a  map  of  the 
country. 

{2)  He  should  write  down  all  the  verbal  instructions  he  receives. 

{3)  He  must  visit  the  sentinels  during  the  day  to  see  that  they 
are  alert  and  understand  their  duties. 


:o 


—76— 

(4)  He  should  not  leave  his  picket  at  night. 

{5)  He  must  familiarize  himself  with  the  ground  about  his 
picket  and  select  various  positions  between  the  picket  and  support 
which  might  offer  advantages  to  the  defense. 

{6)  He  must  superintend  the  construction  of  obstacles  and  field 
works,  when  ordered. 

(7)  After  the  sentries'  posts  are  established  he  should  send  a 
report  to  the  commander  of  the  outposts,  accompanied  by  a 
sketch. 

SUPPORTS. 

Supports  are  generally  from  200  to  800  yards  in  rear  of  the 
pickets  and  should  be  nearly  equally  distant  from  their  own 
pickets. 

They  are  generally  placed  on  roads  leading  to  the  front. 

The  supports  are  usually  located  on  the  "line  of  resistance,'* 
but  it  may  be  occupied  by  either  the  pickets  or  reserves.  In  the 
former  case  the  supports  must  be  moved  forward  to  the  line  of 
pickets ;  in  the  latter  case  they  must  extend  and  wait  till  the 
pickets  fall  back  on  them,  and  then  fall  back  slowly,  disputing 
the  ground,  until  they  join  the  reserve. 

Each  support  may  furnish  one,  two  or  more  pickets.  The 
strength  of  the  support  should  be  equal  to  that  of  all  its  pickets. 
When  on  the  line  of  resistance  preparations  should  be  made  for 
defense  ;  hasty  intrenchments  should  be  built,  lines  of  retreat  be 
selected  so  as  not  to  mask  the  fire  of  the  main  body  or  reserve. 

The  supports  of  the  reserve  must  furnish  the  patrols  which  are 
sent  out  to  examine  the  roads  at  long  distances.  , 

A  support  and  its  picket  should  belong  to  the  same  tactical 
unit,  viz  :  same  company,  when  the  support  is  small,  and  same 
battalion,  when  it  is  large. 

One  of  our  companies  with  80  men  present  for  duty,  could 
furnish  one  support  and  one  picket  of  40  men  each,  or  one  support 
of  40  men  and  two  small  pickets  of  20  men  each,  as  follows  : 


—77— 

1  Double  sentinel  post,  3  reliefs,     -         -         -         -  6 

1  Sentinel  over  arms,  3  reliefs, 3 

2  Patrols,  4  men  each, 8 

Non-commissioned  officers, 3 

Total, 20 

With  100  men  present,  a  company  could  furnish  one  support 
of  50  men,  and  two  pickets  of  25  men  each.  Supports  and  pickets 
may  be  placed  together  when  the  line  of  observation  is  near  the 
best  line  for  defense. 

COMMANDER    OF   SUPPORT. 

As  the  brunt  of  resistance  will  generally  fall  on  the  support,  it 
is  the  duty  of  its  commander  to  carefully  study  his  position  and 
determine  how  and  where  the  resistance  is  to  be  offered.  He 
must  act  in  concert  with  the  pickets  and  also  the  reserve,  when 
there  is  one.  He  must  consequently  consult  with  the  command- 
ers of  his  pickets,  and  of  that  portion  of  the  reserve  that  is  to  be 
in  his  rear,  and  must  determine  : 

(1)  The  lines  of  retreat  of  the  pickets  lohen  they  fall  back,  so  the 
fire  of  the  support  shall  never  he  masked. 

(2)  The  lines  of  retreat  for  supports  and  pickets  so  as  not  to 
mask  the  f  re  of  the  reserves. 

(3)  The  positions  the  pickets  must  occupy  when  they  fall  back, 
or  their  combined  position  if  the  support  should  move  up  to  the 
picket. 

He  must  maintain  lateral  connections  with  his  adjacent  sup- 
ports, either  by  a  sentinel  or  by  patrols,  and  should  be  in  com- 
munication with  the  reserve,  either  by  courier  or  field  telegraph. 

Unless  there  is  an  attack,  the  duties  of  the  supports  are  not 
arduous,  and  after  the  position  is  sufficiently  strengthened  by 
earthworks,  rifle  pits,  etc.,  the  men  may  be  allowed  to  rest  com- 
fortably. A  sentinel  over  the  arms  and  a  patrol  will  be  a  suffix 
cient  number  to  keep  awake. 

Supports  will  not  render  compliments,  but  if  the  commander  of 
the  outposts,  or*  other  officer  entitled  to  a  parade  of  the  guard 


—78— 

approaches,  he  should  be  met  by  the  commander  of  the  support, 
and  any  instructions  or  information  he  may  give  should  be  copied 
in  a  note  book. 

IN   CONTACT   WITH   THE   ENEMY. 

If  night  has  brought  the  action  to  an  end  and  the  troops  re- 
main in  position  to  renew  the  attack  by  daybreak,  there  will  not 
be  time  to  draw  from  the  body  of  the  troops  detachments  destined 
to  furnish  outposts  ;  they  must  be  provided  from  the  battalions 
and  regiments,  then  in  the  first  line  supported  by  the  battalions 
in  rear,  with  some  sections  pushed  to  the  front,  and  connected  on 
the  right  and  left  by  patrols.  If  the  troops  of  the  first  line  have 
become  disorganized  they  must  be  relieved  by  others  from  the 
reserves.  The  troops  must  bivouac  in  position,  and  reconnoiter- 
ing  patrols  be  kept  at  the  front  to  observe  the  enemy's  move- 
ments. 

DETACHED     POSTS. 

They  are  simply  small  detachments  used  to  guard  important 
points  such  as  bridges,  fords,  etc. 

They  may  be  stationed  on  the  flanks  to  protect  them  from 
detachments  of  the  enemy's  cavalry. 

They  may  be  used  to  connect  pickets  that  are  too  far  apart  to 
furnish  their  own  connecting  patrols. 
3P  They  may  be  sent  to  elevated  points,  or  into  woods  beyond  the 

line  of  sentinels. 

Their  strength  will  vary  with  the  importance  of  their  mission. 

They  should  be  concealed  from  the  enemy,  and  should  always 
have  a  sentry  near^  by — they  should  also  send  out  frequent  patrols. 
The  duty  is  very  fatiguing,  and  the  posts  should  be  relieved  at 
least  twice  in  twenty-four  hours. 

They  must  be  careful  not  to  be  surprised  and  cut  off. 

If  they  contain  more  than  twelve  or  fifteen  men,  they  should 
be  commanded  by  an  officer. 


—79— 


POSTS    OF    EXAMINATION. 


Are  small  posts  of  an  officer  or  non-commissioned  officer  and 
three  or  four  men,  stationed  on  a  road  near  the  line  of  sentinels, 
to  examine  persons  who  desire  to  pass  the  line  either  way,  and  to 
determine  whether  they  shall  be  allowed  to  pass  or  be  turned 
back  or  made  prisoners. 

The  commander  of  outpost  decides  where  they  shall  be  located, 
and  gives  instructions  to  the  non-commissioned  officers  in  charge. 

NIGHT     SYSTEM. 

The  Cordon  system  used  during  the  day  would  be  non-effective 
in  preventing  the  passing  of  individuals  at  night,  unless  the  num- 
ber of  sentries  was  greatly  increased  or  the  line  drawn  in  much 
nearer  to  the  main  body,  neither  of  which  is  admissible. 

A  great  increase  in  the  number  of  sentries  would  defeat  one  of 
the  main  objects  for  which  outposts  are  established,  while  the 
drawing  in  of  the  outposts  at  night  could  only  be  justified  by  a 
gain  of  strength  in  position  commensurate  with  the  loss  in  dis- 
tance. 

The  better  plan  is  to  abandon  the  Cordon  system  at  night,  and 
to  establish  pickets  well  to  the  front  on  the  roads  ;  each  picket 
should  establish  a  double  sentinels'  post  from  200  to  400  yards  in 
front  of  it. 

The  connection  between  pickets  should  be  maintained  by  con- 
stant patrols  formed  from  the  double  sentries  of  the  day.  The 
patrols  should  thoroughly  cover  the  ground  between  the  sentries 
and  pickets. 

The  reconnoitering  patrols  must  also  be  sent,  as  usual,  to  the 
front  of  the  line  of  sentinels. 

If  further  security  is  desired,  a  Cordon  may  be  established  near 
the  camp,  which,  in  the  single  sentinels,  will  not  require  many 
men. 

In  very  open  country  the  number  of  double  sentries  would  have 
to  be  increased  and  some  pickets  be  stationed  between  the  roads. 


—80— 

PATEOLS. 

Patrols  are  of  three  kinds  : 

ri)  Visiting  patrols,  )  p^rnished  bv  the  nickets 

(2)  Reconnoitering  patrols,      f  *  umisnea  Dy  tne  pickets. 

(3)  Special  patrols,     |  Furnished^by  ^supports  or 

Visiting  patrols  consist  of  a  non-commissioned  officer  and  two 
privates,  detailed  from  the  picket  to  visit  its  own  sentinels,  to  see 
if  they  are  alert  and  familiar  with  their  orders  and  duties. 

The  frequency  with  which  these  patrols  are  made  will  be  deter- 
mined by  the  commander  of  the  picket.  They  should  be  made 
at  least  once  between  reliefs  at  night,  and  oftener  if  the  sentinels 
are  unfamiliar  with  outpost  duty,  and  the  weather  is  foggy,  or 
the  enemy  is  near. 

During  the  day  this  duty  may  be  performed  by  a  single  non- 
commissioned officer. 

KECONNOITERING   PATEOLS. 

They  are  small  patrols,  usually  of  a  non-commissioned  officer 
and  three  or  four  men,  sent  out  from  the  pickets  to  examine  the 
ground  in  front  of  the  line  of  observation. 

Figure  7. 

oy  <  —  -^ 


Vt 


-^^^-oA 


—81— 

By  day  they  must  be  sent  to  examine  localities  not  visible  to 
the  sentinels,  such  as  little  clumps  of  woods,  farm  houses  and 
ravines. 

They  should  not  be  sent  too  far  from  the  line  of  sentinels,  A 
mile  is  about  the  maximum  distance  they  should  be  allowed  to 
go,  and  at  least  oije  member  should  always  be  in  sight  of  the 
sentinel. 


The  outposts  should  be  relieved  at  daybreak,  as  it  is  the  most 
probable  time  of  attack. 

The  pickets  should  be  formed  about  half  an  hour  before  dawn. 
Reconnoitering  and  visiting  patrols  should  be  sent  out.  If  they 
report  that  they  have  observed  nothing  unusual,  the  commander 
of  the  picket  will  proceed  to  post  the  sentinels  on  the  day  line  of 
observation,  and  will  also  resume  the  day  position  with  his  picket 
if  it  has  been  changed  for  the  night. 

The  two  pickets  remain  under  arms,  under  command  of  the 
officer  of  the  old  picket,  until  the  relieved  sentinels  and  the  new 
commander  join.  The  commander  of  the  old  picket  will  then  turn 
over  to  the  new  commander  the  standing  and  special  orders  of 
his  post,  and  explain  to  him  the  preparations  already  made  for 
defense.  The  old  picket  then  joins  its  support,  which  marches  to 
camp  as  soon  as  its  pickets  have  joined. 


9- 


CHAPTEE  YI. 


TACTICS. 

Tactics  may  be  defined  to  be  the  art  of  handling  troops  on  the 
ground. 

Grand  tactics  are  usually  applied  to  the  movements  of  large 
bodies  of  troops,  such  as  brigades,  divisions  and  army  corps,  and 
commands  of  the  three  arms  combined,  while  minor  tactics  is  con- 
fined to  the  actions  of  smaller  bodies.  The  distinction  is  unim- 
portant and  we  will  not  dwell  upon  it. 

The  use  of  a  definite  system  of  tactics  distinguishes  civilized 
fi'om  savage  warfare,  and  hordes  of  uncontrolled,  unguided  sav- 
ages have  rarely  been  able  to  overcome  the  rigid  squares  and 
strong  tactical  lines  of  well-drilled  and  well-disciplined  troops. 
Thrilling  examples  of  this  kind  can  be  found  in  the  records  of  our 
own  Indian  wars  and  in  the  Egyptian  and  Indian  campaigns  of 
our  English  brothers.  Equally  brilliant  illustrations  can  be  found 
in  the  history  of  the  conflicts  of  the  Roman  legions  and  the 
northern  savages  nearly  twenty  centuries  ago. 

The  principles  of  tactics  are  of  a  scientific  character  and  have 
engrossed  the  attention  of  many  scientific  men  both  civil  and 
military  since  armies  were  first  organized.  The  success  of  an 
army  in  war  depends  more  than  ever  upon  the  intelligence  and 
professional  knowledge  of  both  men  and  oflicers.  A  close  study 
of  tactics  must  be  a  very  essential  part  of  their  work.  The  days 
of  the  rough  and  ready  soldier  who  earned  victory  by  his  superior 
ability  at  hacking  and  chopping  have  passed  never  to  return. 
The  domain  of  the  soldier's  profession  is  ever  widening,  it  is  con- 
tinually encroaching  on  new  fields  of  science  and  learning.  The 
study  of  tactics  must  be  combined  with  the  studies  of  the  ground, 
topographically  and  geologically  ;  researches  into  the  powers  of 
arms  of  all  kinds,  the  value  of  fortifications  and  obstacles,  and  the 
physical  powers  of  man  and  horse. 


—84— 

Tactics  differs  from  strategy  in  that  it  is  based  upon  principles 
that  are  ever  changing  with  the  changes  of  arms.  Napoleon 
remarked  that  the  system  of  tactics  should  be  changed  every  ten 
years.  The  wisdom  of  his  saying  has  been  exemplified.  The 
Germans  and  French  set  to  work  to  remodel  their  tactics  after  the 
war  of  1870-71,  and  had  not  fully  accomplished  their  tasks  when, 
eight  years  after,  the  Russo-Turkish  war  made  more  changes 
imperative.  The  tactics  employed  during  the  war  of  the  rebellion 
have  long  been  obsolete  and  Upton's  Tactics,  based  upon  the 
lessons  of  that  war,  have  now  been  superseded  by  the  new  drill 
books  prescribing  new  rules  of  action  on  the  field  of  battle, 
though  the  evolutions  of  masses  remain  substantially  the  same. 

The  principles  of  strategy,  on  the  contrary,  were  the  same  for 
Alexander,  Caesar,  Napoleon,  Grant  and  Von  Moltke.  Railways 
have  greatly  increased  the  celerity  of  movement  of  armies,  and 
telegraph  lines  quickly  give  information  of  the  enemy's  designs  ; 
but  bases,  lines  of  operation  and  communications  are  governed  by 
the  same  strategical  principles. 

"  Strategy  directs  armies  to  the  proper  field.  Tactics  fights  the 
battles  and  gains  the  victories,  strategy  often  adds  to  the  value  of 
them."  We  do  not  know  when  man  first  attempted  concerted 
movements  against  his  fellow  man  on  the  field  of  battle  but  it  was 
the  origin  of  tactics,  and  from  that  day  to  this  the  progress  has 
been  sure  and  steady. 

Frederick  the  Great  may  be  said  to  be  the  father  of  modern 
tactics.  He  introduced  thin  lines  (three  ranks),  maintained  an 
iron  discipline,  greatly  increased  the  accuracy  of  his  musketry 
fire,  perfected  the  combination  of  the  various  arms  on  the  field 
and  relied  upon  celerity  of  movement  and  the  mobility  of  his  lines 
to  overcome  the  sluggish  evolutions  of  his  deep-ranked  opponents. 
His  success  earned  for  him  the  title  of  "  The  Great." 

Napoleon,  the  highest  type  of  military  genius  the  world  has 
ever  seen,  adopted  thin  lines,  coupled  with  heavy  deep  columns, 
the  former  to  do  the  fighting  along  the  general  lines,  the  latter  to 
be  thrown  forward  against  flank  or  center  at  the  critical  moment 
to  crush  the  enemy  by  their  enormous   shock   power.     He   has 


—85  — 

been  severely  criticised  for  giving  such  great  depth  to  his  columns 
and  there  is  no  doubt  that  he  did  sometimes  use  this  formation 
unnecessarily,  especially  at  Waterloo."  "Donzelet's  division 
which  contained  nine  battalions  had  twenty-seven  ranks  in  its 
column.  The  divisions  of  Marcognet  and  Durette  had  each 
twenty-four  ranks  ; "  but  nothing  succeeds  like  success,  and  the 
study  of  his  marvelous  campaigns  must  ever  delight  the  student 
of  the  art  of  war. 

Napoleon's  tactics  remained,  in  principle,  the  tactics  of  all  the 
armies  of  the  civilized  world  until  the  war  of  the  rebellion. 
Shortly  after  this  the  breechloader  made  its  debut,  and  the  appear- 
ance of  masses  on  the  field  of  battle  was  relegated  to  the  past. 
The  skill  and  success  of  our  skirmishes  during  the  latter  part  of 
the  war  made  it  evident  that  the  open  order  must  be  adopted  in 
all  actions  where  breechloading  rifles  are  used.  The  Germans 
were  convinced  of  this  after  Gravelotte,  and  had  the  courage  to 
undertake  the  unprecedented  step  of  modifying  their  tactics  in 
the  midst  of  a  great  war.  Their  iron  discipline  and  magnificent 
general  staff  made  this  possible. 

The  company  is  the  unit  of  combat.  This  is  the  key-note  of 
modern  tactics. 

"  The  spirit  of  modern  tactics  breathes  trust  and  confidence,  of 
the  colonel  in  his  captains,  of  the  captains  in  their  subalterns,  and 
of  the  subalterns  in  the  non-commissioned  oflScers  and  men.  It 
means  freedom  for  all  to  act  as  they  deem  best  in  situations  which 
cannot  be  foreseen  and  provided  for." 

Control  must  be  maintained  as  rigidly,  yes,  more  rigidly  than 
ever,  but  this  control  is  in  the  hands  of  the  many  instead  of  in 
the  hands  of  one  or  of  a  few.  It  does  not  destroy  the  principle 
of  unity  of  command,  but  creates  more  individual  responsibility, 
and  the  great  problem  now  before  us  is  how  to  train  our  oflicers 
and  men  up  to  this  responsibility  and  at  the  same  time  tighten 
the  reins  of  discipline. 

Col.  Robert  says  :  "  Tactics  in  particular  has  become  in  our 
day  one  of  the  most  difficult  arts.  It  demands  at  once  science, 
experience,  energy,  character,  knowledge  of  the  human  heart  and 


human  passions,  qualities  rarely  found  united  in  the  same  individ- 
ual." The  greatest  generals  have  committed  grave  tactical 
errors. 

Tactical  rules  are  drawn  from  experience  in  war,  but  frequently 
improvements  in  weapons  make  such  rapid  strides,  that  they  get 
greatly  in  advance  of  the  political  events  that  bring  about  wars 
for  testing  them.  We  are  thus  thrown  into  a  vast  sea  of  uncer- 
tainty and  speculation  and  are  compelled  to  adopt  theories  not 
securely  founded  on  experience.  Such  is  our  condition  to-day,  so 
far'  as  battle  tactics  are  concerned.  The  domain  of  tactics  has 
been  increased  of  late  years.  A  few  years  ago  it  was  limited  to 
the  field  of  1)attle,  but  it  is  now  conceded,  "  that  it  begins  at  the 
moment  the  presence  of  the  enemy  exercises  any  influence  on  the 
formations  and  movements  of  the  troops." 

The  five  principal  functions  of  armies  are  :  To  fight,  to  march, 
to  rest,  to  live,  and  to  protect  themselves. 

We  may  then  subdivide  the  subject  into  five  parts,  viz  : 

1.  Tactics  of  security. 

2.  Tactics  of  supply. 

3.  Tactics  of  station. 

4.  Tactics  of  march. 

5.  Tactics  of  combat. 

We  have  in  previous  chapters  covered  the  tactics  of  supply,  of 
station  and  of  security.  We  have  remaining  the  tactics  of  march 
and  of  combat. 

By  discussing  these  subdivisions  for  each  arm  separately,  then 
for  the  various  combinations  of  the  three  principal  arms — infantry, 
cavalry  and  artillery — the  entire  domain  of  tactics  may  be  cov- 
ered. *L  can  only  touch  the  principal  points,  as  many  volumes 
have  been  written  on  the  tactics  of  a  single  arm. 

MARCH  TACTICS. 

Marching  occupies  a  great  portion  of  the  daily  life  of  an  army. 
Its  influence  over  the  success  or  failure  of  a  campaign  cannot  be 
over-estimated.  The  most  brilliant  strategical  conceptions  may 
fail  through  the  non-arrival  of  certain  units  at  the  times  and 


—87— 

places  specified  in  the  orders  of  the  general.  An  important  battle 
may  be  lost  by  the  failure  of  the  artilleiy  or  cavalry,  to  reach  the 
right  spot  at  the  time  they  are  due.  Bazaine's  army  was  shut  up 
in  Metz  and  captured,  due  to  almost  criminal  incapacity  in  march- 
ing it  westward.  The  skill  of  the  general  and  his  staff  is  most 
effectively  shown  by  the  way  the  masses  are  moved  in  the  theater 
of  war  and  the  condition  of  the  men  when  brought  into  action. 
When  distant  from  the  enemy  the  comfort  of  the  men  becomes  of 
prime  importance.  Hours  of  marching  may  be  selected  which 
will  interfere  least  with  the  repose  of  the  troops.  The  army  may 
march  by  divisions  or  even  brigades,  and  each  unit  may  have  its 
rations  and  baggage  near  at  hand  and  the  men  can  be  made  com- 
fortable as  soon  as  they  arrive  in  camp  or  bivouac.  In  the 
presence  of  the  enemy,  tactical  considerations  and  preparation 
for  combat  must  be  the  controlling  motives. 

A  column  of  troops  on  the  march  must  be  protected  against 
surprises,  and  the  different  elements  must  be  arranged  so  they  can 
arrive  on  the  field  of  battle  in  proper  order. 

Protection  requires,  ^rs^,  exploration  or  reconnoisance.  This 
service  is  performed  by  the  divisional  cavalry,  which  precedes  the 
column  by  one  or  two  days'  marches,  exploring  the  country  on  all 
sides,  obtaining  contact  with  the  enemy  when  possible  and  being 
careful  to  preserve  this  contact  constantly.  Patrols  are  kept  out 
to  watch  the  roads  and  the  country  generally,  and  energetic 
measures  are  taken  to  secure  all  possible  information  of  the 
enemy's  movements.  This  information  must  be  sent  to  the  com- 
mander-in-chief as  speedily  as  possible. 

The  new  powders  and  new  arms  have  increased  the  dangers  to 
which  troops  may  be  exposed  on  the  march,  and  for  this  reason 
at  least,  the  tactical  importance  of  cavalry  in  exploration  and 
security  has  greatly  increased  and  the  tactics  of  masses  of  cavaliy 
must  be  studied  with  great  care. 

The  infantry  and  artillery  are  of  but  little  importance  in  the 
service  of  exploration  when  cavalry  is  present.  The  former  is 
too  slow,  and  the  latter  can  only  operate  along  roads  or  in  open 
■country. 

Second — Security. 


—88— 

The  service  of  exploration  may  not  offer  much  protection  to  the 
marching  column.  Consequently,  we  must  have  advanced  guards, 
rear  guards  and  flankers  to  completely  surround  the  main  body, 
to  give  timely  warning  of  the  enemy's  approach  and  to  retard  his 
movements  until  the  main  body  can  be  deployed  and  brought  into 
action. 

A  police  guard  commanded  by  an  officer  marches  immediately 
in  rear  of  the  troops.  Its  duties  are  to  arrest  stragglers,  to  search 
buildings  for  men  who  may  be  pillaging  or  trying  to  desert,  to 
take  charge  of  prisoners,  and  such  other  duties  as  may  be  assigned 
to  it  by  the  commander-in-chief.  The  police  duties  on  the  march 
and  in  camp  during  the  war  of  the  rebellion,  were  entrusted  to 
officers  called  provost-marshals. 

In  the  march  of  an. army  corps  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy,  the 
artillery  of  the  leading  division  should  be  with  the  advanced 
guard,  between  its  infantry  regiments  of  the  reserve.  The  corps 
artillery  would  be  placed  between  the  first  and  second  divisions, 
the  artillery  of  the  second  division  behind  its  leading  regiment  of 
infantry  ;  that  of  the  third  division  behind  its  leading  regiment. 
When  possible,  the  march  of  large  bodies  should  be  conducted  in 
several  parallel  columns  to  expedite  the  march  and  the  formation 
in  order  of  battle.  The  artillerj^  should  then  be  near  the  head  of 
each  column,  with  a  sufficient  infantry  support  in  front  for 
security.  In  their  maneuvres  in  1889,  the  Germans  employed  the 
following  formation  for  an  army  corps  marching  on  two  roads, 
viz:  One  of  the  divisions  kept  its  artillery  in  the  normal  place, 
the  division  marching  with  the  corps'  artillery  placed  its  divisional 
artillery  in  the  advanced  guard  and  the  corps'  ai'tillery  behind  the 
leading  battalion  of  the  main  body. 

If,  for  any  reason,  the  cavalry  cannot  be  at  the  front,  it  must 
march  at  the  rear  of  the  column.  Its  place  in  battle  is  near  the 
fiank  on  which  the  ground  is  most  favorable  for  its  action.  When 
possible  the  troops  march  alongside  the  roads  and  leave  them  for 
the  artillery  and  the  trains.  When  troops  move  in  large  bodies, 
particularly  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  they  should  march  on 
as  broad  a  front  as  the  military  situation  may  justify.     When  the 


—so- 
country  is  favorable,  the  command  is  divided  into  several  columns, 
which  march  on  different  roads.  "  There  is  one  broad  principle, 
however,  which  must  not  be  lost  sight  of,  viz:  the  division  of  a 
force  into  lateral  columns  is  disadvantageous  as  regards  deploy- 
ment into  line  of  battle  if  the  differences  between  the  different 
heads  of  columns  are  together  much  greater  than  the  total  depth 
of  the  whole  force  if  it  were  marching  in  one  column."  (Von 
Schellendorf.)  There  is  danger  of  these  columns  being  crushed 
singly  before  the  others  could  come  to  its  relief. 

Baggage  trains  are  necessary  encumbi'ances  to  the  movements 
of  an  array  and  add  greatly  to  the  difficulties  of  the  march. 
When  in  touch  with  the  enemy  they  must  be  kept  well  in  rear  of 
the  column^  following  in  the  order  corresponding  to  the  order  of 
march  of  the  staffs  and  regiments  to  which  they  belong.  If  an 
engagement  is  expected,  troops  may  be  followed  by  their  spare 
horses  and  ambulances,  the  artillery  by  its  first  echelon  of  ammu- 
nition wagons,  and  the  pioneers  by  the  bridge  trains  and  imple- 
ment wagons.  The  small  arms  ammunition  wagons  should 
follow  the  regiments  to  which  they  belong.  Field  hospitals,  the 
remainder  of  the  ammunition  columns  and  some  of  the  provision 
trains  should  be  kept  sufficiently  near  to  join  the  troops  at '  the 
close  of  the  engagement. 

If  the  troops  are  advancing  the  trains  will  not  need  much  pro- 
tection other  than  that  afforded  by  the  trainmen  who  are  armed. 
In  a  hostile  country  a  special  escort  is  provided  to  ensure  safety, 
especially  when  the  army  is  retreating  and  the  trains  are  in  front 
(654  D.  R.).  In  route  marches  regiments  usually  alternate  in 
leading  the  brigade,  brigades  in  divisions,  divisions  in  corps.  It 
is  not,  however,  a  matter  of  any  importance.  Fifteen  miles  is 
considered  an  average  day's  march  for  infantry  on  fair  roads. 
The  time  in  which  it  can  be  made  depends  upon  the  conditions  of 
the  roads  and  weather  and  the  length  of  the  column  and  the  con- 
dition of  the  troops.  A  battalion  of  four  companies  ought  to 
march  15  miles  on  the  average  road  in  our  country  in  about  five 
hours,  a  division  in  about  6^  hours,  etc.  Marching  columns  are 
affected  by  so  many  conditions  it  is  impossible  to  predict  their 
progress. 


—90— 

In  war,  marches  occur  daily,  battles  only  occasionally.  Napo- 
leon said,  "  Victory  is  to  the  army  that  maneuvres,"  and  maneuvres 
have  increased  greatly  in  importance  since  the  origin  of  the 
maxim.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  explain  to  you  that  Napoleon 
meant  maneuvres  which  were  tactically  and  strategically  well 
planned  and  executed. 

Rigid  discipline  must  be  maintained  on  the  march,  the  ranks  be 
kept  closed  up  to  nonnal  marching  distance,  and  no  man  be 
allowed  to  fall  out  except  by  authority  of  the  captain  of  his  com- 
pany. Night  marches  are  very  fatiguing  to  men  and  animals, 
and  ought  to  be  avoided  except  in  emergencies. 

Art.  30,  Instruction  of  May  9,  1885,  for  Infantry  (French)  is  as 
follows  :  "  Night  marches  are  to  be  avoided  as  much  as  possible  ; 
the  results  obtained  by  them  are  rarely  in  accord  with  the  fatigue 
they  cause  the  troops." 

The  German  Regulation,  Art.  222,  is  :  "  When  strategical  con- 
siderations make  it  necessary  to  expedite  the  march,  night  marches 
may  become  essential.  During  great  heat  they  may  be  preferable 
to  day  marches." 

As  you  see,  we  find  the  two  great  military  nations  at  variance 
on  this  subject. 

Von  der  Goltz  says  :  "  Slowness  and  fatigue  are  characteristics 
of  the  marches  of  great  armed  masses  ;  but  an  army  that  marches 
better  than  its  enemy  has  an  enormous  superiority,  for  he  can 
always  concentrate  his  masses  more  quickly  than  his  enemy,  and 
can  attack  with  superior  forces.  An  army  can  be  judged  by  the 
number  of  stragglers  it  leaves  behind  in  a  forced  march.  It  is 
during  the  march  the  discipline  of  an  army  becomes  manifest." 

ORDERS. 

Orders  for  the  march  should  be  short  and  explicit.  "  An  order 
is  short  when  it  does  not  contain  one  word  too  much  ;  complete 
when  there  is  not  a  syllable  wanting  ;  clear  when  it  can  be  com- 
prehended at  once  by  the  meanest  intellect."     (Von  Hardegg.) 

The  commander-in-chief  generally  orders  the  corps  or  division 
commanders  to  move  on  a  certain  point  on  a  particular  road,  and 


—91— 

specifies  the  time  at  which  he  desires  them  to  reach  their  destina- 
tions, and  leaves  the  details  to  the  commander  of  the  unit. 

An  order  from  the  general  in  chief  to  his  corps  and  division 
commanders  generally  contains  a  brief  statement  of  the  military 
situation  and  the  intentions  of  the  commander-in-chief  to  enable 
them  to  cooperate  in  carrying  out  these  intentions.  When  corps 
or  divisions  march  on  different  roads  the  order  of  each  should 
specify  what  commands  are  marching  on  its  flanks  and  their 
hours  of  marching. 

"  The  orders  of  the  commander-in-chief  are  usually  of  a  gen- 
eral character.  As  they  pass  through  the  various  subordinate 
commanders  they  become  more  detailed  and  specific  and  must 
include  the  following  subjects  : 

1.  Position  and  intention  of  the  enemy  so  far  as  is  known. 

2.  General  situation  of  our  own  troops. 

3.  Summary  description  of  the  intended  movement  with  direc- 
tions for  action  in  case  the  enemy  is  met. 

4.  Instructions  for  the  advanced  cavalry. 

5.  Number  and  composition  of  columns,  with  name  of  com- 
mander, and  duties  imposed  on  each. 

6.  Roads  allotted  to  each  corps,  division,  etc. 

V.  Composition  of  adjoining  columns,  and  roads  they  are  to 
follow. 

8.  Detachments  to  be  formed  by  each  column  for  scouting, 
outposts,  advanced  and  rear  guards. 

9.  Hour  of  departure  of  different  units,  with  initial  points. 

10.  Time  at  which  first  hourly  halt  is  to  be  made,  and  time, 
place  and  length  of  any  long  halt  that  may  be  ordered. 

11.  Place  of  headquarters  during  the  march  and  reports  to  be 
made. 

12.  Directions  whether  troops  shall  go  into  camp,  cantonment 
or  bivouac. 

13.  Designation  of  places  where  supplies  may  be  obtained  and 
wounded  and  sick  left." 

A  good  knowledge  of  time  and  space  is  necessary  in  drawing 
up  orders  for  the  march  of  an  army,  especially  when  the  units  are 


—92— 

to  march  on  different  roads  and  concentrate  at  a  given  locality  at 
a  certain  hour. 

Many  things  must  be  considered  :  First,  the  condition  of  the 
road  and  the  season  of  the  year  ;  second,  the  size  of  the  command 
and  its  composition  ;  third,  the  condition  of  the  men  and  animals  ; 
fourth,  the  proximity  of  the  enemy — a  good  chief  of  staff  must 
consider  all  of  these  things  and  much  depends  upon  his  accuracy 
and  good  judgment.  In  this  connection  we  must  turn  again  to 
the  history  of  the  greatest  master  ;  his  orders,  usually  written  by 
himself,  are  masterpieces  of  conciseness  and  intelligence.  The 
choice  of  decisive  point  having  been  determined  by  strategy,  of 
which  he  was  the  master,  "  he  possessed  the  ability  to  make  such 
arrangements  that  his  columns  starting  from  points  widely  sepa- 
rated, were  concentrated  with  wonderful  precision  upon  the 
decisive  point  of  the  zone  of  operations,  and  in  this  way  he 
insured  the  successful  issue  of  the  campaign,"  (Jomini.)  Exam- 
ples, campaigns  of  1806  and  1815.  Najjoleon  was  his  own  chief 
of  staff. 

TIME  AND  DISTANCE. 

Marching  in  columns  of  fours,  1000  foot  soldiers  will  probably 
occupy  450  yards  of  road, — if  kept  well  closed  up,  this  distance 
may  be  slightly  diminished.  This  gives  about  4000  infantry  to 
the  mile. 

In  computing  distances  for  cavalry  troops,  we  must  allow  about 
four  yards  for  each  horse  ;  on  this  basis,  100  troopers  marching 
in  column  of  fours  would  cover  100  yards  of  road,  about  1700  to 
a  mile.  A  battery  with  six  pieces  and  their  caissons,  battery 
wagon  and  forge  would  require  about  300  yards.  An  army 
wagon  with  six  mules  is  about  50  feet  long,  and  at  least  one-third 
of  this  must  be  added  to  cover  elongations  in  the  line,  so  we  are 
safe  in  allowing  22  yards  to  each  six-horse  wagon.  "  A  practical 
British  rule  is  two  infantrymen  to  each  yard,  one  horseman  per 
yard  and  20  yards  for  each  artillery  carriage."     (Pratt.) 

An  army  corps  of  25,000  men  with  artillery  and  cavalry  on  the 
road  will  be  from  12  to  15  miles  in  length.     If  marching  on  a 


—93— 

single  road,  the  head  battalions  will  be  going  into  camp  just  as 
the  rear  ones  are  starting  on  their  march. 

When  distant  from  the  enemy,  the  troops  may  camp  in  column. 
This  enables  the  various  subdivisions  to  march  as  separate  units 
with  their  own  baggage  trains  in  rear.  Each  unit  can  then  begin 
its  march  at  an  early  hour  and  arrive  at  its  camping  place  before 
night. 

The  accidents  of  service  will  usually  produce  sufficient  change 
in  the  positions  of  the  various  units. 

Strategical  marches  are  made  with  a  view  to  massing  bodies  of 
troops  at  a  certain  point  at  a  specified  time.  They  are  generally 
made  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  but  may  occur  at  any  time. 
If  marching  in  a  hostile  country  all  tactical  precautions  must  be 
observed.  They  generally  are  made  in  the  quickest  possible  time 
and  thus  become  forced  marches. 

Fig.  8,  taken  from  Colonel  Maillard's  L'art  cle  la  Guerre, 
illustrate  the  method  of  marching  that  would  be  observed  in  an 
army  corps  in  the  theater  of  operations,  with  the  possibility  of 
meeting  the  enemy.  The  distances  given  are  only  approximate, 
but  are  accurate  enough  to  show  the  long  line  of  road  occupied 
by  a  single  corps.  The  trains  take  nearly  as  much  more.  You 
can  easily  see  that  the  head  of  the  column  will  go  into  camp  about 
the  time  the  tail  starts  on  the  march.  If  there  is  no  danger  of  an 
attack,  you  will  see  that  the  march  will  be  made  more  comfortably 
by  marching  the  divisions  separately  and  allowing  the  brigades 
to  have  their  baggage  trains  intercalated.  Each  division  could 
then  go  into  camp  in  its  relative  place  and  arrive  at  its  new  camp- 
ing place  at  nearly  the  same  hours,  with  its  baggage  near  at  hand. 
The  corps  is  supposed  to  be  marching  to  the  front  through  a 
friendly  country,  the  rear  guard  is  consequently  small  and  need 
not  exceed  a  battalion  of  infantry  and  a  troop  of  cavalry. 

A  halt  of  ten  minutes  each  hour  should  be  made,  to  give  the 
men  a  little  rest  and  a  chance  to  adjust  their  loads  and  to  relieve 
themselves.  A  longer  halt  of  from  half  an  hour  to  an  hour  at 
mid-day  for  luncheon,  when  the  march  is  to  be  continued  well 
into  the  afternoon.  The  leading  company  in  each  regiment  should 
take  a  steady  gait  of  about  three  miles  an  hour  on  good  roads,  or 


—94— 
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—OS- 
two  and  a  half  miles  an  hour  if  the  column  is  long.  If  each  unit 
will  keep  its  own  gait  and  pay  no  attention  to  the  variations  in 
the  movements  of  units  just  ahead  of  it,  the  "  accordion-like  " 
motion,  so  wearying  to  troops,  may  be  greatly  diminished.  In 
route  marches  the  men  are  allowed  to  carry  their  arms  in  the 
most  convenient  way,  and  to  chat  and  smoke  if  they  desire.  The 
company  officers  must  see  that  they  keep  closed  up  and  do  not 
straggle  from  their  proper  set  of  fours. 

If  the  column  is  to  close  up  every  night,  the  different  units 
must  leave  camp  at  different  hours.  In  an  army  corps  the  last 
brigade  would  leave  five  or  six  hours  after  the  first  one.  The 
time  must  be  accurately  determined  for  each  unit,  so  there  will 
be  no  break  in  the  column,  and  so  no  command  shall  be  under 
arms  long  before  it  is  to  begin  the  march.  This  is  regulated  in 
the  French  army  by  establishing  initial  points. 

The  initial  point  of  the  march  is  that  at  which  each  march  unit 
should  take  its  place  in  the  column. 

The  point  is  chosen  far  enough  in  advance  of  the  camp,  can- 
tonment or  bivouac  to  permit  each  unit  to  reach  it  without  useless 
detours.  It  should  be  easily  seen.  The  chiefs  of  units  should 
ascertain  its  location  as  soon  as  they  receive  the  order  to  march, 
and  estimate  the  time  it  will  take  the  heads  of  their  columns  to 
reach  it.     (Aide-Memoire.) 

In  marching  cavalry,  the  first  two  or  three  miles  from  camp 
should  be  made  at  an  easy  walk,  then  a  halt  of  10  or  15  minutes 
should  be  made  to  allow  the  men  to  relieve  themselves.  A  halt 
of  five  minutes  per  hour  should  be  made  after  the  first  hour.  It 
should  march  about  five  miles  an  hour,  alternating  the  walk  and 
the  trot.  Men  should  never  be  allowed  to  lounge  in  the  saddle 
and  should  be  required  to  examine  the  girth  and  saddle  blanket 
at  each  halt  to  see  that  they  are  properly  adjusted.  They 
should  also  examine  the  horses'  feet  frequently  to  see  that  no 
stones  are  fastened  in  by  the  shoe.  No  trooper  is  allowed  to  fall 
out  of  ranks  without  the  permission  of  his  captain,  who  must 
give  him  a  written  permit  or  send  a  non-commissioned  officer 
with  him.  If  he  is  taken  in  an  ambulance  the  non-commissioned 
officer  must  return  his  horse  and  arms  to  the  troop. 


—96— 

The  trains,  parks  and  convoys  marching  with  an  army  corps, 
form  a  column  longer  than  that  of  the  troops.  You  can  imagine 
the  difficulties  experienced  in  moving  them  along  a  single  road. 
Accidents  are  continually  happening  to  vehicles  and  animals,  and 
the  progress  of  the  train  is  irregular  and  uncertain.  It  is  there- 
fore better  to  divide  it  into  echelons,  with  an  officer  in  charge  of 
each  echelon.  The  echelons  march  separately,  with  intervals  of 
one  or  two  miles  between  them.  The  French  divide  their  trains 
into  three  classes. 

First — Regimental  trains,  which  carry  the  baggage  and  sup- 
plies for  the  regiments  and  which  are  intercalated  in  the  column 
when  there  is  no  danger  of  combat,  so  as  to  give  the  officers 
every  possible  convenience.  If  a  combat  is  possible  they  are  rel- 
egated to  the  rear  of  the  column. 

Second — Combat  trains,  which  comprise  for  a  corps  : 

The  engineer  park  of  the  corps. 

Half  of  the  ammunition  sections.  Infantry  (one),  artillery 
(three). 

The  ambulances  of  headquarters. 

Two  field  hospitals. 

"  The  combat  trains  march  immediately  in  rear  of  the  columns 
of  troops  of  which  they  are  an  integral  part." 

"  When  the  corps  marches  in  several  columns,  the  order  for  the 
march  must  indicate  the  division  to  be  made  of  the  combat  train, 
or  if  it  remains  concentrated,  its  place  of  march." 

"It  is  placed  under  the  orders ^f  the  senior  officer  with  the 
engineer  park." 

Third — Parks  and  convoys.  They  include  a  great  number  of 
carriages,  belonging  to  many  different  services.  As  stated  before, 
they  are  divided  into  echelons,  and  the  order  of  march  is  made  to 
conform  to  the  order  of  urgency  to  the  troops,  of  the  contents  of 
the  various  wagons. 

The  first  echelon  usually  contains  : 

1.  The  remaining  sections  of  the  ammunition  column. 

2.  The  sections  of  the  artillery  park. 

3.  The  bridge  train,  except  that  portion  already  with  the 
advanced  guard. 


—97—  » 

The  second  echelon  would  contain  : 

1.  The  subsistence  stores  for  headquarters. 

2.  The  subsistence  stores  for  the  infantry  divisions. 

3.  The  depot  of  remounts. 

4.  The  balance  of  the  effects. 

5.  The  field  hospitals. 

The  third  echelon  would  contain  : 

1.  The  auxiliary  convoys  of  subsistence. 

2.  The  field  bakeries. 

3.  The  carriages  for  requisitions. 

These  three  echelons  march  and  camp  separately.  "  For  each 
echelon  the  service  of  security  and  escort  duty  is  performed  by 
the  men  with  the  trains  (cannoneers,  artificers,  workmen,  etc.), 
organized  into  tactical  units  for  this  purpose." 

The  records  of  all  European  campaigns  from  1Y96  to  1866 
shows  the  average  day's  march  to  have  been  13.57  miles. 

CONVOYS. 

Convoys  are  of  many  different  kinds.  They  may  have  for  an 
object  the  transportation  of  military  stores,  money,  provisions, 
sick  and  wounded,  and  prisoners. 

The  strength  and  composition  of  the  escort  will  depend  upon 
the  value  of  the  convoy,  the  probable  danger  it  will  be  subjected 
to,  the  length  of  the  journey,  etc.,  and  the  commander  of  the 
escort  should  receive  detailed  written  instructions  as  to  the  object 
of  his  mission. 

In  modern  days  convoys  are  usually  carried  on  railroad  or 
steamboat  lines  which  are  carefully  guarded,  and  the  train  or 
boat  carries  an  additional  guard.  The  commander  of  the  escort 
must  have  full  authority  over  all  parts  of  the  escort  and  the.  men 
connected  with  the  train.  He  should  of  course  defer  to  the 
demands  of  officers  in  charge  of  the  train,  as  to  hours  of  depart- 
ure, care  of  material,  packing  of  carriages,  etc.,  when  a  proper 
defense  of  the  train  will  permit. 

When  the  convoy  is  large  it  ought  to  be  divided  into  several 
divisions,  and  an  agent  be  placed  in  charge  of  each  sub-division 
7 


to  see  that  the  wagons  keep  closed  up  to  their  proper  intervals, 
and  if  some  of  the  wagons  have  been  requisitioned  from  hostile 
citizens,  soldiers  must  be  placed  along  the  line  to  watch  them. 
Ammunition  should  be  placed  at  the  head  of  the  train,  subsistence 
stores  next,  then  baggage  wagons.  If  the  train  is  likely  to  be 
attacked,  the  most  important  part  of  the  train  ought  to  be  placed 
in  the  safest  part  of  the  convoy. 

The  order  of  march  depends  upon  the  proximity  of  the  enemy, 
the  strength  and  kind  of  troops  composing  the  escort  in  the  coun- 
try to  be  passed  through. 

Spare  parts  should  be  carried  for  the  wagons.  If  a  wagon 
breaks  down  it  must  fall  out  for  repairs  and  then  join  the  tail  of 
the  column.  If  it  cannot  be  replaced  its  team  and  load  are  divided 
up  among  the  other  wagons. 

Halts  are  necessary  for  rest,  watering  animals,  closing  up  the 
wagons,  but  teams  are  not  unhitched.  At  the  end  of  the  day's 
march,  the  wagons  are  parked  either  in  line  of  several  ranks,  in 
squares,  the  poles  inside,  or  in  a  circle. 

A  convoy  must  always  have  an  advanced  and  a  rear  guard. 
The  commander  of  the  escort  places  the  body  of  the  escort  at  the 
most  important  place  in  the  line  of  march.  When  the  train  will 
admit  the  principal  part  of  the  escort  marches  by  the  side  of  the 
road  opposite  the  center  of  the  convoy  or  between  two  divisions. 
If  the  country  is  not  open  it  marches  either  at  the  head  or  the 
tail,  depending  upon  which  is  most  liable  to  attack  by  the  enemy. 
The  duties  of  the  advanced  and  rear  guards  are  similar  to  those 
for  the  same  parts  of  a  marching  column. 

Convoys  by  water  are  escorted  after  similar  principles.  A 
guard  is  placed  on  each  boat,  and  troops  are  also  placed  in  boats 
which  precede  and  follow  the  convoys  as  advanced  and  rear 
guards.  Sometimes  the  escort  can  advantageously  march  on  land. 
If  attacked  it  should  take  position  so  as  to  prevent  the  enemy 
from  firing  on  the  boats. 

Defense  of  a  Convoy. — As  soon  as  the  enemy's  presence  is 
known,  the  carriages  are  closed  up  as  much  as  possible, — into 
double  or  triple  columns,  if  the  road  will  permit.     If  the  com- 


—99— 

mandant  is  sure  the  enemy's  forces  are  superior  to  his,  he  should 
at  once  park  the  train  for  defense  as  already  explained.  The 
troops  are  disposed  so  as  to  keep  the  enemy  as  far  from  the  train 
as  possible.  If  after  an  obstinate  defense  it  is  evident  that  the 
escort  will  be  overpowered,  the  train  should  be  set  on  fire  and  the 
animals  killed  rather  than  to  allow  them  to  fall  into  the  enemy's 
hands.  It  may  be  necessary  to  abandon  part  of  the  train  to  save 
the  remainder  ;  in  this  case,  the  ammunition  wagons  should  be 
preserved  to  the  last.  In  convoying  prisoners  the  same  general 
rules  apply.  If  the  convoy  is  attacked,  all  the  prisoners  are  made 
to  lie  down  at  once,  and  are  forbidden  to  rise  until  ordered,  on 
pain  of  death. 

The  attack  on  a  convoy  is  made  preferably  when  it  is  at  halt 
and  commences  to  park,  or  while  it  is  passing  a  defile  or  a  difficult 
bit  of  road.  The  attack  is  usually  made  by  cavalry  supported  by 
infantry.  They  first  give  their  attention  to  the  escort  and  strive 
to  overcome  it  or  by  attacking  at  different  points  at  the  same 
time  they  compel  the  commander  to  divide  the  escort.  Having 
overcome  the  escort  the  train  is  either  appropriated  or  destroyed 
if  it  is  impossible  to  take  away  the  wagons.  The  animals  may  be 
secured  and  the  vehicles  and  supplies  be  burned.  If  the  animals 
cannot  be  carried  off  they  are  shot  so  as  to  be  of  no  further  use 
to  the  enemy.    (Aide-Memoire.) 


CHAPTER  YII. 


ARTILLERY. 

The  organization  of  artillery  has  already  been  sufficiently 
■described,  and  this  lecture  will  be  confined  to  the  tactical  use 
of  field  artillery. 

Although  the  youngest  of  the  three  great  arms  of  the  service, 
its  lineage  can  be  traced  through  many  centuries.  It  is  both 
pleasant  and  instructive  to  trace  the  evolution  of  the  almost 
perfect  machine  of  to-day  from  that  of  even  three  centuries  ago, 
for  it  indicates  the  progress  of  man  in  the  mechanical  arts. 
Seville,  we  are  told,  in  124Y  was  defended  from  the  Moors  by 
"  cannon  throwing  stones,"  and  that  the  Moors  used  heavy  guns 
at  Cordova  in  1280.  It  is  also  claimed  that  Monk  Schwartz,  a 
Cordelier,  made  the  first  cannon  in  Europe  in  1330.  It  is  certain 
that  cannon  were  very  effective  during  the  siege  of  Orleans  in 
1428,  and  at  the  battle  of  Crecy  in  1346.  The  first  cannon  cast 
in  England  was  by  Huggel  in  1543.  It  would  certainly  be  very 
interesting  to  see  that  gun  beside  one  of  the  110-ton  guns  of  the 
Benbow,  which  are  43  feet  8  inches  long,  of  17  inch  caliber,  and 
throw  an  1800  pound  projectile  over  12  miles.  The  16-inch  gun 
is  49.67  feet  long,  and  carries  a  shot  of  2370  pounds.  It  is  esti- 
mated that  there  are  400,000,000  guns  in  the  world.  I  am  unable 
to  state  how  nearly  this  is  correct  or  how  many  of  this  number 
are  serviceable.  Germany  alone  has  494  field  batteries  of  six 
guns  each,  or  a  total  of  2964  field  guns  ready  for  service  at  any 
moment.  France  has  484  batteries;  Italy  has  192  batteries,  and 
Austro-Hungary  can  muster  nearly  2000  field  guns. 

History  shows  us  that  the  importance  of  artillery  has  grown 
continually  since  its  first  appearance  on  the  battlefield.  Its 
development  has  kept  pace  with  that  of  the  small  arm,  and  artillery 
can  still  be  very  effective  beyond  the  range  of  the  rifle.     In  fact 


—102— 

it  would  seem  as  if  the  limit  had  been  reached  except  for  the  fact 
that  there  is  apparently  no  limit  to  human  progress. 

The  range  is  already  greater  than  the  extent  of  view  on  most 
battlefields,  and  we  don't  care  to  fire  at  invisible  targets.  The 
velocities  obtained  are  all  we  can  desire.  The  rapidity  of  fire  is 
certainly  great,  and  puts  us  to  much  trouble  to  supply  ammuni- 
tion enough  to  the  firing  line.  Our  sights  and  fuses  can  be 
improved,  but  we  may  well  ask,  What  next  ?  It  may  be  assumed 
that  the  relative  power  of  the  infantry  and  artillery,  so  far  as 
material  is  concerned,  will  not  alter  much  in  future;  it  seems 
likely  that  the  gain,  if  any,  will  be  on  the  side  of  the  artillery. 

The  infantry  has  lost  some  of  its  manceuvring  power  by  the 
necessary  adoption  of  the  extended  order.  The  artillery  has 
undoubtedly  gained,  but  it  cannot  yet  play  an  independent  role 
on  the  battlefield. 

It  acts  by  fire  alone,  and  must  be  used  in  connnection  with 
other  arms.  Its  power  of  self-defense  is  undoubtedly  increasing, 
and  artillery  now  enters  the  fight  sooner  and  stays  longer  than 
formerly.  The  opportunities  for  observing  the  working  of  mod- 
ern artillery  in  battle  have  not  been  satisfactory.  The  French 
artillery  was  greatly  inferior  to  the  German  in  1870,  and  the  full 
power  of  the  latter  was  not  developed.  In  the  war  of  '77-'78, 
neither  the  Turks  nor  the  Russians  fully  comprehended  the  use 
of  artillery,  and  it  was  so  badly  handled  that  we  could  not  learn 
much  about  it  from  their  campaigns.  Since  then  smokeless 
powders  have  somewhat  obscured  our  theoretical  sight,  by  clear- 
ing the  atmosphere  of  battle.  The  first  great  artillery  battle  of 
the  future  may  possibly  destroy  many  of  our  illusions  or  replace 
them  by  certainties. 

Tactically  artillery  is  usually  employed  in  battalions  of  from 
two  to  four  batteries,  or  in  groups  of  batteries.  A  battery  is 
rarely  isolated,  except  to  form  part  of  an  advance  guard,  a  rear 
guard,  or  to  join  in  a  strong  reconnoissance.  One  of  the  cardinal 
principles  is,  that  a  battery  should  never  be  broken  up  when  it  is 
possible  to  use  all  of  the  pieces  together. 

In  connection  with  other  arms  its  tactical  role  is  : 


—103— 

FiKST —  To  take  advantage  of  its  long  range  to  open  the  fight 
demolish  the  cover,  and  compel  the  enemy  to  unveil  his  projects. 

To  fulfill  this  requirement  the  artillery  must  arrive  at  its  posi- 
tion early  in  the  fight.  It  must  consequently  march  near  the 
head  of  the  column,  with  just  sufficient  infantry  escort  to  prevent 
its  capture  by  concealed  detachments  of  the  enem3\  The  chief 
of  artillery  accompanies  the  commanding  officer  in  his  reconnois- 
sance  of  the  ground,  to  receive  his  orders,  and  select  positions  for 
his  batteries.  The  greatest  possible  artillery  force  is  brought 
into  action  at  once.  The  first  target  selected  should  be  the 
enemy's  artillery,  if  it  is  in  position;  if  not,  then  the  masses  of 
infantry  must  be  shelled  to  force  them  to  deploy  or  seek  shelter. 
The  artillery  duel  then  opens  the  battle,  and  it  is  continued  until 
one  side  is  silenced.  The  victorious  batteries  can  then  give  atten- 
tion to  the  troops,  and 

Second —  Give  its  support  to  the  other  arms  during  the  com- 
bat. It  can  readily  prevent  the  massing  of  infantry  and  cavalry; 
can  beat  with  its  fire  copses,  hedges,  or  woods  protecting  the 
enemy  from  infantry  fire,  and  with  fire  and  shrapnel  do  much 
damage  to  the  advancing  infantry  lines,  and  sustain  the  morale  of 
its  own  line.  In  open  ground  it  can  defend  its  own  front,  but  it 
is  at  all  times  entitled  to  the  support  of  any  infantry  troops  that 
may  be  near. 

If  it  comes  within  range  of  protected  infantry  fire,  its  position 
is  critical,  and  it  must  look  to  the  infantry  for  relief.  If  it  is  on 
the  flank,  it  must  have  a  special  infantry  or  cavalry  support.  In 
case  the  terrain  is  favorable,  an  infantry  support  should  be  placed 
600  or  800  yards  in  front  of  artillery  to  keep  the  enemy's  infantry 
from  getting  within  rifle  range  of  the  batteries.  A  few  years  ago 
it  was  considered  a  point  of  honor  not  to  lose  a  gun,  but  the 
Prussian  regulations  say,  "That  under  circumstances,  especially 
in  defensive  actions,  the  artillery  remaining  motionless  and  un- 
shaken in  its  position,  is  heroic,  and  that  the  loss  of  pieces  is  not 
only  justifiable  but  honorable."  U.  S.  D.  R. :  "Batteries  will 
not  retire,  even  in  the  face  of  imminent  danger,  without  orders. 
The  loss  of  well-served  guns  in  the  defense  of  a  position  or  in 
the  close  support  of  other  arms,  is  honorable." 


—104— 

A  battery  out  of  ammunition  is  forbidden  to  withdraw,  but 
must  remain  to  impose  upon  the  enemy,  nor  must  a  piece  be 
withdrawn  for  repairs.  In  the  entrance  walls  of  the  executive 
building  of  the  United  States  Military  Academy  are  set  two  brass 
field  guns,  each  bearing  the  following  inscription :  "  Lost  without 
dishonor,  at  Buena  Vista."  The  brave  men  who  worked  those 
guns  up  to  the  last  moment,  nearly  fifty  years  ago,  unconsciously 
furnished  a  motto  for  all  future  artillerymen. 

Third — It  must  prepare  for  the  decisive  attack,  hy  concen- 
trating its  fire  on  the  point  where  the  principal  effort  is  to  be 
made. 

The  commander  having  selected  the  point  at  which  the  prin- 
cipal attack  is  to  be  made,  the  chief  of  artillery  turns  the  fire  of 
all  his  batteries  on  that  point,  in  an  effort  to  break  down  the 
defenses,  demoralize  the  defenders,  and  silence  any  artillery  that 
may  be  brought  into  action  at  that  place. 

To  effect  this,  it  may  move  forward  by  echelons  to  short  range. 
If  it  is  successful  in  breaking  down  the  barriers,  the  fight  is  more 
than  half  won.  The  infantry  should  not  be  advanced  until  it  is 
evident  that  the  preparation  by  the  artillery  has  been  complete. 
The  Germans  learned  this  lesson  at  a  terrible  expense  in  front  of 
r-'  St.  Privat  as  their  magnificent  corps  suffered  terrible  slaughter 

by  advancing  to  the  attack  before  the  artillery  work  was  com- 
pleted. 

Fourth — It  ought  to  shell  the  troops  of  the  second  and  third 
lines  to  prevent  them,  entering  into  the  fight. 

Fifth — As  soon  as  the  position  is  captured,  it  must  move 
rapidly  forward  to  occupy  and  pursue  the  retreating  enemy  with 
its  fire  and  prevent  his  troops  from  reforming. 

Sixth — If  the  fortunes  of  war  should  frown  upon  us,  and  a 
retreat  become  necessary,  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  must  be 
protected  by  the  artillery  even  to  its  sacrifice. 

If  a  retreat  is  ordered  before  the  troops  are  completely  broken 
and  the  enemy  upon  them,  the  artillery  should  be  withdrawn  to  a 
good  position  in  the  rear,  from  which  to  support  the  movement. 
If  the  troops  are  closely  engaged,  the  second  and  third  infantry 


—105— 

lines  are  posted  in  rear,  and  part  of  the  batteries  are  withdrawn. 
The  remainder  covers  the  movement  of  the  retiring  troops,  and 
the  last  batteries  retire  with  the  last  of  the  infantry  troops. 

Changes  of  Position. — Batteries  may  move  forward  to  render 
their  fire  more  efficient  and  for  the  moral  support  it  gives,  also  to 
occupy  positions  abandoned  by  the  enemy;  lateral  changes  are 
made  when  better  positions  can  be  had,  and  to  unmask  a  tire  from 
the  rear. 

A  battery  may  also  be  moved  100  or  200  yards  to  the  rear 
when  the  enemy  has  the  exact  range  to  compel  him  to  change  it 
or  to  mislead  him. 

All  movements  to  the  front  are  to  be  made  at  a  rapid  gait. 
As  a  principle,  all  movements  to  the  rear  are  made  at  a  walk. 
Horse  batteries  operating  with  cavalry  must  of  course  assume  the 
same  gait  as  the  cavalry. 

HoBSE  Artillery. — A  battalion  of  horse  artillery  should  be 
assigned  to  each  cavalry  division.  When  the  division  is  on  the 
march  and  not  in  proximity  to  the  enemy,  one  battery  may  march 
in  the  center  or  in  rear  of  the  main  body  of  the  advanced  guard, 
and  the  remaining  batteries  march  in  rear  of  the  leading  regiment 
of  the  main  body.  If  it  is  probable  the  enemy  will  be  met,  the 
batteries  must  be  concentrated  and  marched  near  the  head  of  the 
main  body.  As  it  is  the  business  of  the  cavalry  division  to  recon- 
noitre thoroughly  the  front  of  the  army  and  screen  it  from  the 
enemy,  and  to  keep  touch  with  his  cavalry,  it  may  expect  to  be 
engaged  in  many  combats  with  the  enemy's  cavalry  and  horse 
artillery.  Celerity  of  movement  and  quick  appreciation  of  the 
situation  may  gain  very  great  advantages.  If  the  horse  artil- 
lery gets  into  position  rapidly,  it  may  prevent  the  enemy's  cavalry 
from  forming  for  action,  and  also  gain  an  advantage  over  his 
artillery  which  will  enable  our  cavalry  to  charge  and  rout  the 
enemy.  If  the  charge  is  unsuccessful,  and  our  cavalry  is  forced 
to  retire,  the  artillery  must  hold  its  position  and  protect  the 
movement  by  firing  on  the  enemy's  cavalry.  There  is  still  much 
discussion  by  artillerymen  as  to  the  value  of  horse  artillery,  but 
from  what  I  have  read  and  thought  of  the  question,  I  feel  no 
hesitation  in  saying  that  it  is  of  great  value.     In  future  conti- 


—106— 

nental  wars  each  army  will  be  preceded  by  large  masses  of 
cavalry.  It  will  be  the  duty  of  each  to  get  as  near  the  ehemy, 
and  to  keep  as  near  to  him  as  possible,  and  at  the  same  time 
prevent  his  cavalry  from  penetrating  our  screen  and  observing 
our  movements. 

Cavalry  has  great  offensive  powers  under  certain  conditions, 
but  unless  it  is  thoroughly  trained  to  fight  on  foot  its  defensive 
power  is  weak.  How,  then,  can  it  resist  the  efforts  of  the  enemy 
to  penetrate  the  veil  it  should  keep  drawn  before  the  army? 
Again,  if  the  advance  of  the  cavalry  division  is  to  be  stopped  by  a 
few  infantrymen  in  a  village  or  behind  a  hedge,  it  would  be  folly 
to  send  it  out.  A  few  batteries  of  artillery  not  only  greatly  increase 
its  offensive  power,  but  give  it  great  power  of  resistance,  and 
enable  it  to  do  that  for  which  it  is  maintained,  and  as  horse 
artillery  is  the  only  kind  that  can  keep  up  with  the  cavalry  for 
any  great  distance,  its  raison  d*  etre  is  certainly  well  established. 
Horse  artillery  and  cavalry  should  form  part  of  the  advanced 
guard  of  every  considerable  force.  Under  a  brilliant  leader,  they 
have  a  most  useful  role  in  covering  the  retreat.  "They  may 
be  extremely  useful  in  battle,  by  assisting  in  a  flanking  movement, 
or  by  their  mobility  in  forestalling  the  enemy  at  some  important 
point."  (May.)  Cavalry  forms  for  attack  in  three  lines — attack- 
ing line,  support,  and  a  reserve.  Some  cavalry  regulations  claim 
that  the  guns  should  be  carried  rapidly  forward  to  a  position  on 
the  flank,  so  as  not  to  interfere  with  the  cavalry,  but  Major  Pratt 
thinks  "it  is  preferable  to  push  the  guns  at  a  gallop  straight  to 
the  front  and  come  into  action,  inclining  the  greater  portion  of 
the  cavalry  away  to  the  flank.  The  advantages  of  this  arrange- 
ment are  that  it  simplifies  the  tactics  of  the  artillery."  The 
cavalryman  would  reply  to  this  that  he  also  wants  his  tactics 
simplified.  The  new  artillery  D.  R.,  Par.  1094,  states:  "The 
flank  selected  for  the  position  should  be  that  on  which  the  guns 
can  serve  as  a  movable  pivot  for  the  cavalry,  will  the  least  inter- 
fere with  its  movements  and  can  longest  remain  in  action."  It  is 
diflScult  and  generally  impossible  to  make  rules  to  fit  all  cases,  and 
in  war  no  two  actions  ever  were  or  ever  will  be  alike  in  all  details. 


—107— 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  question  might  be  settled  by  saying  that 
the  artillery  commander  must  first  select  the  best  range  and  get 
a  position  as  far  advanced  as  safety  will  permit.  Choice  of  posi- 
tion in  the  early  stages  of  the  fight  belongs  to  the  artillery.  The 
great  oflfensive  and  defensive  powers  of  artillery  entitle  it  to  a 
place  in  the'  line  of  battle.  It  is  generally  conceded  that  a  long 
line  of  artillery  with  a  clear  field  of  fire  is,  if  well  served,  able  to 
protect  its  front,  even  against  infantry.  This,  of  course,  under 
the  supposition  that  the  infantry  cannot  find  cover  within  1000  or 
1500  yards  of  the  batteries.  During  the  Franco-Prussian  war,  at 
Gravelotte,  the  German  artillery  occupied  two-fifths  of  the  entire 
front  of  action. 

Position. — A  commanding  position  is  preferable  for  artillery, 
as  it  gives  a  better  view  of  the  field,  and  consequently  better 
opportunities  for  using  its  long  range  to  advantage,  than  can  be 
obtained  on  low  ground.  A  gradual  slope  to  the  front  gives  the 
best  fire  effects.  A  high  position  gives  a  plunging  fire,  and  is 
convenient  for  firing  over  the  heads  of  our  own  troops.  A  steep 
slope  in  ^ront  will  prevent  the  forward  movernent  of  the  batteries, 
and  is  only  useful  in  a  passive  defensive.  A  crest  with  gentle 
slope  on  both  sides  is  the  most  favorable  position,  as  it  offers  pro- 
tection to  the  horses  and  caissons,  and  partial  protection  to  the 
men  working  the  pieces,  but  the  latter  must  not  be  withdrawn  so 
far  as  to  lose  command  over  the  entire  front.  Much  protection 
may  be  given  by  gun -pits  and  intrench  ments,  when  there  is  time 
to  construct  them.  We  must  bear  in  mind  that  any  artificial 
cover  that  will  interfere  with  the  advance  of  the  artillery  to  aid 
the  infantry  or  to  occupy  captured  positions,  will  be  more  injuri- 
ous than  beneficial.  Soft  clayey  earth  in  front  of  the  batteries 
will  be  an  advantage,  as  it  will  prevent  ricochets,  and  shells  may 
bury  themselves  in  the  soft  earth  before  exploding.  In  the  first 
zone,  which  is  from  the  3000  to  2000-yard  range,  the  artillery  is 
the  most  powerful  arm,  and  should  have  choice  of  position.  In 
the  second  and  third  zones  the  principal  arm  is  the  infantry,  and 
the  artillery  must  conform  to  its  movements  and  render  it  all 
possible  assistance.     Artillery  is  very  weak  on  the  flanks,  and  if 


—108— 

surprised  on  either  flank  it  will  probably  be  lost,  unless  prompt 
aid  is  furnished  by  the  infantry  or  cavalry.  A  natural  obstacle 
on  its  flank  will  therefore  strengthen  its  position.  The  value  of 
artillery  depends  upon  the  method  by  which  it  is  handled  on  the 
battlefield.  It  had  better  be  left  off  the  field  altogether  than  to 
be  brought  on  in  a  slow,  timid  manner,  to  be  poorly  placed  and 
badly  aimed.  In  future  wars  the  battle  of  rencontre  will  be  the 
most  frequent.  'J"'here  will  be  but  little  time  to  reconnoitre  the 
ground  or  ponder  over  the  value  of  various  positions.  The  ad- 
vanced guards  and  the  cavalry  divisions  are  engaged  in  front, 
and  it  will  be  some  time  before  we  will  be  able  to  determine  just 
where  the  battlefield  will  be.  The  commanding  general  will 
scarcely  be  able  to  give  very  detailed  instructions  for  the  location 
of  the  various  arms,  in  fact  the  line  of  battle  will  not  be  deter- 
mined by  the  generals,  but  by  the  commanders  of  smaller  units, 
such  as  battalions  and  companies. 

The  location  of  the  artillery,  as  well  as  its  conduct  throughout 
the  engagements,  will  be  left  to  the  chief  of  artillery,  and  the 
record  of  the  artillery  in  the  fight  will  depend  largely  on  his  mil- 
itary coup  d''  ceil  and  boldness. 

Proportion  of  Guns  to  other  Arms. — You  might  ask  : 
*'  Since  artillery  is  so  powerful,  why  limit  the  number  of  guns  ?  " 
But  you  must  remember  that,  off  the  field,  artillery  is  an  encum- 
brance. Again,  it  can  only  operate  on  certain  kinds  of  ground, 
and  we  only  get  its  full  effect  when  the  terrain  is  favorable  for 
its  action.  In  the  second  and  third  zones  we  must  not  embarrass 
the  action  of  the  all-powerful  infantry,  which  can  operate  on  all 
kinds  of  ground,  so  that,  while  we  are  alloting  more  and  more  of 
the  line  of  battle  to  the  artillery,  experience  teaches  us  there  must 
be  a  limit.  In  a  close  country  the  field  of  usefulness  of  artillery 
will  be  diminished,  and  it  will  be  the  exception  when  all  of  it  can 
be  employed  in  battle.  The  Germans  started  into  the  war  of  1870 
with  3.7  guns  per  1000  of  all  other  arms.  In  1877  the  Russians 
had  3.9  guns  per  1000  men,  and  the  Turks  2.2.  The  power  of 
infantry  has  increased  enormously,  and  we  ought  to  maintain  the 
relative  power  of  our  artillery,  which  would  demand  an  increased 


—109— 

number  of  guns.  On  the  other  hand,  artillery  is  the  most  con- 
stant of  all  arms.  The  number  of  pieces  with  an  army  will  not 
change  materially,  while  losses  in  action,  sickness,  etc.,  are  con- 
stantly diminishing  the  infantry  and  cavalry,  thereby  increasing 
the  proportion  of  artillery.  Modern  theorists  fix  the  proportion 
at  4  guns  per  1000  men.  It  is  curious  to  note  here  that  this  was 
the  number  fixed  by  Napoleon  nearly  one  hundred  years  ago. 
We  need  not  feel  uneasy  at  this  apparent  step  backward,  for 
Napoleon  was  a  thorough  master  of  the  use  of  artillery.  In  fact, 
he  was  the  originator  of  the  mass  system  of  using  artillery. 

Ammunition. — Field  artillery  is  usually  provided  with  three 
kinds  of  ammunition,  viz:  shell,  shrapnel,  and  canister.  A  shell 
is  simply  a  hollow  cast  projectile  filled  with  a  heavy  bursting 
charge  and  fitted  with  either  a  time  or  percussion  fuse,  or  both. 
It  is  used  against  troops,  batteries,  intrenchments,  villages,  roads, 
etc.  The  Prussians  employed  it  almost  exclusively  during  the 
war  of  1870.  When  used  against  earthworks,  buildings,  or  other 
batteries  it  should  strike  before  exploding,  so  as  to  work  by  per- 
cussion, penetration,  and  its  explosive  effect  combined.  Solid 
shot  is  not  carried  by  field  batteries,  but  if  its  use  should  be 
desirable,  we  can  get  much  of  its  effect  by  firing  shell  with  uncut 
fuses.  Shrapnel  differs  from  common  shell  in  having  its  interior 
filled  with  bullets.  The  shell  is  thin,  and  is  simply  intended  to 
convey  the  bullets  to  the  bursting  point.  It  contains  just  enough 
powder  to  burst  the  envelope  and  scatter  the  bullets  a  little. 
Its  destructive  power  is  due  to  its  velocity  at  the  time  of  bursting. 
It  is  very  effective  against  men  and  animals.  Shrapnel  has  been 
used  very  little  in  past  wars,  but  will  be  extensively  used  in 
future.  The  English  seem  to  be  more  enamored  of  it  than  any 
other  European  power.  "  Shrapnel  fire  becomes  effective  at  3500 
yards,  while  its  effect  is  decisive  at  from  2200  to  1600  yards  or 

less Since  the  shrapnel  with  fuses  cut  at  zero  produces  such 

a  murderous  effect,  the  fire  of  artillery  at  short  distances,  which 
was  thought  to  have  lost  in  efficiency  because  of  the  small  effect 
of  canister  from  rifled  guns,  has  become  absolutely  destructive." 
(Hohenlohe.) 


—  no- 
Case  shot  or  canister  consists  of  a  light  cylinder  of  tin  filled 
with  bullets,  the  interstices  being  filled  with  clay  or  sand.  It  is 
essentially  a  close  quarter  projectile,  and  is  effective  only  up  to  a 
few  hundred  yards.  As  we  do  not  desire  it  to  take  the  rifling,  it 
could  be  fired  more  conveniently  from  a  smooth-bore  piece,  and 
yet  we  can  scarcely  carry  smooth-bores  in  this  day  and  genera- 
tion for  the  sole  purpose  of  firing  canister.  Most  nations  solve 
the  question  by  carrying  but  very  little  canister. 

Another  projectile  has  been  devised  recently,  called  the  torpedo 
shell,  which  is  in  reality  a  shrapnel  with  a  bursting  charge  of  gun 
cotton  or  other  high  explosive  in  the  front  end.  It  is  to  be  fired 
at  a  high  angle,  and  it  is  intended  to  burst  almost  directly  over- 
head of  troops  behind  intrenchments  and  who  cannot  be  reached 
by  the  low  angle  of  fall  of  projectiles  fired  from  rifle  pieces  with 
high  initial  velocities.  "  At  3500  yards,  troops  behind  an  ordi- 
nary earthwork  have  nothing  to  fear  from  ordinary  shrapnel  with 

a  high  explosive  charge It  follows  that  if  the  defense  is 

content  simply  to  line  the  parapets  at  the  moment  the  attacking 
artillery  becomes  silent  in  order  not  to  hit  its  own  columns,  the 
latter  will  find  themselves  engaged  in  a  struggle  with  intact  in- 
fantry, and  at  the  critical  moment  will  receive  no  aid  from  their 
own  artillery."  Two  methods  have  been  tried  of  remedying  this 
defect.  One  is  by  using  the  torpedo  shells;  another  is  by  manu- 
facturing field  guns  for  plunging  fire.  They  may  be  either 
mortars  or   howitzers. 

"  The  German  torpedo  shell  dates  from  1888.  France  adopted 
a  similar  one  in  1880,  and  Austria-Hungary  in  1889.  This  pro- 
jectile weighs  about  15.4  pounds,  and  gives  an  average  of  eight 
hundred  fragments,  and  the  fragments  towards  the  base  of  the 
shell  are  thrown  to  the  rear  with  a  velocity  of  from  450  to  550 
yards  per  second,  and  can  then  strike  in  reverse  the  soldiers  lean- 
ing against  cover."  The  field  howitzer  or  mortar  is  yet  in  a  tenta- 
tive condition.  Switzerland  has  constructed  a  piece  for  plunging 
fire,  arranged  as  a  field  gun.  Our  government  is  also  making  a 
3.6  inch  B.  L.  field  mortar  of  steel.  It  weighs  244  pounds,  fires  a 
maximum  charge  of  one  pound  of  powder  and  a  projectile  weigh- 


— Ill— 

ing  twenty  pounds.  It  gives  an  initial  velocity  of  650  feet.  By 
varying  the  angle  of  elevation  between  15°  and  45°,  all  ranges 
from  about  300  feet  to  3500  yards  may  be  covered. 

Gruson  has  made  several  models.  Russia  and  Spain  have  each 
made  experimental  field  mortars.  Germany,  France  and  Italy 
are  at  work  in  the  same  direction. 

Twenty-four  years  have  passed  since  the  great  Franco-Prussian 
war,  and  sixteen  since  the  Russo-Turkish  war.  They  have  been 
full  of  progress.  The  skill  of  the  mechanic  has  been  exerted  to 
its  utmost  to  improve  destructive  weapons  and  material  of  war. 
The  genius  of  the  inventor  has  been  especially  active,  for  success 
insures  great  rewards.  We  have  had  no  oppoi'tunities  to  experi- 
ment on  the  lives  of  our  fellow-men  with  these  great  engines  of 
destruction,  but  many  inert  objects  have  felt  the  force  of  their 
blows  on  many  testing  grounds.  Germany  has  ten  practice 
grounds  for  testing  her  artillery,  and  the  other  nations  are  keep- 
ing pace.  There  is,  however,  but  one  ground  for  testing  a  greater 
power  in  war  than  the  artillery,  viz:  morale,  and  that  ground  is 
the  battlefield.  The  results  make  history.  The  artillery  ought 
to  have  an  advantage  in  morale,  as  it  usually  views  the  field  from 
beyond  the  galling  fire  of  infantry  at  short  ranges. 

Supplying  Ammunition, — The  question  of  ammunition  supply 
on  the  field  of  battle  is  most  important,  both  for  artillery  and 
infantry.  The  expenditure  is  enormous.  The  artillery  of  the 
guard  corps  fired  8000  rounds  at  St.  Privat.  Altogether  it  fired 
25,000  projectiles.  A  single  piece  fired  194  rounds  at  Vionville. 
The  rapidity  of  fire  has  increased  greatly  since  that  time,  and 
many  efforts  are  being  made  to  increase  it  further,  and  it  will  take 
an  enormous  ammunition  column  to  carry  sufiicient  ammunition 
for  more  than  a  single  engagement.  Each  corps  must  have  a 
separate  ammunition  column  under  the  orders  of  the  chief  of 
artillery  of  the  corps.  It 'should  consist  of  caissons  carrying  the 
first  reserve  of  ammunition,  and  wagons  carrying  the  stores  and 
materials  for  refitting  the  guns  and  carriages. 

When  the  army  becomes  engaged  the  columns  must  halt,  not 
less  than  three  miles  from  the  front  of  the  line,  near,  but  not  on 


—112— 

the  roads  leading  to  the  front.  If  the  battle  is  favorable  to  our 
arms,  the  columns  may  approach  closer  to  the  batteries,  otherwise 
they  must  be  held  at  a  distance,  and  only  those  caissons  brought 
up  that  are  absolutely  necessary  to  supply  the  pieces. 

The  limber  ammunition  must  be  kept  in  reserve  for  emergen- 
cies; when  expended,  it  must  be  replaced  as  soon  as  possible. 
"In  future  a  greater  quantity  of  ammunition  will  be  expended 
by  the  artillery  than  during  the  last  war,  and  arrangements  must 
be  made  to  prevent  the  supply  from  becoming  exhausted,  espec- 
ially in  the  critical  moments." — (Hohenlohe.) 

Uniformity  in  calibre  and  weight  would  assist  a  little  in  simpli- 
fying the  question  of  ammunition  supply.  The  French  regulation 
of  1890  divides  the  battery  into  two  parts.  The  first  part  {hat- 
terie  de  tir)  is  composed  of  six  pieces  and  three  caissons.  The 
second  part  [echelon  de  combat)  comprises  six  caissons,  the  bat- 
tery wagon  and  forge. 

The  echelon  is  placed  under  the  orders  of  a  non-commissioned 
officer.  Its  distance  from  the  battery  should  not  exceed  five  hun- 
dred yards,  and  should  be  reduced  as  the  needs  of  the  battery 
become  more  urgent,  in  the  latter  portion  of  the  fight.  It  should 
be  kept  out  of  sight  of  the  enemy,  and  outside  of  the  zone  struck 
by  his  projectiles,  as  much  as  possible.  Replacing  ammunition 
is  done  by  exchanging  an  empty  caisson  at  the  battery  for  a  full 
one  at  the  echelon.  When  the  caissons  of  the  echelon  are  becom- 
ing exhausted,  word  is  sent  to  the  commander  of  the  munition 
section,  giving  number  and  calibre  of  the  battery.  When  the 
munition  sections  arrive,  the  ammunition  is  transferred  to  the 
echelon  wagons. 

Prince  Hohenlohe  says  :  "  The  artillery  should  never  be  with- 
out ammunition.  That  it  should  have  a  supply  of  ammunition 
at  the  opportune  moment  is  for  it  a  vital  necessity.  This  is  why 
it  should  endeavor  to  keep  the  limber  chests  of  the  pieces  always 
full.  The  ammunition  contained  in  these  chests  will  form  its  last 
reserve.  If,  in  spite  of  all  endeavors,  ammunition  fails,  artillery 
must  nevertheless  remain  in  position  without  firing  until  a  new 
supply  can  be  obtained,  and  so  long  as  no  order  to  retire  is 
received." 


—113— 

In  days  gone  by  it  was  customary  to  have  a  great  many  differ- 
ent calibres  in  the  artillery  complement,  but  experience  and  sim- 
plicity have  induced  a  movement  towards  uniformity  in  calibre 
in  field  artillery.  To  enable  it  to  move  rapidly  when  attached  to 
cavalry,  the  field  gun  used  by  horse  artillery  was  reduced  in 
calibre  and  weight.  The  3.2  inch  gun  weighs  829  pounds,  and 
the  3.6  inch  gun  1,181  pounds.  Germany  has  solved  the  question 
by  giving  the  3,47  inch  gun  to  the  horse  batteries  as  well  as  to 
the  field  batteries. 

Astro-Hungary  has  followed  the  example,  by  ordering  uniform 
calibre  for  mounted  batteries  (3.42-inch),  and  the  construction  of 
a  lighter  gun  of  the  same  calibre  for  the  horse  batteries. 

Machine  Guks. — The  place  machine  guns  will  occupy  in  the 
equipment  of  modern  armies  has  not  been  determined.  They 
have  not  been  tested  in  actual  warfare  sufficient  to  enable  us  to 
predict  their  value.  It  became  evident  that  they  ought  not  to  be 
classed  as  artillery,  for  they  have  neither  the  range  or  destructive 
effect  of  field  guns,  and  would  increase  the  number  of  horses  and 
vehicles  without  an  adequate  compensating  value.  The  French 
have  always  had  a  weakness  for  the  mitrailleuse,  but  the  modern 
machine  guns  are  quite  different  machines  to  the  ones  used  in 
1870;  they  are  mounted  on  carriages  and  can  be  fired  at  the  rate 
of  1000  shots  per  minute.  The  mechanism  is  simple,  and  they 
are  protected  so  that  a  rifle  bullet  or  even  a  piece  of  shell  would 
not  injure  them.  Their  value  in  a  defensive  position  is  certainly 
very  great.  They  can  fire  more  shots  per  minute  than  could  be 
fired  by  many  rifles,  and  they  have  one  great  advantage,  viz: 
they  do  not  get  nervous  or  excited.  They  could  cover  the  ground 
up  to  300  yards  with  a  shower  of  bullets  without  change  of  eleva- 
tion, and  their  horizontal  motion  gives  them  quite  a  wide  zone 
of  fire. 

They  can  be  concealed  from  view  behind  the  parapet  or  a  wall 
during  the  artillery  stage  of  the  fight,  and  readily  be  brought 
into  action  when  the  enemy's  infantry  gets  within  close  range, 
when  their  destructive  effect  will  certainly  be  terrible.  We  may 
assume,  until  experience  proves  us  to  be  wrong,  that  their  proper 


—  114— 

sphere  of  action  is  with  the  infantry,  and  possibly  with  the 
cavalry  division,  to  which  they  would  be  of  great  assistance  in 
occupying  defiles,  bridges,  etc.  Their  value  in  street  fighting 
would  be  very  great,  and  against  savages  or  fanatics  who  fight  in 
great  masses,  trusting  to  their  great  numbers  to  overpower  their 
enemies;  such  as  the  English  army  recently  encountered  in 
Egypt. 

The  military  nations  of  the  world  seem  to  be  a  little  loth  to 
authorize  the  use  of  them  on  an  extensive  scale,  or  to  provide  for 
their  tactical  employment. 

Quick-firing  guns  are  those  which  are  loaded  by  hand  for  each 
round.  The  rapidity  with  which  they  can  be  loaded  and  fired 
depends  upon  the  calibre.  They  are  extensively  used  in  the  navies 
of  the  world,  from  small  calibres  up  to  six  inches,  but  they  have 
not  been  assigned  a  definite  place  in  field  artillery. 

Smokeless  Powders. — Artillery  powders  are  not  absolutely 
smokeless,  but  they  give  a  light  blue  smoke,  small  in  volume  and 
quickly  dissipated.  The  use  of  smokeless  powder  will  undoubt- 
edly increase  the  efficiency  of  artillery  fire  by  giving  a  clear 
field  of  view.  It  will  also  facilitate  the  use  of  artillery  in  mass, 
as  one  of  the  most  serious  obstacles  to  its  use  in  mass  was  the 
great  cloud  of  smoke  which  hung  over  the  batteries  and  concealed 
the  target  from  view.  Long  ranges  and  the  cost  of  modern  artil- 
lery ammunition  make  it  important  that  the  sights  and  fuses 
should  be  very  accurate  and  that  the  gun  be  carefully  laid.  The 
great  velocities  require  more  perfect  time  fuses,  as  delay  or  accel- 
eration in  the  burning  may  cause  the  projectile  to  explode  wide 
of  the  mark  and  be  wasted.  Although  the  progress  in  the  manu- 
facture of  artillery  material  has  been  greater  in  the  past  twenty 
years  than  in  all  previous  time,  there  is  no  abatement  of  effort 
towards  still  greater  power  and  perfection. 

When  we  study  the  losses  inflicted  by  artillery  it  seems  difficult 
to  account  for  its  importance.  The  Germans  estimated  that  only 
about  4  per  cent,  of  their  losses  in  the  war  of  1870  were  due  to 
artillery  fire;  it  is  also  estimated  that  from  20  to  25  per  cent,  of 
the  French  losses  were  due  to  artillery  fire.     The  difference  is 


—115— 

readily  accounted  for  when  we  recall,  1  st,  the  German  superiority 
in  artillery;  2d,  that  the  French  were  almost  universally  beaten 
and  suffered  greatly  from  artillery  fire  while  retreating. 

In  the  next  war  the  first  artillery  contest  will  be  watched  with 
keen  interest  by  all  the  military  nations  of  the  world.  Supremacy 
in  artillery  means  a  great  advantage,  but  excellence  in  material 
will  not  make  up  for  inefficiency  in  handling. 


CHAPTER   YIII. 


CAVALRY. 

History. — It  will  hardly  be  worth  while  to  trace  the  history  of 
cavalry  through  the  long  ages.  Bodies  of  horsemen  were  used 
by  Alexander  and  Hannibal,  organized  in  various  ways  and 
handled  with  varying  degrees  of  skill.  The  great  eastern  tribes 
raised  hordes  of  irregular  cavalry,  and  the  great  plains  gave 
ample  field  for  using  them.  During  the  time  of  the  knights, 
cavalry  predominated.  In  the  30  years'  war  masses  of  cavalry 
were  used,  but  with  little  appreciation  of  their  possible  utility  on 
the  field  of  battle  or  in  the  services  of  exploration  and  security. 
The  horses  were  heavy  and  poorly  trained,  and  they  went  into 
action  at  a  trot,  the  troopers  firing  their  pieces  as  they  advanced. 
Two-thirds  of  the  armies  first  commanded  by  Turenne  were 
horsemen.  "In  1672,  when  Louis  XIV  took  the  field,  three- 
fourths  of  his  force  was  formed  of  infantry  and  a  new  era  in  the 
art  of  war  then  began.  Infantry  was  increased  as  the  artistic 
arm  decreased."     (Hozier.) 

In  connection  with  the  trials  for  sorcery  during  Richelieu's 
time,  "a  charge  was  laid  against  a  horse  dealer  that  he  had 
allowed  his  horse  to  be  cleaned,  and  so  terrible  was  the  crime  that 
there  was  a  strong  attempt  made  to  have  both  the  horse  and  his 
master  burned  at  the  stake."  This  is  sufficient  to  indicate  the 
miserable  condition  of  the  horses  used  at  that  time.  The  infantry 
was  armed  chiefly  with  pikes,  but  some  musketeers  were  usually 
attached.  When  cavalry  charged  a  battalion  the  musketeers 
fired  while  the  pikemen  remained  motionless.  If  the  fire  failed 
to  stop  the  charge,  the  pikemen  put  the  butts  of  their  pikes 
against  the  right  foot  and  awaited  the  charge.  Dragoons  were 
formed  in  1669,  under  the  advice  of  Turenne. 

This  was  about  the  condition  of  cavalry  when  Frederick  the 
•Great  appeared  on  the  scene.     It  is  needless  to  say  this  energetic 


—US- 
man  set  about  a  reformation  at  once.  He  trained  his  men  to  ride^ 
forbade  firing  from  horseback,  trained  his  lines  to  charge  in  close 
order,  rally  quickly  and  charge  again  ;  he  forbade  the  mixing  of 
infantry  with  cavalry  in  line,  as  had  been  customary.  The  mag- 
nificent work  of  his  cavalry  under  the  leadership  of  Seidlitz  and 
Zeithen  still  excites  the  admiration  of  the  cavalryman, 

Napoleon  understood  the  value  of  cavalry,  and  the  French  cav- 
alry under  Murat  and  Kellerman  did  excellent  work,  both  in  the 
service  of  exploration  and  on  the  field  of  battle. 

We  do  not  see  much  of  importance  in  the  cavalry  work  abroad 
until  the  war  of  ]870.  In  the  war  of  1866  the  work  of  explora- 
tion of  the  cavalry  of  both  armies  was  very  poorly  done,  and  its 
action  on  the  field  was  in  no  way  remarkable.  The  gallant  charge 
of  Edelsheim's  brigade  at  Custozza  certainly  did  rattle  about  20,- 
000  Italian  infantry  pretty  badly,  both  in  the  morning  and  in  the 
evening.  After  1866,  the  Prussians  set  to  work  vigorously  to 
remodel  their  cavalry  service,  and,  as  usual  with  them,  did  it 
thoroughly,  and  we  find  a  great  improvement  in  their  recou- 
noissance  and  outpost  work.  They  did  lose  contact  with  the 
French  two  or  three  times,  but  they  kept  their  own  troops  well 
covered  and  supplied  pretty  good  information  as  to  the  move- 
ments of  the  enemy.  At  the  outset  the  Germans  were  still  im- 
pressed with  the  idea  that  cavalry  could  not  charge  unshaken 
infantry,  but  after  Bredow's  famous  sacrifice  doubts  began  to 
arise,  and  they  finally  concluded  that  there  might  still  be  much 
work  for  cavalry  on  the  battlefield.  As  Hohenlohe  says,  "  How 
are  you  going  to  tell  whether  the  enemy's  infantry  is  shaken  or 
not  ?"  It  is  all  well  enough  to  say  to  an  infantryman,  "  You  have 
nothing  to  fear  from  cavalry  if  you  keep  cool  and  use  the  great 
power  of  your  magazine  rifle."  Keeping  cool  while  solid  lines  of 
cavalry  with  drawn  sabres  are  coming  at  you  like  a  whirlwind  is 
quite  another  thing.  It  is  not  probable  that  cavalry  will  do 
much  damage  to  infantry  if  it  has  to  cross  much  open  ground  to 
attack  ;  if  it  can  approach  under  cover,  to  within  a  few  hundred 
yards,  and  even  partially  surprise  the  enemy,  it  may  still  charge 
home  effectively. 


—  119— 

Tactics. — The  most  favorable  opportunity  for  charging  in- 
fantry will  be  when  it  has  exhausted  its  ammunition  or  is  in 
retreat  in  disorder,  or  has  been  badly  shaken  by  artillery  or 
infantry  tire.  The  best  time  to  attack  artillery  is  just  before  it  has 
unlimbered,  or  just  after  it  has  limbered  up  to  change  position. 
The  traces  should  be  cut,  the  horses  killed  and  the  pieces  de- 
stroyed by  breaking  the  breech  mechanism.  If  the  battery  can 
be  cajstured  and  taken  off,  so  much  the  better.  The  cavalry 
leader  must  remember  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  cavalry  to  assist 
the  infantry  at  every  opportunity.  Before  the  battle  it  is  the 
eyes  and  ears  of  the  army,  precedes  it  on  the  march  by  one  or 
two  days  and  sends  information  to  the  commander  in  time  to  give 
him  ample  opportunity  for  preparing  for  action.  By  its  vigorous 
work  in  front  it  allows  the  infantryman  to  repose  secure  and  to 
husband  his  energies  for  the  fight.  Dui'ing  the  fight  it  hovers 
on  the  enemy's  flanks,  seeks  to  gain  his  rear,  and  gives  warning 
of  attempted  flanking  movements.  In  the  service  of  exploration 
the  main  body  of  the  divisional  cavalry  is  kept  together  on  the 
main  road.  The  country  is  scoured  by  officers'  patrols  and  con- 
tact squadrons.  The  German  cavalry  at  Saarbrucken  in  August, 
1870,  patrolled  the  neighborhood  so  courageously  as  to  give  the 
French  the  idea  that  the  place  was  held  by  a  strong  force.  They 
consequently  delayed  attacking  it  until  the  2nd  of  August,  when 
they  sent  three  entire  divisions  against  it.  It  was  occupied  by 
but  three  battalions,  four  squadrons  and  one  battery.  After  they 
retreated  across  the  Saar  the  French  did  not  pursue  nor  make 
any  effort  to  determine  the  strength  of  the  Germans  in  that 
vicinity. 

From  want  of  experience  under  present  conditions  of  warfare 
we  are  somewhat  at  a  loss  to  determine  what  the  tactical  import- 
ance of  cavalry  on  the  field  of  battle  will  be  in  the  next  war. 

Many  writers  of  recent  times  (since  the  adoption  of  the  maga- 
zine rifle)  have  been  very  busy  attempting  to  demonstrate  a  great 
diminution  in  the  usefulness  of  this  arm,  especially  in  battle.  It 
is  an  extremely  important  question,  for  cavalry  is  very  expensive 
both  in  peace  and  in  war  ;  furthermore,  it  takes  long  training  to 


—120— 

make  a  good  cavalryman,  for  both  man  and  horse  must  be  trained 
separately  and  then  together,  consequently,  if  an  array  is  weak 
in  the  cavalry  at  the  outset,  it  will  hardly  be  able  to  remedy  the 
defect  during  the  short  duration  of  modern  wars.  The  military 
nations  of  Europe  evidently  do  not  place  a  low  estimate  on  the 
value  of  cavalry,  judging  from  the  large  forces  they  maintain  in 
time  of  peace.  Germany  has  465  squadrons,  over  60,000  men  ; 
Russia  has  116  sqixadrons  more,  France  a  few  squadrons  less  and 
the  Italian  cavalry  exceeds  our  entire  regular  army  in  numerical 
strength. 

A  warm  discussion  is  also  maintained  as  to  the  proper  arma- 
ment and  equipm.ent  of  cavalry.  This  would  naturally  follow  a 
difference  of  opinion  as  to  its  functions  in  wax*.  The  sabre,  pistol, 
carbine  and  lance  have  been  advocated  in  all  sorts  of  combina- 
tions. Since  the  war  of  1870  the  lance  seems  to  have  been  resur- 
rected, "  by  one  of  those  queer  turns  of  human  thought  which 
occur  every  now  and  then,  and  which  make  dead  fancies  masquer- 
ade as  live  issues."  It  is  a  return  to  the  days  of  the  Knights 
Templar. 

"  The  strategical  importance  of  cavalry  has  greatly  increased 
and  so  much  that  its  value  in  this  respect  alone  justifies  the 
expense  of  maintaining  it."  Its  usefulness  in  exploring  the  ground 
in  front  of  the  army  on  the  march  and  in  protecting  the  front  and 
flanks  has  increased  with  the  advent  of  smokeless  powder  and 
long  range  rifles.  It  can  form  an  impenetrable  screen  between 
the  army  and  the  enemy,  and  by  keeping  touch  with  him  can  fur- 
nish the  commander-in-chief  much  useful  information  as  to  his 
numbers,  position  and  movements.  If  the  enemy  is  retreating  the 
cavalry  must  be  on  his  flanks  harassing  him,  cutting  off  his  trains 
and  watching  his  every  movement. 

Battles  will  be  preceded  by  combats  between  cavalry  units, 
which  will  give  them  grand  opportunities  to  show  their  prowess. 
There  can  be  no  more  thrilling  scene  in  war  than  that  presented 
by  masses  of  cavalry,  with  drawn  sabi'es,  rushing  madly  to  the 
final  shock  which  will  carry  the  foremost  men  to  earth,  a  pile  of 
dead  and  maimed  men  and  horses,  while  the  mass  that  has  the 


—  121— 

greatest  momentum  remaining  will  sweep  on,  scattering  before  it 
the  remnant  of  the  weaker  column.  Hence  the  cavalryman  must 
study  well  the  tactics  of  cavalry  masses  in  action  against  cavalry. 
In  foreign  services  we  find  many  different  kinds  of  cavalry. 
In  our  service  we  make  no  distinction.  Our  new  drill  regulations 
gives  us  the  squadron,  "  to  be  composed  of  not  more  than  four 
troops  nor  less  than  two."  The  squadron  is  the  proper  tactical 
unit  for  cavalry.  The  regiment  still  remains  the  administrative 
unit. 

Many  authors  attempt  to  give  exact  rules  for  determining  the 
proportion  of  cavalry  in  an  array,  but  they  are  of  no  value.  It  is 
safe  to  say  that  in  a  theater  well  suited  to  the  use  of  cavalry 
there  would  be  plenty  of  work  for  all  of  the  cavalry  likely  to  be 
found  in  modern  armies.  We  should  at  least  be  as  strong  as  our 
antagonist  in  that  arm  ;  if  stronger  so  much  the  better. 

Our  cavalry  is  trained  to  fight  both  on  horseback  and  on  foot, 
which  gives  it  mobility  and  power. 

It  can  safely  be  said  that  the  world  has  never  seen  cavalry  with 
greater  fighting  power  than  that  possessed  by  the  magnificent 
cavalry  of  the  army  of  the  Potomac  in  1865,  when  it  was  com- 
manded by  that  king  of  cavalrymen.  Gen.  Philip  H.  Sheridan.  It 
could  march  any  distance,  fight  either  mounted  or  on  foot,  against 
infantry,  artillery  or  cavalry,  and  did  not  need  the  support  of 
other  arms. 

It  was  purely  American  in  organization  and  tactics,  and  we 
have  the  word  of  its  old  commander  that  the  cavalry  of  the 
French  and  Germans  during  1870-71  did  not  compare  to  it. 
When  we  speak  of  cavalry  fighting  on  foot  we  at  once  get  on 
debatable  ground.  Many  cavalrymen  maintain  that  they  should 
never  dismount  to  fight,  nor  use  any  weapon  but  the  sabre. 
Russia  has  taken  hold  of  the  idea  of  fighting  on  foot,  and  her 
dragoons  are  drilled  in  that  method  of  fighting.  They  are  armed 
with  rifles,  and  I  understand  that  they  have  bayonets  for  them. 
It  seems  rather  odd  that  a  cavalryman  should  have  any  use  for  a 
bayonet,  Ijut  time  will  show  either  the  folly  or  wisdom  of  it. 

In  buttle  the  cavalry  is  posted  on  that  flank  of  the  army  near 
which  the  ground  is  best  suited  to  cavalry  operations.     If  the 


—122— 

ground  is  rough  and  broken  there  will  not  be  much  opportunity 
for  the  cavalry  before  the  close  of  the  battle,  when  it  may  be 
able  to  join  in  the  pursuit,  or  help  to  protect  the  retreat.  The 
long  ranges  of  modern  arms  compel  the  cavalry  to  take  post 
many  yards  in  rear  of  the  infantry,  in  fact,  cavalry  cannot 
remain  massed  within  range  of  artillery  or  infantry,  and  unless 
some  cover  can  be  provided  for  it,  it  had  better  be  kept  off  the 
field  of  battle,  engaged  in  trying  to  harrass  the  enemy's  flanks 
and  giving  warning  of  any  attempted  turning  movement  or  flank 
attack  on  our  lines. 

The  cavalry  may  be  called  on  again  to  make  heroic  sacrifices  to 
draw  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  infantry  and  give  a  respite  to  our 
own,  or  to  gain  time  for  reinforcements  to  arrive.  It  will  be 
even  a  more  bloody  sacrifice  than  Bredow's,  but  if  it  brings  vic- 
tory the  heroic  dead  will  have  their  names  high  up  on  the  roll  of 
honor. 

The  strength  of  cavalry  on  the  battlefield  is  in  impetuosity  and 
shock,  and  its  true  weapon  is  the  sabre  ;  the  lance  may  be  very 
good  at  the  instant  of  shock,  but  two  seconds  afterwards  it  is  of 
no  use.  It  requires  long  drill  to  make  a  soldier  proficient  in  the 
use  of  it,  and  it  is  always  an  encumbrance.  The  tendency  in 
Europe  is  toward  unification  in  the  armament  and  duties  of  all 
cavalry.  "  The  best  authors  are  of  the  opinion  that  all  cavalry 
ought  to  be  exercised  in  all  of  the  duties  pertaining  to  the  cav- 
alry arm."  All  the  French  cavalry  is  armed  with  the  Lebel 
magazine  carbine  of  8mm.  calibre.  The  other  European  powers 
are  arming  their  cavalry  in  a  similar  way. 

They  are  expected  to  use  them  only  in  unforeseen  emergencies, 
in  the  service  of  exploration,  service  of  security,  and  on  outpost 
duty.  We  propose  to  do  all  of  that  with  our  cavalry,  and  in 
addition  we  expect  to  teach  them  to  get  the  full  and  proper  use 
of  their  firearms  by  fighting  on  foot.  Cavalry  that  cannot  fight 
on  foot  may  be  stopped  by  a  very  slight  obstacle.  Fifteen 
infantrymen  behind  a  good  earthwork  could  arrest  the  progress  of 
a  squadron  of  cavalry,  yes,  of  a  regiment,  as  long  as  they 
remained  mounted,  and  they  could  make  a  defile  impassable  for  a 
like  number. 


—  123— 

What  folly,  then,  is  it,  not  to  teach  troops  to  make  every  possi- 
ble use  of  the  weapons  they  carry.  "At  Rezonville  5000  troop- 
ers rushed  on  each  other  with  terrific  force.  The  French  cavalry 
had  to  yield,  triumphantly  pursued  by  the  German  horse.  A  few 
scattered  squads  of  the  Second  Chasseurs  d'Afrique  dismounted 
and  threw  themselves  into  the  little  wood  of  Ville-sur-Iron  and 
opened  fire  on  the  German  cavalry.  A  few  French  skirmishers 
in  the  valley  of  the  farm  of  Greyere  did  likewise,  and  the  victor- 
ious cavalry  which  had  just  sustained  a  violent  struggle  with 
three  hostile  brigades,  was  compelled  to  discontinue  the  pursuit 
and  return  to  its  lines,  unable  to  endure  the  fire  of  the  few  troop- 
ers it  had  dismounted."  {Major  Nigote  in  Les  Grandes  Ques- 
tions du  tTour.) 

To  quote  further  from  Major  Nigote  :  "  The  lance  which  some 
are  endeavoring  to  introduce,  and  the  sabre  itself,  will  in  the 
near  future  peacefully  repose  on  the  walls  of  our  arsenals  beside 
the  battle  axes,  the  halberds  and  the  armor  of  our  ancestors,  and 
this  will  come  to  pass  on  the  day  when  our  troops  shall  have 
learned  to  use  their  musketoori  on  foot  and  on  horseback."  It  is  a 
satisfaction  to  know  that  at  least  one  European  officer  fully 
appreciates  the  value  of  cavalry  fighting  on  foot.  We  have  known 
it  for  thirty  years. 

The  charge  is  the  climax  in  the  life  of  the  cavalryman. 

The  command  is  divided  into  three  lines  :  Attacking  line,  sup- 
port and  reserve. 

In  charging  the  enemy  the  sub-divisions  charge  successively, 
each  at  such  distance  from  the  one  preceding  as  to  support  it 
promptly  or  to  enable  it  if  repulsed  to  clear  the  flanks  of  the 
column  and  re-form  in  its  rear.  The  successive  sub-divisions  con- 
tinue the  attack,  break  through  the  enemy's  line,  rally  in  his  rear, 
and  charge  again  as  they  return."     C.  D.  R.  (635). 

In  charging  a  battery  the  cavalry  charges  as  foragers,  that  is 
in  open  order.  Infantry  in  open  order  would  be  charged  in  the 
s^me  way  ;  it  may  also  charge  in  line,  the  men  riding  boot  to 
boot,  officers  leading.  Starting  at  a  walk  they  soon  take  the  trot, 
then  the  gallop,  with  horses  well  in  line  and  the  alignments  well 


—124— 

kept  until  about  100  yards  from  the  enemy  when  the  command 
**  Charge  !"  is  given,  and  with  sabres  raised  all  should  charge 
home. 

It  should  be  dismounted: 

1.  In  a  wooded  or  rough  country  where  mounted  action  is  im- 
practicable, such  as  in  small  villages,  woods,  defiles,  bridges, fords, 
etc. 

^.  When  necessary  to  dislodge  detachments  of  the  enemy'' s  in- 
fantry,or  dismounted  cavalry  from  behind  an  obstacle,  or  to  hold 
important  points  against  the  enemy. 

3.  To  replace  infantry  in  a  position  to  deceive  the  enemy  while 
the  infantry  retires. 

Jf.  During  a  retreat,  to  compel  the  pursuing  troops  to  deploy. 

In  dismounted  action  the  carbine  is  the  only  useful  weapon. 
The  sabres  are  left  on  the  horses  and  the  revolver  is  not  of  much 
use.  The  cavalryman  has  to  become  proficient  in  the  use  of  three 
weapons,  carbine,  sabre  and  pistol ;  you  will  see  at  once  that  it 
takes  a  long  time  to  make  a  good  cavalryman. 

Our  cavalry  is  trained  to  fight  6n  fpot.  Nos.  1,  2  and  3  of 
each  set  of  fours  dismount  and  link  horses.  No.  4  i-emains 
mounted  as  horseholder.  The  reserve  is  directed  to  act  as  guard 
for  the  horses.  When  dismounted  it  manoeuvres  and  fights  as 
laid  down  for  infantry. 

Foraging  is  a  duty  which  will  fall  largely  upon  the  cavalry. 
In  its  proper  signification  it  means  collecting  the  supplies  of  a 
country  for  the  use  of  the  army  located  on  it  or  passing  through 
it.  No  soldier  should  be  permitted  to  seize  food  or  clothing  for 
himself.  His  supplies  should  come  to  him  through  the  author- 
ized officers,  and  all  pillaging  or  the  wanton  destruction  of  private 
property  should  be  severely  punished,  even  by  death  if  an 
example  is  necessary. 

War  may  be  made  to  support  war,  but  the  non-combatant 
population  should  be  treated  with  as  much  considei'ation  as  possi- 
ble. "  By  treating  the  inhabitants  with  justice  and  humanity, 
and  giving  them  an  equivalent  for  their  property,  many  friends 
are  gained  or  at  least  their  hostility  is  diminished."     (Dufour.) 


— 125  — 

Troops  are  of  course  allowed  to  buy  provisions  from  the  people. 
Requisitions  are  usually  made  on  the  authorities  of  the  country. 
If  this  fails  then  the  army  must  use  force.  The  supplies  are 
brought  into  camp  under  escort  and  turned  over  to  the  proper 
officers.  The  foraging  parties  and  escorts  are  often  composed 
entirely  of  cavalry.  To  prevent  surprises  and  ambuscades  scouts 
and  flankers  are  thrown  out.  The  train  is  kept  well  closed,  and 
a  small  rear  guard  is  designated.  Vedettes  may  be  sent  to 
prominent  points  to  watch  the  country. 

THE    ATTACK. 

In  cavalry  against  cavalry  it  must  not  await  an  attack  at  a 
halt,  for,  at  the  time  they  come  together  it  should  have  at  least 
as  much  momentum  as  its  antagonist.  No  precise  formations  are 
prescribed  for  cavalry  in  an  attack.  They  are  left  to  the  discre- 
tion of  the  leader. 

It  is  usually  formed  in  three  lines,  called  the  attacking  line, 
support  and  reserve.  The  attacking  line  gives  the  main  blow, 
and  ought  to  be  stronger  and  cover  a  longer  front  than  the 
enemy.  If  the  enemy  can  be  surprised  or  attacked  while  man- 
oeuvring the  gait  should  be  increased  at  longer  distances  from 
him.  After  the  attack  comes  the  melee  and  the  use  of  the  sabre. 
This  is  to  continue  until  the  support  attacks.  If  the  enemy 
retreats,  part  of  the  line  should  pursue  as  foragers,  the  rest  should 
be  rallied  and  held  in  hand  for  the  regular  pursuit. 

The  support  must  manoeuvre  so  as  to  give  timely  assistance  to 
the  attacking  line  ;  its  movements  should  conform  to  those  of  the 
attacking  line  ;  if  the  latter  is  threatened  with  a  flank  attack  the 
support  must  be  kept  closer  to  it  and  prepare  to  ward  it  off.  The 
reserve  is  kept  in  hand  to  cover  emergencies.  "  It  is  not  thrown 
into  action  except  by  the  authority  of  the  division  commander, 
or  to  meet  an  unexpected  flank  attack,  *  *  when  the  support 
has  charged,  the  reserve  becomes  the  support,  *  *  *  ^j^gn  it 
is  ordered  to  attack  about  one-fourth  of  its  force  is  still  held  in 
reserve."     (C.  D.  R.,  pa.  960.) 

The  cavalry  must  also  assist  in  covering  the  concentration  of 
the  army  after  mobilization.     It  ought  to  be  first  on  the  ground 


—  126— 

and  make  a  serious  effort  to  explore  as  much  as  possible  of  the 
enemy's  territory  in  the  vicinity  of  the  zone  of  concentration.  It 
is  very  important  to  know  the  enemy's  intentions  at  the  earliest 
possible  moment.  These  will  be  indicated  by  a  knowledge  of  his 
plans  for  concentration  ;  it  may  also  delay  the  enemy's  concentra- 
tion by  threatening  important  points,  attacking  detachments  en 
route,  destroying  railways  and  telegraph  lines. 

There  are  of  course  many  difficulties  to  be  overcome  in  hand- 
ling cavalry  on  the  field  of  battle.  It  cannot  be  held  in  mass  on 
open  ground  within  effective  range  of  artillery — and  shrapnel  fire 
is  effective  at  3500  yards.  At  this  distance  it  will  be  difficult  for 
the  cavalry  leaders  to  determine  the  condition  of  the  enemy's 
infantry.  Even  if  it  is  deemed  advisable  to  charge,  it  will  be 
almost  impossible  to  do  so  effectively  over  this  long  distance  with 
any  but  fresh  horses.  Having  this  in  view,  the  Germans  try  to 
train  their  horses  for  it  in  time  of  peace.  Hohenlohe  says  :  "  It 
will  sometimes  require  from  the  cavalry  that  they  shall  be  able 
to  advance  as  much  as  four  miles,  at  a  rapid  pace,  before  they 
deliver  their  charge.  Can  they  do  this  ?  They  must  be  able  to  do 
it  if  they  are  to  be  of  any  use  as  cavalry  in  battle.  As  inspector, 
when  the  squadrons  had  carried  out  their  movements  in  full 
marching  order  at  the  regulation  trot,  I  made  them  execute  the 
same  movements  at  the  regulation  gallop.  This  pace  they  had  to 
keep  up  for  at  least  six  minutes.  Immediately  after  this  I  made 
them  execute  the  long  regulation  charge,  followed  by  a  charge  in 
extended  order." 

This  will  give  you  an  idea  of  the  amount  of  work  put  on  horses 
in  the  German  cavalry  to  test  their  fitness  for  war. 

Lieut.  Greene,  in  his  official  report  of  the  Russo-Turkish  war, 
says  :  "  The  true  use  of  cavalry  in  modern  warfare  was  devel- 
oped in  our  civil  war,  viz:  scouting  and  reconnoissance  ;  in  inde- 
pendent raids  against  lines  of  communication  and  supply ;  in 
following  up  a  retreat,  and  doing  its  heavy  fighting  on  foot. 
Since  1865  there  has  been  nothing  new  on  the  subject."  Euro- 
peans generally  have  failed  to  grasp  the  lessons  taught  by  our 
cavalry.     A  dozen   French  chasseurs  d'  Afrique,  during   1870, 


—  127— 

actually  arrested  the  progress  of  a  whole  brigade  of  Prussian  cav- 
alry for  some  time.  They  would  not  have  delayed  the  progress 
of  Sheridan's  cavalry  longer  than  the  time  it  would  have  taken  a 
troop  to  dismount. 

THE   CAVALRY   RAID. 

Cavalry  raids  were  frequent  in  the  war  of  the  rebellion  and 
were  as  a  rule  successful,  but  they  were  not  all  well  timed.  They 
are  made  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  supplies,  railway  and  tele- 
graph lines,  ravaging  the  country,  and  in  the  hope  of  drawing  off 
some  portion  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  in  pursuit.  Russia  is  the 
only  European  country  that  attempts  cavalry  raids,  and  their 
hardy  Cossack  horsemen  are  admirably  fitted  for  this  kind  of 
work.  Stuart,  Forrest,  Van  Dorn  and  Morgan  on  the  confed- 
erate side,  and  Sheridan,  Grierson  and  Stoneman  on  the  federal 
side,  made  memorable  raids  during  the  war  of  the  rebellion. 

MOUNTED  INFANTRY. 

Success  on  the  field  of  battle  demands  the  harmonious  action 
of  the  three  arms.  The  cavalry  and  the  artillery  are  complemen- 
tary to  the  infantry.  There  are  times  when  they  need  the  assist- 
ance of  a  little  infantry  very  urgently.  The  infantry  is  slow  in 
movement  on  foot,  and  some  means  ought  to  be  provided  for  giv- 
ing small  bodies  of  it  increased  mobility.  This  can  be  done 
effectively  in  two  ways,  viz :  either  by  mounting  them  on  horses 
or  in  wagons.  Recently  the  question  of  mounting  them  on 
bicycles   has  received   some   attention  in  an  experimental  way. 

The  principal  objection  to  wagons  and  bicycles  is  that  they  are 
obliged  to  keep  pretty  close  to  the  roads  and  would  not  be  avail- 
able for  cross  country  work.  The  question  of  adopting  a  light 
cart  to  be  drawn  by  two  horses,  and  to  carry  six  men,  was  con- 
sidered by  our  tactical  board,  but  was  not  definitely  acted  upon. 
Our  government  has  used  mounted  infantry  frequently  in  Indian 
wars  with  great  success.  The  troops  were  mounted  on  the 
Indian  pony,  with  their  infantry  rifles,  so  they  remained  infantry 


—128— 

with  increased  power  of  locomotion.  We  have  also  employed 
wagons  for  the  same  purpose,  the  most  noted  case  being  the  ex- 
pedition for  the  relief  of  Major  Thornburgh's  command.  It  was 
composed  of  four  troops  of  the  Fifth  cavalry  and  131  infantry- 
men mounted  in  wagons  ;  in  a  little  over  48  hours  it  marched 
from  Rawlins  to  Milk  river,  a  distance  of  170  miles.  We  can 
find  accounts  of  infantry  having  been  used  in  this  way  as  far  back 
as  Napoleon.  The  present  Third  regiment  of  <;avalry  was  organ- 
ized in  1846  as  a  regiment  of  mounted  rifles,  but  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  it  was  made  a  cavalry  regiment.  The  English  have 
had  a  regiment  of  mounted  infantry  for  some  time.  Its  value 
was  learned  in  the  wars  in  Egypt  and  in  Zululand,  and  they  will 
probably  retain  it  for  similar  cases.  The  Germans  carried  infantry 
in  carts  on  more  than  one  occasion  during  the  war  of  1870.  The 
value  of  mounted  infantry  is  a  favorite  topic  of  discussion,  and  as 
usual  we  find  all  shades  of  opinion.  Its  opponents  claim  that  it 
is  neither  cavalry  nor  infantry  ;  in  trying  to  imitate  the  cavalry 
it  simply  becomes  bad  infantry  and  worse  cavalry.  Many  English 
cavalry  officers  are  opposed  to  it  from  selfish  motives.  They  say 
if  it  becomes  more  efficient,  the  authorities  may  replace  some  of 
the  cavalry  by  mounted  infantry,  as  it  is  more  economical  and 
more  quicklj"^  trained.  Others  who  agree  that  mounted  infantry 
is  very  desirable,  do  not  agree  as  to  its  organization  and  the 
method  of  transportation. 

The  weight  of  opinion,  however,  seems  to  be  in  its  favor.  A 
cavalryman  even  when  dismounted  is  no  match  with  his  short- 
barreled  cai'bine  for  the  infantryman  with  his  long  range  rifle, 
consequently  in  some  emergencies  he  needs  the  mounted  infantry- 
man. In  attacking  a  village  or  wood,  or  in  holding  a  defile,  the 
infantryman  has  a  great  advantage.  Dismounted  cavalry  could 
not  cope  with  infantry  of  equal  strength.  We  would  not  expect 
to  employ  mounted  infantry  on  the  battlefield  as  cavalry  would 
be  employed,  and  I  do  not  see  why  there  should  be  any  objection 
to  mounted  infantry  as  long  as  it  is  employed  in  its  legitimate 
duties.  We  may  want  to  occupy  a  point  30  or  40  miles  away, 
and  before  the  enemy  can  reach  it.     It  is  necessary  to  hold  it  in 


—129— 

strength  ;  in  this  case  a  regiment  of  moiinted  infantry  lightly 
equipped  would  be  very  valuable.  It  may  be  necessary  to  send 
some  infantry  with  the  cavalry  in  minor  detached  operations.  It 
will  hardly  be  worth  while  to  send  them  on  foot,  so  our  mounted 
infantry  would  be  valuable  again.  The  mounted  movements  of 
such  infantry  should  be  of  the  simplest  kind,  enough  to  allow 
them  to  move  over  the  gi-ound  readily  in  any  direction  and  to  dis- 
mount and  form  line  quickly.  The  only  cavalry  training  they 
should  have  should  be  to  ride  and  take  care  of  their  horses,  all 
the  rest  of  their  training  should  be  as  infantry.  Mounted  infantry 
ought  to  be  composed  of  men  selected  for  light  weight  and 
agility,  and  men  with  some  knowledge  of  horses  and  riding.  In 
every  campaign  a  wide  field  of  usefulness  can  be  found  for  such 
troops*. 

I  am  very  much  in  favor  of  an  idea  recently  broached  by  an 
Austrian  officer,  as  to  the  value  of  attaching  a  company  of 
mounted  infantry  to  each  brigade  of  infantry  to  be  an  integral 
part  of  it,  to  do  all  of  the  duties  now  imposed  on  detachments  of 
cavalry.  Being  armed  and  equipped  as  infantry,  they  would  be 
more  powerful  than  cavalry  and  more  mobile  than  infantry  ; 
being  attached  to  the  brigade  permanently,  they  would  be  known 
to  the  officers  and  men,  and  would  partake  of  their  spirit  to  a 
greater  extent  than  a  troop  of  cavalry  merely  attached  for  a  day. 
It  would  also  avoid  the  necessity  of  breaking  up  the  cavalry  regi- 
ments into  detachments.  If  the  brigade  was  marching  alone,  the 
mounted  troops  could  be  used  for  scouts  and  flankers.  They 
could  examine  a  ravine  or  a  wood  and  carry  quickly  the  informa- 
tion they  obtained.  The  detachments,  being  able  to  fight  as 
infantry,  would  have  greater  offensive  and  defensive  power  than 
cavalry.  They  would  also  have  greater  mobility  than  cavalry, 
for  they  would  not  be  sent  away  from  their  brigades  for  more 
than  a  few  hours  at  a  time,  and  could  go  lightly  equipped.  In 
action  they  could  watch  the  flanks  and  quickly  bring  tidings  of 
any  movements  of  the  enemy  in  that  direction. 

Mounted  infantry  would  be  very  valuable  in  the  rear  guard.    It 
could   rapidly  gain   good   positions   for    annoying   the   enemy's 
troops,  forcing  them  to  deploy  and  delaying  their  advance  at 
9 


—ISO- 
fords,  bridges,  etc.,  and  when  closely  pressed  they  could  mount 
and  rapidly  retire  to  new  positions. 

Haraley  in  his  "  Operations  of  War "  says  :  "  For  seizing  a 
post  or  defile  before  infantry  could  arrive  there,  and  which  cav- 
alry would  be  incompetent  to  hold,  for  rapidly  turning  a  flank, 
for  executing  distant  enterprises  against  communications,  mounted 
riflemen  seem  the  inevitable  solution  of  a  problem  the  conditions 
of  which  are  speed  of  movements  with  ability  to  contend  with 
any  kind  of  force."  ^ 

*'  The  question,  until  we  have  some  experiences  of  recent  war 
to  go  upon,  must  be  a  theoretical,  perhaps  a  controversial  one." 
(May.) 

There  need  not  be  any  conflict  in  the  duties  of  cavalry  and 
mounted  infantry.  The  field  is  wide  enough  for  both.  Plenty 
can  always  be  found  in  war  for  each  and  every  arm  to  do,  with- 
out any  trying  to  usurp  the  functions  and  duties  of  another.  The 
cavalry  need  not  feel  that  the  adoption  of  mounted  infantry  is 
any  slur  on  its  efficiency.  On  the  other  hand,  the  mounted 
infantrymen  need  not  think  that  his  spurs  and  pony  make  him  a 
cavalryman.  Two  most  vital  things  to  an  army  are  mobility  and 
power ;  mounted  infantry  has  both. 

RESUME. 

It  is  the  duty  of  cavalry  to  be  bold  and  aggressive  and  to  seek 
opportunities  for  action. 

It  must  keep  contact  with  the  enemy  and  cover  its  own  army. 

It  must  get  information  and  harass  the  enemy. 

It  must  never  await  an  assault,  but  rush  to  meet  it. 

It  must  strike  the  flanks,  and  at  the  same  time  protect  its  own. 

It  should  charge  in  echelons,  first  the  attacking  line,  then  the 
support,  always  keeping  a  reserve. 

It  must  be  active  in  pursuit  of  the  defeated  enemy. 

It  must  be  hardened  to  exposure  and  fatigue. 

It  should  be  composed  of  young,  agile  men  of  not  over  medium 
weight. 


—131  — 

It  should  be  armed  with  carbine  and  sabre,  the  sabre  to  be 
attached  to  the  saddle. 

It  should  be  trained  to  dismount  and  fight  on  foot. 

It  should  always  have  a  reserve  to  be  brought  into  action  after 
all  of  the  enemy^s  troops  are  engaged. 

Never  charge  without  a  support. 


CHAPTEE  IX. 


INFANTRY. 

The  strength  of  an  army  is  in  its  infantry.  The  other  arms 
are  complementary. 

At  least  75  per  cent,  of  the  losses  in  battle  are  inflicted  by 
infantry  fire.  It  can  fight  on  all  kinds  of  ground.  It  has  great 
offensive  and  defensive  power,  and  acts  both  by  fire  and  shock. 
It  is  the  least  expensive  and  the  most  easily  trained  of  the  arms; 
in  battle  it  is  the  king,  and  dominates  the  action  of  the  artillery 
and  cavalry. 

The  changes  in  arms  progress  so  rapidly,  and  wars  come  so 
seldom,  that  we  are  constantly  confronted  with  new  conditions 
upon  which  we  can  only  theorize,  without  opportunities  for 
putting  them  to  the  crucial  test  of  war. 

So  far  as  the  main  features  of  the  infantry  drill  regulations  are 
concerned,  we  find  a  general  agreement. 

The  "  extended  order "  for  battle  has  been  adopted  by  all  mil- 
itary nations,  and  our  new  "  extended  order "  drill  has  been  taken 
almost  entirely  from  the  French. 

Formations  in  close  order  are  still  necessary  for  parades, 
reviews,  and  for  the  movements  of  masses  beyond  the  range 
of  the  enemy's  fire. 

The  modern  tendency  is  towards  making  the  close  order  forma- 
tions as  few  and  as  simple  as  possible,  and  limiting  them  to  those 
actually  required  on  the  field  of  battle. 

A  company  ought  to  readily  form  in  line;  in  column  of 
platoons;  and  column  of  fours  faced  in  any  direction,  and  to  be 
able  to  pass  from  any  formation  to  any  other  by  the  shortest 
route  and  in  the  quickest  possible  time. 

A  battalion  ought  to  be  easily  formed  in  line ;  in  line  of 
platoon  columns;  in  colutnns  of  companies,  platoons,  fours, 
and  in  mass,  faced  in  any  direction,  and  be  able  to  pass  from 


—134— 

any  one  to  any  other  by  the  shortest  route  and  in  the  quickest 
time. 

These  cover  all  necessary  close  order  movements  from  the  time 
of  breaking  up  the  column  of  march  until  the  close  of  the  action. 

A  regiment  is  three  battalions,  each  with  its  own  chief.  It 
therefore  has  all  the  formations  common  to  the  battalion,  and  in 
addition  those  of  line  of  masses  with  open  or  closed  intervals, 
column  of  battalions  and  column  of  masses.  In  Germany  "  the 
regiment  fights  but  does  not  manoeuvre."  They  only  devote  two 
sections  and  a  few  lines  of  their  drill  regulations  to  the  regiment. 
The  regiment  is  simply  an  administrative  unit.  The  battalion  of 
four  companies  is  the  tactical  unit;  it  contains  the  largest  num- 
ber that  can  be  controlled  on  the  battlefield  by  one  man,  and  a 
very  convenient  number  to  be  entrusted  with  isolated  operations 
such  as  guarding  a  bridge,  attacking  a  village,  or  holding  a  defile. 
It  is  also  a  convenient  unit  upon  which  to  base  calculations  on 
the  extent  of  front  of  larger  units,  such  as  brigades,  divisions,  etc. 

The  underlying  principle  to  be  observed  in  an  infantry  attach 
is  a  succession  of  efforts  in  depth,  each  strengthening  the  previous 
one  in  men  and  morale  until  it  becomes  evident  to  the  enemy  thai 
he  is  overpowered  and  must  give  way. 

The  principle  is  recognized  by  all,  but  different  methods  are 
adopted  for  carrying  it  into  execution. 

All  nations  agree  in  the  following  general  outline,  viz:  The 
attacking  troops  are  usually  divided  into  three  lines,  the  first  line 
composed  of  firing  line,  supports,  and  company  and  battalion 
reserves  where  there  are  any. 

The  second  line,  about  600  yards  in  rear,  is  formed  to  reinforce 
and  support  the  first  line  when  necessary,  and  to  aid  in  the 
attack. 

The  third  line  may  be  used  to  keep  up  the  strength  of  the 
second  line,  or  to  act  as  a  reserve,  behind  which  the  troops  can 
rally  in  case  of  defeat;  it  may  be  sent  to  regularly  pursue  the 
enemy,  or  may  be  arranged  to  guard  a  flank.  Behind  all  comes 
the  general  reserve  held  in  the  hand  of  the  commander-in-chief,, 
and  subject  only  to  his  orders. 


—135— 

There  are  no  hard  and  fast  rules  in  battle,  and  the  commanders 
are  at  liberty  to  modify  those  formations  to  suit  the  emergency 
of  any  particular  case.  While  the  spirit  of  modern  tactics  aims 
to  increase  individuality,  it  at  the  same  time  increases  responsi- 
bility, and  the  latitude  allowed  the  individual  judgment  is  not 
intended  to  cover  serious  errors  arising  from  lack  of  knowledge 
or  zeal. 

The  most  satisfactory  way  of  explaining  modern  infantry  battle 
tactics,  will  be  to  take  a  battalion  of  four  companies  (the  tactical 
unit),  and  follow  it  through  the  various  stages  as  prescribed  in 
our  drill  regulations  for  infantry. 

We  will  suppose  the  battalion  to  be  detailed  for  the  first  line, 
and  the  ground  to  be  open.  At  about  5000  yards  from  the  enemy 
the  column  of  march  must  be  broken  up  and  the  command 
divided  into  units  for  combat.  The  commanding  general  assigns 
the  corps  to  the  various  parts  of  the  field,  designates  the  general 
reserve  and  its  position,  and  takes  position  where  he  can  best 
observe  the  field.  He  has  probably  been  unable  to  see  much  of 
the  enemy's  position  or  much  of  his  own  line  of  battle,  and  the 
details  must  be  left  to  his  subordinates. 

Each  corps  commander  assigns  his  divisions  to  parts  of  the 
front  they  are  to  occupy;  the  division  commanders  designate 
brigades  for  the  various  lines,  depending  upon  the  density  the 
corps  commander  decides  to  maintain,  and  so  the  division  of 
duties  goes  on  until  we  find  certain  battalions  must  form  the  first 
line — the  one  nearest  the  enemy  during  the  engagement.  Up  to 
this  time  the  manoeuvres  must  be  beyond  range  of  the  enemy's 
artillery  or  behind  cover. 

The  first  line  now  advances  rapidly — as  yet  no  particular  move- 
ments or  formations  are  ordered  by  the  drill  regulations;  they 
soon  get  into  the  hands  of  the  regimental  commanders;  and  each 
colonel  orders  such  as  seem  best  to  him.  Columns  suffer  most 
from  artillery  fire,  and  for  that  reason  we  ought  to  abandon 
them  as  soon  as  the  fire  is  felt;  on  the  other  hand,  we  desire  to 
keep  the  troops  well  under  the  control  of  the  chiefs  as  long  as 
possible,  and  this  is  facilitated  by  keeping  them  in  small  compact 


-136— 


columns.  We  may  strike  a  mean  between  the  two  and  form  our 
battalion  into  line  of  platoon  columns;  it  also  allows  us  to  pass 
readily  into  formation  for  attack. 


Figure  8. 


X    yVK  2*StC 

cJtr 


M/ao^ 


nM'''ifi6ui<n 


r/KStlMt 


BATTALION  IN  THE  FIRST  LINE. 

At  about  2500,  possibly  3500  yards  from  the  enemy,  his  artil- 
lery fire  will  be  felt,  and  we  must  take  a  preparatory  formation 
for  combat.  The  captain  of  the  companies  which  are  to  be  on 
the  fighting  line  designate  the  sections  for  the  firing  line  (if  the 
battalion  is  to  be  formed  in  one  line,  two  companies  may  be  in 
the  firing  line  and  two  in  support,  as  indicated  in  Fig.  8).  Scouts 
are  sent  forward  in  covered  ground,  and  when  they  have  gained 
150  yards,  the  sections  which  are  to  form  the  firing  line  advance; 
when  they  have  gained  200  yards,  the  sections  in  support  advance. 
The  reserves  follow  at  300  yards  in  rear  of  the  support. 

The  lines  move  forward  rapidly  without  firing.  At  1400  yards 
the  firing  line  forms  line  of  sections  and  continues  to  move  for- 
ward. It  will  soon  be  within  range  of  the  enemy's  infantry  fire, 
and  must  take  advantage  of  cover.  At  about  1200  yards,  line  of 
squads  is  formed;  at  900  yards,  line  of  skirmishers. 

The  enemy's  fire  is  getting  warm  and  the  troops  are  anxious  to 
reply,  but  tire  must  be  withheld  as  long  as  possible.  When  it 
becomes  necessary  to  relieve  the  strain  on  the  men  and  keep  up 


—137— 

the  march,  the  captains  may  order  volleys  to  be  fired,  and  may 
specify  the  number  to  be  fired  at  each  succeeding  halt. 

The  support  draws  near,  keeping  under  cover  if  possible, 
when  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  make  a  continuous  advance,  the 
method  of  advancing  by  rushes  must  be  adopted.  The  supports 
are  thrown  into  the  firing  line  to  increase  its  density  and  replace 
losses.  When  the  first  supports  are  exhausted,  new  ones  are  fur- 
nished from  the  reserves,  and  the  latter  are  replaced  from  the 
second  line  if  necessary,  and  thus  the  movement  progresses  to  the 
front.  The  rushes  are  made  by  alternate  companies  or  wings  in 
battalions,  and  from  cover  to  cover  if  practicable;  if  not,  then 
the  regulations  say  thirty  yards.     Paragraph  608  says  : 

"  Each  captain  ....  determines  the  distance  to  be  passed  over 
in  the  rushes."  The  distances  must  be  covered  rapidly,  and  each 
rush  ought  to  advance  the  line  at  least  fifty  yards;  the  remaining 
portions  of  the  line  fire  volleys  during  the  rush  to  disconcert  the 
enemy  and  decrease  the  effect  of  his  fire.  The  joining  of  sup- 
ports is  always  a  signal  for  a  new  rush  on  the  part  of  the  line 
thus  reinforced." 

Two  methods  of  reinforcement  are  allowed  : 

First,  the  group  method,  in  which  the  supports  are  thrown  into 
vacant  spaces  in  the  line  caused  either  by  casualties  or  by  flank 
movements. 

Second,  the  method  by  doubling,  in  which  the  supports  in  open 
order  rush  into  the  spaces  between  the  skirmishers. 

We  find  a  disagreement  among  military  men  as  to  which  is  the 
better  method,  and  it  admits  of  argument. 

The  object  of  reinforcing  is  to  increase  the  power  and  density 
of  the  firing  line,  raise  the  morale  of  the  men  under  the  fire,  and 
give  it  an  impetus  which  will  carry  it  boldly  forward  to  a  new 
position  in  advance. 

It  seems  to  me  the  method  of  doubling  is  the  best. 

"As  the  firing  line  approaches  the  enemy's  position,  the  cap- 
tains select  a  position  from  which  the  charge  is  to  be  made  not 
over  200  yards  from  the  enemy's  line.  The  supports,  reserves, 
and  second  line  conform  to  the  movements  of  the  firing  line,  and 
draw  near  to  reinforce  it  for  the  final  assault  and  take  part  in  it. 


—138— 

Upon  reaching  this  last  position,  bayonets  are  fixed  and  rapid  fire 
is  opened."  This  cannot  last  long,  not  over  two  or  three  minutes, 
as  the  emotion  of  the  soldier  is  at  its  height  and  he  cannot  be  held 
long  under  the  murderoiis  magazine  fire  of  the  defense.  He  must 
either  go  backward  or  forwai'd.     The  first  is  the  safest. 

The  regulations  say  :  "At  the  signal  from  the  colonel  the  field 
music  sounds  the  charge  and  the  whole  line  rushes  upon  the  enemy. 
If  the  first  rapid  fire  does  not  shake  the  enemy,  the  remainder  of 
the  battalion  reserve  is  brought  up  and  another  rush  made, 
followed  by  the  rapid  fire." 

Whether  a  second  period  of  "  rapid  fire "  will  be  possible  or 
not,  is  reasonably  open  to  doubt.  If  the  enemy  is  not  shaken 
after  the  first  rapid  fire,  he  intends  to  stay,  and  can  only  be 
driven  out  by  greatly  superior  numbers. 

"As  soon  as  the  position  has  been  carried,  the  firing  line 
advances  until  it  has  found  a  position  favorable  for  firing  on 
the  enemy.  The  parts  of  the  reserve  not  in  the  firing  line 
hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  pursue  the  enemy  or  to  resist 
a  counter  attack." 

"  The  first  opportunity  is  taken  to  assemble  the  companies  on 
the  captured  position." 

"If  repulsed,  the  line  rallies  under  the  protection  of  the 
reserve." 

There  are  tioo  pursuits — the  pursuit  hy  fire  executed  by  the 
firing  line,  and  the  regular  pursuit  made  by  the  reserve  or  troops 
not  engaged,  and  made  in  battle  formation. 

Such  is,  in  outline,  a  modern  infantry  engagement.  It  seems 
simple,  but  as  Clause witz  said,  "  the  simple  is  often  difficult  of 
execution,"  and  so  it  is  in  battle. 

It  is,  indeed,  questionable  whether  front  attacks  over  open 
ground  are  longer  possible.  If  they  are,  it  will  be  at  a  terrible 
sacrifice.  Others  claim  that  front  attacks  are  always  possible  to 
brave,  determined  troops  and  energetic,  skillful  officers,  but  that 
we  must  modify  our  methods  since  the  adoption  of  i-ifles,  which, 
without  changing  the  sight,  will  strike  a  man  located  within  500 
yards  of  the  firing  point.  The  supports  would  suffer  as  much  as 
the  firing  line,  without  a  chance  to  fire,  consequently  many  advo- 


—139— 

cate  the  suppression  of  the^  supports  and  say,  "  give  the  firing  line 
its  proper  density  at  about  600  yards  from  the  enemy,  move  it 
forward  rapidly  to  the  zone  of  rapid  fire,  the  reserve  to  approach 
to  within  400  yards  of  the  firing  line,  and  during  the  rapid  fire 
to  join  the  firing  line  in  columns  of  attack  in  single  rank  in  close 
order,  and  rush  forward  to  the  charge," 

It  would  be  destructive,  but  Napoleon  said  :  "  To  have  an 
omelet  we  must  break  some  eggs." 

We  are  apt  to  lose  sight  of  the  principal  object  of  a  battle  in 
contemplating  the  death-dealing  power  of  modern  arms. 

Success  is  the  first  object,  and  all  battle  tactics  should  be  based 
on  success  first  and  losses  second. 

You  will  see  from  the  above  discussion  that  there  are  two 
stages  to  every  attack.  First,  the  preparatory  stage,  which  has 
for  its  object  the  investment  and  immobilization  of  the  defense  to 
discover  his  weak  point,  and  to  overcome  him  by  fire,  under 
cover  of  which  the  second  or  third  lines  advance  to  assist  in  the 
attack,  which  is  the  second  stage. 

The  first  stage  begins  when  the  column  of  march  is  broken  and 
ends  with  the  close  of  rapid  fi,re.  During  this  time  the  enemy 
must  be  demoralized  by  the  fire  action  of  the  attack.  The  shock 
is  merely  auxiliary  to  the  bullet.  If  the  enemy's  morale  has  not 
been  broken  when  the  charge  is  sounded,  the  attack  will  be  a 
failure,  unless  carried  out  by  such  overwhelming  numbers  as  to 
make  resistance  useless. 

"  To  obtain  a  moral  and  material  superiority,  do  not  hesitate 
when  on  the  offensive,  about  the  necessary  expenditure  of  men, 
and  get  close  enough  to  the  enem,y  to  be  able  to  rapidly  inflict  on 
him,  the  amount  of  loss  required  to  break  down  his  resistance.'''' — 
(Mayne.) 

These  are  some  of  the  principles  upon  which  the  German  fire 
regulations  are  based.  It  recognizes  that  men  must  expect  to  be 
hurt  in  war,  and  that  in  order  "to  obtain  moral  and  material 
superiority  "  over  the  enemy  some  sacrifice  is  necessary. 

The  first  thing  is  to  get  close  enough  to  the  enemy  to  injure 
him  by  fire  and  "  break  down  his  resistance  "y  this  requires  activ- 


—140— 

ity  of  movement  and  good  battle  discipline;  battle  discipline  is 
good  when  the  movements,  and  especially  the  fire,  is  thoroughly 
under  the  control  of  the  commanders  on  the  firing  line  down  to 
the  chiefs  of  sections  and  groups,  which  brings  us  to  the  point, 
that  the  all-important  thing  is  to  regulate  the  tactics  of  infantry 
on  the  field  of  battle  so  as  to  get  at  all  times  the  best  use  of 
its  fire. 

The  German  regulations  say  :  "  The  science  of  leading  masses 
of  infantry  consists  in  employing  their  fire  by  concentrating  it 
according  to  time  and  place,  and  in  throwing  disorder  by  this  fire 
among  the  enemy's  troops." 

The  adoption  of  the  group  organization  by  all  continental 
powers,  and  now  by  us,  is  based  on  the  necessity  for  absolute 
control  over  the  fire,  which  it  is  believed  can  only  be  obtained  by 
placing  this  control  in  the  hands  of  the  company  ofiicers  and  non- 
commissioned officers  who  are  on  the  firing  line.  It  has  not  been 
tested  in  war,  but  its  universal  adoption  forces  us  to  believe 
that  it  is  based  on  principles  that  will  stand  the  test  when  war 
comes. 

Victory  is  generally  won  by  inflicting  heavy  losses  by  fire  /  it 
may  he  due  to  greatly  superior  niimhers,  or  to  an  attack  on  the 
flanJc,  hut  one  must  engage  in  the  expectation  of  being  superior  in 
fire  at  the  point  of  attack  and  of  demoralizing  the  enemy  by 
efficient  fire  before  we  can  attack  with  the  bayonet. 

Small  losses  are  effected  by  the  bayonet,  for  if  the  time  is  ripe 
for  the  charge,  the  work  has  already  been  done  by  the  bullet,  and 
the  enemy  does  not  wait  for  the  steel.  The  charge  is  the  final 
act  in  the  tragedy  to  which  all  previous  actions  have  been  lead- 
ing, and  the  bayonet  indicates  the  power  and  determination  to 
push  the  struggle  to  the  end  and  complete  the  demoralization 
already  engendered  by  fire. 

A  prominent  authority  whose  name  I  cannot  recall,  said:  "7%e 
crisis  has  passed  with  the  close  of  rapid  fire,  and  the  battle  at  this 
point  is  either  lost  or  won.^^ 


—141— 


KINDS  OF  FIRE. 


Our  infantry  drill  regulations  recognize  four  kinds  of  fire. 

1.  Voile}/  Firing. — Simultaneous  firing  by  all  of  the  men  of 
a  squad,  platoon  or  larger  unit,  at  the  command  of  its  chief,  who 
designates  the  object  and  its  range. 

2.  I'^ire  at  Will. — Each  skirmisher  who  can  see  the  enemy  fires 
until  the  command  or  signal  Cease  firing  is  given. 

3.  Fire  with  Counted  Cartridges. — Each  skirmisher  fires  only 
the  number  of  cartridges  indicated  by  his  officer. 

4.  Rapid  Fire. — Used  only  at  short  ranges  and  just  before  the 
charge  when  on  the  offensive,  and  during  the  charge  when  on  the 
defensive.     The  cartridges  in  the  magazine  are  used  in  this  fire. 

FIRE  DISCIPLINE. 

The  firing  must  at  all  times  be  under  the  absolute  control  of 
the  officers  of  the  firing  line,  and  the  most  rigid  fire  discipline 
must  be  exacted,  which  means  that  our  men  must  be  trained  in 
time  of  peace,  so  that  during  the  excitement  of  battle  they  will 
fire  exactly  as  directed  by  their  officers. 

1.  They  must  fire  at  the  designated  object. 

2.  They  must  adjust  their  sights  to  the  designated  range. 

3.  They  must  fire,  and  cease  firing,  when  ordered,  and  only 
the  number  of  cartridges  indicated. 

4.  They  must  fire  deliberately,  with  careful  aim,  at  the  feet 
of  the  enemy. 

The  importance  of  fire  discipline  cannot  be  over-estimated.  It 
is  difficult  to  secure.  Long  and  careful  training  in  time  of  peace 
will  do  much  for  us,  but  in  the  excitement  of  battle  it  is  difficult 
to  restrain  the  soldier  from  firing  at  his  enemy,  and  to  get  him  to 
carefully  adjust  his  sight  and  aim. 

In  187T  the  final  assaults  at  decisive  points  were  made  with 
"  great  swarms  "  of  skirmishers  from  eight  to  sixteen  men  deep. 

Gen.  Skobeleff,  the  hero  of  the  war,  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that 
"  the  only  formation  in  which  troops  can  successfully  assault 
entrenched  positions  is  in  successive  lines  of  skirmishers."    His 


—142— 

famous  assaults  at  Plevna  and  brilliant  victories  won  at  great 
sacrifice  of  life,  are  now  historical,  the  sacrifices  have  been  for- 
gotten, the  victories  are  blazoned  on  banners. 

DENSITY  OF  THE  FORMATION. 

By  the  density,  we  mean  the  number  of  men  in  depth  per  yard 
of  front.  It  will  depend  upon  the  energy  with  which  the  attack 
is  to  be  prosecuted.  For  an  army  on  the  offensive,  it  should  be 
from  eight  to  twelve  men  per  yard;  for  an  army  corps,  from  six 
to  nine;  for  a  division,  four  to  seven.  The  attacker  ought  to 
have  at  least  one  and  a  half  times  the  number  of  men  in  the 
defense,  which  would  allow  to  the  defense  from  six  to  nine  men  per 
yard  for  an  army,  four  to  six  for  a  corps,  and  three  to  five  for  a 
division.  On  this  basis,  the  front  of  an  army  corps  of  25,000 
men  in  action  would  vary  from  2000  to  3000  yards;  for  an  infan- 
try division,  from  1300  to  2500  yards.  An  extended  front  makes 
weak  lines.  On  the  other  hand,  a  narrow  front  gives  greater 
density  than  we  can  use,  and  throws  the  burden  of  the  fight  on 
part  of  the  command. 

The  extent  of  front  is  frequently  determined  by  the  topography 
of  the  position,  but  we  must  not  fall  into  the  error  of  extending 
our  line  too  much  in  an  effort  to  occupy  the  entire  length  of  the 
position,  as  the  French  did  at  Pont  Noyelles. 

DISTANCE  BETWEEN  LINES. 

The  distance  between  the  lines  will  depend  greatly  on  the 
ground  and  the  amount  of  shelter  it  affords.  It  is  based  on  the 
condition  that  the  fire  destined  for  one  line  shall  not  reach  the 
one  in  rear.  It  varies  from  300  to  600  yards.  The  regulations 
place  the  supports  200  yards  in  rear  of  the  firing  line. 

It  is  probable  that  the  first  battle  will  demonstrate  the  necessity 
for  increasing  the  distance  on  account  of  the  great  range  and 
flat  trajectory  of  modern  rifles,  and  the  increased  extent  of  the 
dangerous  zones. 


—143— 

AMMUNITION  SUPPLY. 

The  consumption  of  ammunition  with  modern  arms  is  enor- 
mous. If  the  engagement  lasts  long,  the  question  of  supply 
becomes  both  important  and  diflBcult.  The  small  calibre  rifle 
increases  the  number  of  rounds  that  can  be  carried  on  the 
men ;  at  the  same  time  the  magazine  increases  the  power  of 
expenditure. 

Different  methods  have  been  adopted  for  carrying  ammunition 
to  the  field.  In  Germany  it  is  carried,  first,  by  the  soldier; 
second,  by  the  company  baggage  wagons;  third,  by  ammunition 
*' echelons." 

In  France  it  is  can-ied,  first,  by  the  soldier;  second,  by  bat- 
talion ammunition  wagons;  third,  by  ammunition  parks. 

The  Germans  have  raised  the  number  to  be  carried  by  the  men 
to  150  rounds;  as  the  weight  of  the  rifle  has  been  decreased, 
there  is  no  increase  in  the  total  weight  to  be  carried  by  the 
soldier. 

The  great  difficulty  comes  in  supplying  ammunition  to  troops 
already  engaged.  Lack  of  ammunition  means  defeat  and  disas- 
trous retreat. 

The  question  is  an  urgent  one,  and  has  not  been  satisfactorily 
solved.  "We  can  only  say  that  the  soldier  must  always  go  into 
action  with  as  many  rounds  on  his  person  as  he  can  carry  com- 
fortably, say  from  120  to  150.  The  strictest  fire  control  must  be 
exercised  by  the  company  officers,  and  no  ammunition  be  wasted 
at  useless  ranges.  The  magazines  are  only  for  use  at  the  last  or 
critical  stage  of  the  combat. 

On  the  defensive  the  question  of  ammunition  supply  is  com- 
paratively simple,  as  it  can  readily  be  brought  up  close  to  the 
troops;  this  makes  it  probable  that  long  range  fire  will  be  used 
more  by  the  defense  than  by  the  attacking  troops,  and  we  may 
expect  to  suffer  losses  at  greater  distances. 

It  will  readily  be  seen  from  the  previous  discussion  that  the 
battlefield  is  divided  into  zones  in  accordance  with  the  effects  of 
fire.  First,  is  the  zone  of  manoeuvre  in  which  the  larger  units 
get  their  positions,  and  form  in  lines  as  they  are  to  attack;  this 


—144— 

zone  must  be  beyond  the  effective  range  of  artillery,  say  3500 
yards.  The  second  zone  extends  from  this  range  up  to  2500 
yards,  where  the  fire  of  artillery  may  be  severe  and  we  must  take 
the  preparatory  formation  for  combat.  The  third  zone  will  ex- 
tend to  the  effective  range  of  infantry  fire,  say  from  1200  to  1500 
yards,  where  the  advance  line  must  be  deployed.  The  fourth 
zone  will  extend  to  the  distance  at  which  we  must  open  fire,  say 
800  or  1000  yards.  The  fifth  and  most  important  zone  will  be 
from  the  opening  of  fire  to  the  "  rapid  fire  "  line.  The  method 
of  conducting  the  attack  through  this  zone  will  decide  the  result 
of  the  fight.     The  sixth  and  last  zone  covers  the  assault. 

The  Germans  divide  the  field  into  zones  for  infantry  as  follows: 
First — Zone  of  evolution,  from  one  mile  to  1100  yards.  Second — 
The  first  fighting  zone,  from  1100  yards  down  to  550  yards. 
Third — The  zone  of  increased  and  hot  firing,  from  550  to  275 
yards.  Fourth — Zone  of  last  firing,  from  275  to  225  yards. 
Then  the  assault. 

After  all  has  been  said  and  done,  "zones,"  "echelons"  and 
"formations"  ai'e  merely  secondary  to  energy,  courage,  deter- 
mination, and  celerity.  The  moral  qualities  are  uppermost  in  war. 
"  Fine  feathers  make  fine  birds,"  but  clothes  and  arms  do  not 
make  fine  soldiers. 

The  fighting  qualities  of  armies  are  greatly  dependent  on 
national  characteristics.  The  French  elan  was  glorious  under  the 
victorious  flag  of  the  great  Napoleon,  and  carried  eveiything 
before  it;  under  a  later  Napoleon  it  was  crushed  by  defeat  and 
compelled  to  make  an  inglorious  peace. 

THE  DEFENSIVE. 

The  formation  for  the  defense  is  the  same  as  for  the  offensive. 
The  firing  line  is  more  dense  in  the  early  stages  of  the  fight.  The 
supports  need  not  be  detached  when  there  is  no  cover  for  them; 
or,  the  density  may  be  kept  small  until  the  attack  reaches  short 
range,  then  every  rifle,  except  those  in  the  reserves  may  be  brought 
to  bear  to  crush  the  attack  in  the  murderous  zone.  It  has  the 
advantage  of  a  second  position  in  rear;  its  artillery  can  also  fire 


—145  — 

until  the  last  moment  while  that  of  the  offense  is  masked  by  its 
own  troops.  It  has  cover  and  plenty  of  ammunition,  and  it  is 
difficult  to  understand  how  it  can  be  routed  except  by  greatly 
superior  forces. 

The  attack  has  the  advantage  in  morale,  but  the  material  ad- 
vantages certainly  favor  the  defense;  front  attacks  will  undoubt- 
edly be  very  hazardous  in  future,  but  it  seems  useless  to  say  that 
they  will  be  impracticable;  it  is  well  enough  to  talk  about 
manoeuvres,  and  flank  attacks,  and  turning  movements;  we 
know  that  very  favorable  circumstances  are  necessary  for  their 
success. 

A  flank  attack,  if  the  enemy  has  posted  his  troops  properly, 
becomes  a  front  attack,  and  I  think  it  may  be  taken  for  granted 
that  in  the  future,  as  well  as  in  the  past,  battles  will  be  won  by 
front  attacks  on  defensive  positions.  Losses  will  be  more  demoral- 
izing because  they  will  occur  in  less  time.  It  is  one  thing  to  lose 
25  per  cent,  of  the  men  of  a  brigade  in  two  days'  fighting,  but 
it  is  much  more  demoralizing  to  lose  the  same  percentage  in  an 
hour. 

Modern  conditions  make  infantry  engagements  more  destruc- 
tive while  they  last,  but  bring  about  a  decision  in  much  less  time, 
and  up  to  the  present  time  statistics  show  that  short  wars  are  less 
destructive  of  life  than  the  long  wars  of  years  ago ;  and  wars  will 
be  short  in  future,  for  no  nation  can  very  long  endure  the  terrible 
drain  in  money  and  men  imposed  by  modern  conditions  of  war. 

INFANTRY  AGAINST  CAVALRY. 

"  Infantry  has  nothing  to  fear  from  cavalry  if  the  men  remain 
calm  and  use  their  arms  properly." — J).  R. 

Cavalry  is  essentially  an  offensive  arm,  and  infantry  would 
only  fight  it  defensively.  In  days  gone  by,  when  the  fire  power 
of  infantry  was  comparatively  small,  it  formed  in  squares  to  resist 
cavalry  attacks,  but  now  it  need  not  even  rally  if  deployed, 
although  it  is  better  to  rally  by  platoons  or  companies,  as  it  places 
the  control  of  the  fire  in  the  hands  of  the  chiefs  and  enables  it  to 
fire  effective  volleys.  If  the  cavalry  charges  en  masse,  the  prepa- 
10 


—  146— 

ration  for  it  will  be  seen  early  enough  to  give  ample  time  to 
assemble  the  platoons.  Any  formation  which  will  permit  the 
infantry  to  make  good  use  of  its  fire  will  answer. 

INFANTRY  AND  ARTILLERY. 

If  infantry  can  get  shelter  within  effective  range  of  artillery, 
it  can  soon  disable  it  by  picking  off  the  men  and  horses.  It  gen- 
erally acts  as  support  for  artillery,  in  which  case  it  is  placed  on 
the  flanks  or  just  in  rear  of  the  batteries,  where  it  can  be  placed 
under  cover.  If,  however,  a  favorable  position  can  be  found,  it 
is  better  to  place  the  infantry  from  300  to  600  yards  in  front  of 
the  batteries,  to  protect  them  from  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  infan- 
try. In  selecting  such  a  position  we  must  be  careful  not  to  mask 
the  fire  of  the  artillery. 

"Artillery  can  only  expect  to  obtain  the  best  result  if  it 
remains  always  convinced  that  it  is  only  an  auxiliary  arm  to 
the  infantry." — (Hohenlohe.) 

Mass  formation  of  infantry  must  be  abandoned  before  the  zone 
of  effective  artillery  fire  is  reached,  which  will  be  from  3000  to 
4000  yards.     "Shrapnel  will  be  effective  at  3500  yards." 

Maj.  Gen.  Boguslawski  epitomizes  some  remarks  on  infantry 
tactics  as  follows:  1.  Neither  the  repeater  nor  smokeless  powders, 
nor  yet  the  latest  improvements  in  field  artillery  will  cause  any 
radical  change  in  battle  tactics.  There  is  no  ground  for  the 
theory  that  we  must  make  a  fresh  start.  2.  The  attack  requires 
greater  depth  than  formerly.  3.  In  the  attack  in  the  open  it 
would  be  desirable  to  have  a  few  general  rules  to  avoid  the 
dispersion  of  troops.  4,  The  soldier  should  not  only  be  most 
carefully  instructed  in  all  his  physical  work,  but  those  mental 
qualities  of  service  in  war  should  also  be  developed  to  their 
utmost.  5.  Leaders  high  and  low,  must  study  simplicity  in  giving 
or  executing  orders.  6.  Simplicity  in  devising  tactical  exercises 
should  also  be  studied. 

"  Part  of  the  elementary  training  of  troops  should  be  the 
mixing  up  of  the  firing  lines  of  different  tactical  units  to  prac- 
tice men  in  the  disorder  of  battle." 


—147— 

"Finally,  though  fire  rules  the  battle,  sudden  and  timely 
hayonet  charges  are  still  valuable,  and  in  the  changing  turmoil 
of  the  battle,  good  infantry  will  never  fail  to  prove  it." 

In  this  lecture  I  have  only  been  able  to  point  out  some  of  the 
underlying  forms  and  principles  of  modern  infantry  action  and 
to  suggest  lines  of  thought.  Each  might  be  amplified  into  a 
separate  volume  without  exhausting  the  subject. 

Enough  has  been  said  to  show  that  tactics  is  indeed  a  science 
with  many  branches,  and  that  a  little  battle  which  seems  to  be 
simple,  is  a  complex  affair.  Based  on  simple  principles,  it  ramifies 
until  it  enters  every  part  of  man's  organization — mind,  soul, 
and  body. 

It  is  a  great  game  in  which  human  life  and  the  existence  of 
nations  are  the  stakes,  and  "the  most  terrible  thing  next  to  a 
great  defeat  is  a  great  victory." 

In  connection  with  infantry  tactics,  we  should  carefully  study 
"  fire  tactics  and  fire  discipline,"  "  uses  of  cover  and  ground," 
"intrenchments,"  "ammunition  supply,"  and  "troop  leading." 

In  the  charge,  the  officer's  place  is  in  front.  He  must  excite 
the  enthusiasm  of  his  men,  and  lead,  not  drive  them. 

The  Germans  lost  6,247  officers  in  a  seven  months'  war. 

These  figures  are  eloquent,  more  eloquent  than  the  grandest 
eulogies  pronounced  by  man. 


CHAPTEE  X. 


STRATEGY. 

Strategy  signifies  "  the  art  of  the  general." 

There  are  many  definitions  of  strategy  and  many  different 
views  as  to  its  domain. 

Jomini  says. — "  Strategy  is  the  art  of  directing  armies  in  the 
theater  of  operations.  Tactics  the  art  of  directing  them  on  the 
field  of  battle." 

Blum'e. — "  The  mission  of  strategy  is  to  assemble  at  the  right 
time  and  place  the  means  of  which  tactics  has  need." 

Mercur. — "  Strategy  has  for  its  object  to  so  inaugurate  and  con- 
duct wars,  campaigns  and  battles  as  to  obtain  the  greatest  and 
most  lasting  success,  or  the  least  dispiriting  and  injurious  defeat." 

Its  domain  is  too  vast  to  be  accurately  covered  by  the  few 
words  of  a  definition. 

It  is  a  science  based  on  well  defined  principles.  The  art  lies  in 
the  application  of  these  principles  to  the  ever  varying  circum- 
stances of  war. 

While  every  professional  soldier  must  possess  a  knowledge  of 
the  main  principles  of  strategy  before  he  can  consider  his  prepa- 
ration for  war  complete,  there  are  but  few  who  get  opportunities 
to  practice  what  they  know,  as  strategy  is  usually  provided  by 
the  commander-in-chief. 

Strategy  and  tactics  are  generally  considered  as  having  separate 
domains,  but  the  division  lines  cannot  be  accurately  drawn,  and 
each  encroaches  on  the  other's  territory  without  injury  to  either. 

"  Strategy  determines  the  object  and  direction  of  the  march  of 
the  army.  Tactics  is  charged  with  the  execution  of  it.  Tactics 
fights  the  battles  and  wins  the  victories.  Strategy  tells  us  how 
great  the  victory  really  was,  or  how  disastrous  the  retreat." 
(Mercur.) 


—ISO- 
Strategy  is  by  no  means  an  exact  science.  There  are  certain 
great  underlying  principles  which  have  always  existed,  and  will 
continue  to  exist,  unchanged,  but  new  conditions  are  constantly 
arising,  nations  and  people  are  changing  ;  methods  of  destruction 
and  of  communication  are  increasing,  and  that  strategy  will  be 
best  which  most  fully  recognizes  modern  conditions  and  draws 
the  greatest  advantages  from  them.  It  must  drop  by  the  way- 
side many  old  traditional  maxims  and  invent  new  ones.  Napoleon 
could  not  have  made  the  grand  strategetical  concentration  of  his 
troops  around  TJlm  under  conditions  now  existing,  for  secrecy  of 
movement,  one  of  the  greatest  aids  to  strategy,  is  practically 
impossible  for  large  commands.  Telegraph  lines,  fast  railway 
trains  and  the  speedy  circulation  of  the  mails,  now  give  ample 
warning  of  the  enemy's  intentions  before  they  can  be  carried  into 
execution.  The  political  acts  and  conditions  of  the  belligerent 
powers  are  daily  made  known  to  the  world  and  the  results  of  the 
battle  with  the  probable  moral  and  strategical  effects  of  it  are 
fully  given  out  in  the  next  issue  of  daily  papers. 

A  perfect  comprehension  of  the  subject  of  strategy  can  only  be 
obtained  by  a  thorough  study  of  military  history,  for  it  is  the 
source  of  all  the  so-called  principles  of  war. 

With  a  full  knowledge  of  the  past,  the  skill  of  the  general  is 
made  manifest  by  his  judgment  in  applying  such  maxims  as  may 
be  suited  to  the  conditions  in  which  he  finds  his  country  and  his 
army,  or  in  devising  new  ones. 

We  still  find  some  works  in  which  the  subject  is  treated  geo- 
metrically, but  such  treatment  is  not  taken  seriously  by  any  well 
balanced  soldier.  Any  schoolboy  is  aware  of  the  fact  that  any 
two  points  on  the  circumference  of  a  circle  are  equally  distant 
from  the  center  ;  he  is  also  aware  of  another  fact,  viz :  that  war  is 
not  made  in  a  carefully  leveled  ring  with  the  combatants  on  the 
circumference  and  the  gold  apple  in  the  center  to  be  the  property 
of  the  one  arriving  first.  Any  soldier  knows  that  the  variations 
in  terrain,  marching  condition,  size  of  command,  morale  and 
information  are  so  numerous  and  never  failing  as  to  make  any 
geometrical  figure  by  which  their  illustration  should  be  attempted,, 
look  like  a  pile  of  straws. 


—151— 

It  extends  into  politics  and  includes  questions  of  statesmanship 
and  diplomacy.  The  less  statesmen  have  to  do  with  armies  in 
the  field  the  better  for  the  armies,  as  was  sadly  illustrated  in  the 
war  of  the  rebellion.  Good  statesmanship)  is  shown  in  main- 
taining the  organization  of  the  military  power  of  the  country 
ready  to  meet  any  possible  emergency  and  in  so  managing  the 
resources  of  the  country  as  to  be  able  to  effectually  provide  for 
the  arming,  mobilization  and  supply  of  the  army  when  hostilities 
are  threatened.  As  an  example  we  can  point  to  the  war  of 
IS^O-Yl.  France  was  totally  unprepared  for  the  war  she  pro- 
voked. Instead  of  a  magnificent  army  ready  to  march  on  Berlin 
as  contemplated  in  French  strategy,  she  found  an  administration 
of  army  affairs  rotten  to  the  core,  and  her  intended  rapid  mobili- 
zation was  a  hollow  sham.  With  her  antagonist  things  were 
reversed,  and  Napoleon's  much  vaunted  offensive  was  consigned 
to  an  early  grave,  and  in  less  than  three  months  the  armies  with 
which  he  expected  to  work  out  his  hopes  were  indeed  across  the 
Rhine,  but  as  prisoners  of  war.  Poor  statesmanship  made  it 
impossible  for  the  emperor  to  adopt  his  strategical  views. 

Statesmanship  may  determine  the  object  of  the  war  and  decide 
upon  the  operations  most  likely  to  attain  this  object.  The  ten- 
dencies of  governments  to  appeal  to  arms  as  the  only  satisfactory 
method  of  settling  differences  have  decreased  greatly.  Many 
small  quarrels  which  in  years  past  would  have  brought  on  long 
and  bloody  conflicts  are  now  adjusted  by  the  gentler  methods  of 
arbitration. 

Nations  have  certain  rights  they  are  bound  to  defend  and 
great  interests  to  be  protected.  They  must  protect  the  lives  and 
liberties  of  their  citizens  in  all  parts  of  the  world.  To  this  end 
they  must  demand  of  other  countries  the  same  care  and  protec- 
tion of  visiting  or  resident  foreigners  they  give  to  their  own 
people.  They  have  a  right  to  demand  a  reparation  of  the  wrong 
done  them.  If  this  is  refused,  then  arms  can  be  resorted  to,  to 
sustain  the  dignity  and  right  of  the  nation.  It  may  be  necessary 
"  to  uphold  neighboring  states  whose  existence  is  necessary  either 
for  the  safety  of  the  government  or  the  balance  of  power" 
(Jomini),  as  in  the  case  of  Mexico  mentioned  above. 


—152— 

A  state  may  go  to  war  to  acquire  territory.  The  Russians  feel 
that  they  need  and  are  entitled  to  a  better  southern  outlet  for  the 
products  of  their  vast  domains,  and  they  may  make  another 
effort  to  obtain  it  by  force  of  arms,  but  all  Europe  will  have 
something  to  say  on  the  subject  and  she  may  not  get  any  more 
than  she  got  in  "79,  Nations  may  go  to  war  to  fulfill  their  alli- 
ances with  other  nations.  A  war  to-day  between  France  and 
Germany  or  Germany  and  Russia  would  undoubtedly  involve 
Austria,  Italy  and  possibly  England. 

Religious  wars  are  not  likely  to  occur  in  future. 

You  will  readily  see  that  the  kind  of  war  would  greatly  influ- 
ence the  extent  and  nature  of  the  operations  by  which  the  object 
is  to  be  attained,  and  that  the  preliminary  strategy  of  the  open- 
ing campaign  might  be  dictated  by  the  desires  of  statesmanship 
as  to  the  end  to  be  reached. 

Diplomacy  effects  the  strategical  situation  by  enlisting  the  aid 
of  friendly  powers  and  by  placating  the  unfriendly  ones  until 
some  more  convenient  season.  Mr.  Seward's  diplomacy  during 
the  war  of  the  rebellion  prevented  open  rupture  with  England  at 
a  time  when  it  would  have  been  very  discouraging  to  our  cause, 
and  might  have  had  a  serious  effect  on  the  life  of  our  nation.  At 
the  close  of  the  rebellion  the  strategetical  concentration  of  large 
bodies  of  our  troops  in  Texas  under  General  Sheridan  frustrated 
the  designs  of  France  and  Austria  on  Mexico,  but  diplomacy  did 
not  allow  the  real  motives  of  the  government  to  appear  in  General 
Grant's  order  to  General  Sheridan,  and  which  defined  his  duties 
as  follows  :  .  .  .  "  Your  duty  is  to  restore  Texas  and  that  part  of 
Louisiana  held  by  the  enemy  to  the  Union  in  shortest  practicable 
time  in  a  way  most  effectual  for  securing  permanent  peace.  .  .  . 
In  case  of  an  active  campaign  (a  hostile  one),  I  think  a  heavy 
force  should  be  put  on  the  Rio  Grande  as  a  first  preliminary. 
Troops  for  this  might  be  started  at  once.  ...  To  be  clear  on  this 
last  point  I  think  that  the  Rio  Grande  should  be  strongly  held 
whether  the  forces  in  Texas  surrender  or  not,  and  that  no  time 
should  be  lost  in  getting  troops  there." 

Many  technical  names  are  used  in  strategy,  and  an  under- 
standing of  their  meaning  is  of  course  essential  to  a  comprehen- 
sion of  the  subject. 


—  153— 

The  theater  of  war  is  the  name  applied  to  all  territory  upon 
which  the  assailants  may  attack  each  other.  In  the  war  of  the 
rebellion  it  included  all  southern  states,  Maryland,  Pennsylvania 
and  the  high  seas,  since  both  belligerents  had  navies. 

The  theater  of  operations,  according  to  Jomini,  '*  embraces  all 
the  territory  an  army  may  desire  to  invade,  and  all  that  it  may 
be  necessary  to  defend."  He  sub-divides  theaters  of  operations 
into  zones  of  operations  for  sejjarate  armies,  when  all  are  acting 
together  for  a  common  object. 

The  army  first  in  the  field  selects  the  theater  of  operations. 
The  French  expected  to  open  the  campaign  of  1870  on  German 
soil — but  before  they  could  get  ready  the  Germans  opened  it  on 
French  soil.  The  Germans  assumed  the  offensive  at  once,  and 
were  thus  enabled  to  carry  the  waste,  destruction  and  hardship  of 
war  into  French  territory.  The  general  who  expects  to  operate 
in  a  territory  should  be  thoroughly  well  informed  on  its  topog- 
raphy and  its  resources.  Good  maps  with  careful  reconnoissance 
work  will  give  the  first,  and  the  second  must  be  learned  from 
statistics  gathered  in  time  of  peace,  which  the  war  department  of 
his  government  should  be  able  to  furnish.  The  topography  of 
the  theater  of  operations  is  of  great  importance.  Its  roads, 
railroads,  streams,  mountain  chains,  principal  towns,  must  all  be 
considered  in  preparing  a  plan  of  campaign  and  in  selecting  an 
objective.  Napoleon  generally  prepared  very  definite  instruc- 
tions for  his  marshals  on  the  subject  of  reconnoitering  the  various 
theaters  of  operation,  and  his  letters  to  them  are  full  of  informa- 
tion as  to  the  value  of  terrain  in  military  operations. 

BASES  OF  OPERATIONS. 

Three  very  essential  things  must  be  selected  in  every  theater  of 
operations,  viz :  1st,  a  base  of  operations  ;  2d,  an  objective  point ; 
3d,  a  way  to  reach  this  objective  point,  which  will  be  called  a 
line  of  operations.  A  base  of  operations  may  be  either  a  portion 
of  territory,  a  river,  a  bit  of  sea  coast,  a  city.  It  is  that  jjart  of 
country  or  place  from  which  the  army  starts  on  an  offensive 
movement  from  which  also  it  expects  to  draw  its  supplies,  and  to 


—154— 

•which  it  expects  to  return  if  defeated.  The  base  of  operations  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  usually  the  Potomac  river.  As  it 
got  nearer  to  Richmond  it  established  secondary  bases  on  the 
rivers  running  east  or  west,  such  as  the  Rappahannock.  When 
defeated  and  forced  to  retire  behind  those  lines  they  became  lines 
of  defense. 

In  the  early  part  of  the  Mexican  war,  Gen.  Scott  captured 
Vera  Cruz  and  made  it  his  secondary  base  of  operations,  his 
primary  base  being  his  own  country.  Sherman  on  the  march  to 
the  sea  had  no  base  of  operations  after  he  left  Atlanta  until  he 
met  Gens.  Schofield  and  Terry  near  Goldsboro,  N.  C.  Their  base 
was  established  at  Wilmington  under  the  protection  of  the  fleet. 
Gen.  Grant  also  cut  loose  from  his  base  of  operations  and  crossed 
the  Mississippi  below  Vicksburg, 

These  open  and  flagrant  violations  of  the  so-called  laws  of  war 
have  been  roundly  condemned  by  military  critics  as  violating  the 
best  known  principles  of  our  art,  but  they  were  highly  successful 
and  have  thus  completely  disarmed  criticism.  Bases  of  operations 
must  still  fulfill  many  conditions  to  be  deemed  good,  although 
the  railroads  have  simplified  their  functions,  especially  in  refer- 
ence to  the  accumulation  of  supplies.  Depots  of  supplies  are 
established  at  great  railroad  centers  in  different  portions  of  the 
country  from  which  supplies  can  readily  be  shipped  to  secondary 
depots,  so  the  necessity  for  establishing  great  storehouses  on  the 
base  of  operations  has  practically  disappeared. 

This  of  course  allows  greater  freedom  to  be  used  in  the  selec- 
tion of  both  theaters  and  bases  of  operations. 

A  base  should  be  easily  defended,  should  have  good  roads 
leading  towards  the  selected  objective  from  various  points,  good 
communications  between  these  roads  and  between  points  on  its 
own  line. 

Bases  may  be  either  perpendicular,  parallel  or  oblique  to  the 
enemy's  line  of  operations.  Jomini  says  "  bases  such  as  have  two 
sides  almost  perpendicular  to  each  other  and  forming  a  re-entrant 
angle  are  most  advantageous,  thus  affording  a  double  base  if 
required,  and  which  by  giving  control  of  two  sides  of  the  strata- 


—  155— 

gic  field,  assure  two  lines  of  retreat  widely  apart  and  facilitate 
any  change  of  the  line  of  operations  which  an  unforeseen  turn  of 
affairs  may  necessitate,"  or  in  other  words  those  which  cover  our 
own  lines  of  communications,  and  menace  those  of  our  adver- 
sary. 

When  the  army's  base  of  operations  becomes  its  line  of  defense 
a  line  convex  towards  the  enemy  will  be  advantageous,  as  the 
army  may  be  located  so  as  to  be  able  to  move  quickly  towards 
threatened  points. 

The  extent  of  area  of  a  base  of  operations  is  also  important 
when  we  consider  the  size  of  modem  armies.  It  must  permit 
rapid  concentration  for  combat  and  yet  allow  a  comfortable 
deployment  of  troops  for  camp  and  supply.  Too  extended 
deployment  must  be  guarded  against.  Derrecagaix  makes  the 
following  comparison:  "About  August  3,  1870,  while  the 
French  army  of  260,000  men  was  spread  over  a  zone  of  about  200 
kilometers,  the  German  army,  which  contained  nearly  400,000 
men,  was  concentrated  between  Bettingen  and  Landau,  a  dis- 
tance of  about  72  kilometers." 

Armies  of  that  size  concentrated  for  offensive  action  must 
necessarily  be  formed  in  echelon,  so  that  a  base  to  be  advanta- 
geous ought  to  have  sufficient  depth  to  facilitate  the  concentration 
of  the  various  echelons,  and  a  number  of  railroad  lines  leading 
into  it,  to  permit  the  rapid  embarking  of  the  troops  and  their 
strategic  deployment  after  reaching  the  base. 

FRONT  OF.  OPERATIONS. 

The  line  joining  the  heads  of  the  columns  of  an  army  on  the 
march  is  called  the  "front  of  operations,"  or  sometimes  the 
"  strategic  front."  When  this  latter  is  used  the  "  front  of  opera- 
tions "  is  applied  to  all  the  terrain  included  between  the  fronts  of 
march. 

In  establishing  a  front  of  operations  the  general  must  bear  in 
mind  : 

1.  That  his  columns  must  not  become  too  widely  separated  for 
good  mutual  support. 


—  156— 

2.  He  must  protect  his  flanks.  It  will  at  once  be  evident  that  a 
front  of  operations  with  mountains  or  large  streams  perpendicular 
to  it  or  even  running  through  it  obliquely  would  be  unfavorable. 
A  front  of  operations  parallel  to  the  enemy's  line  of  operations 
threatens  his  communications  and  places  him  at  a  great  disad- 
vantage. 

LINES  OF    OPERATION. 

The  line  of  operations  of  an  army  may  be  said  to  be  the  gen- 
eral direction  followed  by  an  army  in  its  zone  of  operations, 
whether  it  marches  in  one  or  in  many  connected  columns.  It 
includes  all  of  the  roads,  railroads,  canals,  rivers  lying  between 
the  objective  and  the  base  of  operations  used  in  transporting 
troops  or  supplies.  Many  different  definitions  are  given  for  lines 
of  operations,  but  the  differences  are  unimportant  after  you  have 
grasped  the  idea. 

They  are  divided  into  simple,  double  and  multiple  lines, 
depending  upon  the  number  of  separate  groups  into  which  the 
armies  are  divided.  Into  exterior  and  interior  lines,  depending 
upon  their  positions  with  respect  to  those  of  the  enemy.  Into 
convergent  and  divergent  lines. 

They  may  become  lines  of  communication,  supply,  reinforce- 
ment or  retreat.  It  is  apparent  then,  that  these  lines  must  satisfy 
many  conditions.  Napoleon  put  forth  a  general  rule,  viz: 
"  Select  your  lines  of  operations  so  as  to  threaten  the  enemies' 
communications  without  compromising  your  own."  The  first 
and  most  important  objective  point  being  the  enemy's  army,  we 
are  limited  to  the  lines  of  operations  which  will  bring  us  most 
speedily  to  the  front  or  flank.  If  by  attacking  a  flank  we  threaten 
his  line  of  communications  and  obtain  great  tactical  and  strate- 
gical advantages  as  well,  it  is  evident  that  we  must  select  lines  of 
operations  leading  to  that  flank,  unless  the  geographical  features 
of  the  country  forbid  our  progress  in  that  direction.  If  we  have 
great  superiority  in  numbers  we  may  threaten  both  flanks  and 
center  at  the  same  time. 

Napoleon  illustrated  his  maxim  very  clearly  in  his  campaign  in 
Italy  in  1800.     By  crossing  the  Alps  without  the  knowledge  of 


—157— 

Melas,  the  Austrian  commander,  he  gained  Milan,  between  the 
Austrian  army  and  the  Austrian  frontier,  compelling  Melas  to 
retire  along  the  right  bank  of  the  Po  and  to  fight  the  disastrous 
battle  of  Marengo. 

The  selection  of  a  line  of  operations  for  an  army  entering  upon 
a  campaign  is  of  extreme  importance,  and  requires  the  application 
of  the  best  strategical  principles.  These  principles  have  been  dis- 
cussed by  military  men  at  great  length  ;  I  refer  you  to  Jomini's 
work  on  the  art  of  war  for  a  comprehensive  treatment  of  them. 
The  choice  of  direction  will  depend  upon  the  geographical 
features  of  the  theaters  of  operations,  and  upon  the  location  of 
the  enemy's  army.  Double  lines  have  often  been  adopted  by 
generals,  with  the  desire  of  enveloping  the  enemy.  With  greatly 
superior  forces  they  may  sometimes  lead  to  successful  operations, 
but  they  are  generally  condemned.  The  great  size  of  modern 
armies  has  increased  the  necessity  for  double  lines.  The  Ger- 
mans had  three  armies  in  the  war  of  1870,  and  advanced  into 
France  on  double  lines,  and  did  envelop  the  French  army.  Double 
lines  give  an  active  adversary  an  opportunity  to  attack  each  com- 
mand separately  and  beat  them  in  detail,  by  operating  on  interior 
lines.  Napoleon's  campaigns  of  1796  and  1814  are  brilliant 
examples.  In  1866  the  Germans  advanced  into  Austria  over  two 
distinct  lines  of  operations  and  gave  Marshal  Benedek  an  excel- 
lent opportunity  to  strike  the  commands  separately,  but  he  did 
not  avail  himself  of  it.  Von  Moltke  explained  this  apparent 
violation  of  an  important  principle  by  saying  : 

"  First — The  forces  had  to  be  divided  into  two  masses  to  defend 
two  parts  of  the  kingdom  which  were  threatened. 

"  Second — Circumstances  required  a  concentration  in  three 
masses  or  three  different  points. 

"  Third — The  distances  from  Gorlitz  and  Vienna  to  Gitschin, 
the  point  of  concentration  of  the  Prussian  army,  were  about  the 
same  as  from  Gitschin  to  Olmutz,  the  point  of  concentration  of 
the  Austi-ian  army." 

Derrecagaix  sums  up  the  section  on  lines  of  operations  as  fol- 
lows : 


—158— 

1.  "  The  choice  of  lines  of  operations  ought  to  have  in  view  the 
directing  on  the  decisive  point  of  masses  stronger  than  those  of 
the  enemy. 

2.  "  77ie  choice  depends  upon  the  direction  of  the  bases,  the 
topography  and  the  position  of  the  enemy. 

3.  "  Simple  and  interior  lines  are  preferable. 

Jf.  "  The  most  advantageous  lines  are  those  which  conduct  an 
army  on  the  enemy'' s  communications  and  protect  our  own.''"' 

Lines  of  communication  of  an  army  are  those  which  connect 
it  with  its  magazines  and  upon  which  it  is  dependent  for  supplies. 
They  are  consequently  the  most  important  of  all  lines.  We  may 
suspend  operations  for  want  of  suitable  lines  of  operations,  and 
bide  a  more  convenient  time,  but  we  must  maintain  our  lines  of 
communication,  for  on  these  lines  are  established  our  depots  of 
supplies,  storehouses,  hospitals  and  ammunition.  Napoleon  said  : 
"  According  to  the  laws  of  war,  every  general  who  loses  his  line 
of  communication  merits  death." 

Perhaps  the  most  remarkable  case  in  history  was  Sherman's 
march  to  the  sea.  When  he  left  Atlanta  he  cut  himself  off  from 
all  communications  with  the  outside  world,  abandoned  his  line  of 
communications  entirely  un^il  he  could  establish  another  from 
some  point  on  the  seaboard.  Up  to  the  capture  of  Atlanta  his 
line  of  communications  was  a  single  track  road  from  Nashville,  a 
very  poor  affair  when  compared  to  our  modern  roads,  but  with 
skillful  management  it  supplied  the  wants  of  his  army.  Gen. 
Grant  also  deserted  his  lines  at  Vicksburg,  passed  into  hostile 
territory  below  the  city  and,  to  use  his  own  words,  '*  was  now  in 
the  enemy's  country  with  a  vast  river  and  the  stronghold  of 
Vicksburg  between  me  and  my  supplies." 

In  1870  the  great  railroad  facilities  of  France  and  Germany 
offered  ample  lines  of  communication  for  the  German  army  dur- 
ing its  progress  on  Paris.  At  first  nine  railroad  lines  were 
employed  in  concentrating  men  and  supplies  on  the  French 
frontier.  As  the  struggle  progressed,  the  captured  French  lines 
were  put  in  repair  and  ample  guards  provided  to  protect  them. 
So  the  Germans  found  no  great  difficulties  in  maintaining  ample 


—ISO- 
communications.     No  very  serious  effort  was  made  by  the  French 
to  cut  those  lines. 

The  great  number  of  railroad  lines  entering  large  cities  and 
crossing  all  sections  of  the  country  have  greatly  simplified  the 
question  of  communications,  and  it  is  hardly  probable  that  an 
army  in  the  field  will  be  tied  to  a  single  line  ;  it  ought  conse- 
quently to  have  greater  freedom  of  movement  and  less  anxiety 
about  things  in  rear.  On  the  other  hand,  armies  have  grotrn  in 
size  and  in  needs  so  that  some  line  of  communication  is  more 
necessaiy  than  ever.  They  must  consequently  guard  their  lines 
very  carefully.  If  they  have  but  one,  and  the  enemy  can  cut  it, 
he  will  place  the  army  in  a  very  precarious  situation. 

LINES  OF  DEFENSE. 

Lines  of  defense  are  usually  natural  obstacles,  behind  which 
the  army  can  retire  and  organize  for  resistance.  They  are  gen- 
erally rivers,  high  mountain  chains  or  deserts.  Napoleon  said, 
*'  Of  all  obstacles,  deserts  are,  without  doubt,  the  most  difficult 
to  cross  ;  mountains  come  next,  and  great  rivers  third."  If 
Russia  should  determine  to  advance  upon  India,  the  British 
would  find  a  powerful  ally  in  the  great  Turkestan  desert.  The 
Alps  form  a  strong  defensive  line  for  Italy.  The  Blue  Ridge 
mountains  protected  the  Confederates  until  the  capture  of  Chat- 
tanooga. Great  rivers  are  usually  considered  to  be  strong 
defensive  lines  ;  but  the  Danube  has  been  crossed  and  re-crossed 
many  times  in  the  face  of  the  foe  ;  likewise  the  Rhine.  Lee's 
army  crossed  and  re-crossed  the  Potomac  without  much  difficulty. 

A  good  line  of  defense  ought  to  have  strong  obstacles  in  front 
and  on  its  flanks  to  protect  it  against  turning  movements.  It 
ought  also  to  have  good  lines  of  retreat  and  good  secondary 
positions  in  rear. 

OBJECTIVE  POINTS. 

The  Jirst  objective  is  the  enemy's  army,  for  until  it  has  been 
destroyed  other  results  will  only  be  temporary.     The  objective  is 


—160— 

often  determined  by  the  political  situation  and  by  the  object  of 
the  war. 

The  most  usual  objective  is  the  enemy's  capital,  usually  his 
most  important  city,  and  the  possession  of  it  generally  decides 
the  war.  In  1870  the  Germans  marched  on  Paris,  and  its 
capitulation  closed  the  war.  In  our  war  the  objective  in  the  east 
was  the  city  of  Richmond — the  Confederate  capital.  If  Lee  had 
drawn  his  army  away  from  it  Grant  would  of  course  have  fol- 
lowed him,  for  Lee's  army  was  necessarily  the  prime  objective. 

The  Confederates  threatened  Washington  several  times,  and  its 
capture  would  undoubtedly  have  given  them  a  great  advantage. 
Jackson  was  within  a  mile  of  the  city,  and  it  is  a  general  impres- 
sion that  he  could  have  captured  it  if  he  had  pushed  on  boldly. 
And  for  some  unexplained  reason  he  retired  without  making  a 
serious  effort. 

In  the  west  the  objective  was  the  great  Mississippi  river,  which 
was  secured  by  the  fall  of  Vicksburg  in  1863. 

After  the  capture  of  Vicksburg,  Chattanooga  became  the  next 
important  objective,  as  it  was  located  in  the  principal  pass 
through  the  mountains,  on  the  Tennessee  river,  and  in  sight  of 
Lookout  Mountain  and  Missionary  Ridge.  It  was  also  a  railroad 
center,  with  roads  leading  to  Atlanta,  west  to  Nashville  and  north 
to  Knoxville.  The  bloody  battles  of  Lookout  Mountain,  Mis- 
sionary Ridge  and  Chicamauga  were  necessary  to  secure  it  to  the 
Union  forces. 

After  leaving  Chattanooga  Sherman's  objectives  were,  first, 
Johnston's  army,  and  secondary,  Atlanta.  On  his  march  to  the 
sea  he  cut  the  confederacy  in  two,  overran  the  country  upon 
which  the  confederates  relied  greatly  for  supplies,  and  would 
have  moved  on  Lee's  rear  but  for  the  close  of  the  rebellion. 

In  McClellan's  peninsular  campaign  his  objective  was  the  city 
of  Richmond  ;  his  base  was  at  Fort  Monroe  under  protection  of 
the  fleet.  He  established  a  secondary  base  on  the  sea  and  invested 
Yorktown  ;  his  lines  of  operation  then  lay  between  the  James 
and  York  rivers  towards  Richmond.  We  will  not  discuss  the 
causes  of  failure  of  this  campaign  which  promised  so  well  at  the 


—161— 

start.  He  fought  the  bloody  battles  of  Fair  Oaks,  Gaines'  Mill, 
Malvern  Hill,  etc. ;  was  repulsed  and  obliged  to  seek  a  new  base 
on  the  James  river.  With  his  fine  army  he  would  probably  have 
succeeded  better  if  he  had  moved  south  from  the  Potomac  across 
the  Rappahannock,  and  against  the  confederate  army,  which  was 
inferior  to  his. 

Gen.  Grant  adopted  this  plan  in  his  final  campaign  which  closed 
the  war.  He  continually  threatened  Lee's  right,  compelling  him 
to  retire  toward  Richmond.  As  Lee  was  able  to  move  on  interior 
lines,  he  was  able  to  confront  Grant  in  every  new  position,  so  the 
Union  army  was  obliged  to  attack  the  confederates  behind  their 
fortifications,  and  then  move  by  the  left  flank  to  force  Lee  to  fol- 
low. After  the  fall  of  Richmond  and  Petersburg,  Lee  moved 
west  along  the  Appomatox  in  the  hope  of  being  able  to  effect  a 
junction  with  Johnston,  but  the  Union  armies  had  closed  around 
him,  captured  the  railroad  lines  and  destroyed  most  of  his  sup- 
plies, and  further  resistance  was  useless.  I  have  given  an  outline 
of  the  grand  strategy  of  the  war  ;  if  you  care  for  a  more  graphic 
and  complete  account  of  it  read  Gen.  Sherman's  article  in  the 
Century  Magazine  of  about  1888. 

DIVERSIONS. 

Diversions  include  those  operations  in  which  detachments  are 
thrown  out  from  the  main  body,  to  execute  special  tasks  beyond 
supporting  distance  from  it.  Brilliant  results  have  frequently 
been  obtained  in  this  way,  but  a  miSh  greater  number  of  failures. 
They  may  be  used  to  tempt  the  enemy  to  divide  his  forces  and 
give  opportunity  for  beating  him  in  detail ;  or  to  intercept  and 
detain  some  of  his  troops  en  route  to  join  him.  They  may  be 
sent  to  try  to  get  in  the  rear  of  his  line  and  cut  his  communica- 
tions, or  to  a  distance  to  show  themselves  in  an  attempt  to  give 
the  enemy  wrong  ideas.  They  may  be  sent  to  mask  or  invest  a 
fortified  place. 

They  ought  only  to  be  attempted  with  superior  forces.  Napoleon 
held  that  detachments  should  only  be  used  exceptionally,  and 

11 


— 162— 

when  manifest  advantages  were  to  be  gained.  They  should  be 
few  and  should  join  the  main  body  as  quickly  as  possible  after 
their  work  has  been  completed.  He  used  diversions  frequently. 
Bragg  sent  a  part  of  his  army  under  Longstreet  to  attempt  the 
relief  of  Knoxville.  He  knew  that  Gen.  Grant's  army  was  larger 
than  his  and  that  it  was  about  to  be  reinforced.  Knoxville  was 
of  no  use  to  him  without  Chattanooga  ;  he  thus  deprived  himself 
of  the  use  of  a  large  part  of  his  forces  and  an  able  general  at  a 
time  when  they  would  have  been  very  useful  to  him.  Gen. 
Grant  says  in  his  memoirs  :  "  I  have  never  been  able  to  see  the 
wisdom  of  this  move."  The  diversions  ordered  by  Gen.  Grant 
during  the  last  campaign  in  Virginia,  and  commanded  by  Sheri- 
dan, were  very  successful.  Many  supplies  were  captured  and 
destroyed,  railroad  lines  cut  and  the  confederate  rear  was 
threatened,  all  of  which  materially  assisted  in  bringing  the  war 
to  a  close.  Grant's  army  was  greatly  superior  to  Lee's  in  num- 
bers, and  he  did  not  jeopardize  the  safety  of  his  army  by  sending 
out  detachments. 

Jomini  says  :  "  However  great  may  be  the  temptation  to 
undertake  such  operations  it  must  constantly  be  borne  in  mind 
that  they  are  always  secondary  in  importance,  and  that  the 
essential  thing  is  to  be  successful  at  the  decisive  points.  A  multi- 
plication of  detachments  must,  therefore,  be  avoided.  Armies 
have  been  destroyed  for  no  other  reason  than  that  they  were  not 
kept  together." 

FORTIFICATIONS. 

Blume  says  :  "  Fortified  places  can  fill  the  following  strategical 
objects  : 

"  First — The  protection  of  important  cities. 

"  Second — The  protection  of  depots. 

"  Third — Defense  of  lines  of  communication,  railroads,  moun- 
tain passes,  bridges,  etc. 

"Fourth — As  points  of  defense  of  territory  not  part  of  the 
principal  theater  of  war. 

"  Fifth — Protection  against  pursuit. 

"  Sixth — As  points  of  support  for  troops  in  the  field." 


—163— 

Fortifications  are  of  little  value  in  offensive  campaigns — the 
only  kind  that  reap  brilliant  victories. 

PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN. 

Von  Moltke  says  :  "  It  is  a  delusion  to  believe  that  a  plan  of 
war  may  be  laid  for  a  long  period  and  carried  out  in  every  point. 
The  first  collision  with  the  enemy  changes  the  situation  entirely, 
according  to  the  result.  Some  things  decided  upon  will  be 
impracticable  ;  others,  which  originally  seemed  impossible, 
become  feasible.  All  that  the  leader  of  an  army  can  do  is  to 
get  a  clear  view  of  the  circumstances  to  decide  for  the  best  for 
an  unknown  pei'iod,  and  carry  out  his  purpose  unflinchingly." 

Grant's  strategy  was  to  march  on  Richmond,  and  it  did  not 
take  long  to  formulate  his  plan  of  campaign  as  far  as  it  could  be 
foreseen  ;  his  daily  plans  were  entirely  the  creatures  of  circum- 
stances, and  good  strategy  is  nothing  more  than  sound  judgment 
of  the  situation  and  quick  appreciation  of  its  possibilities. 
Strategy  is  founded  on  military  history,  and  its  rules  have  been 
derived  from  study  of  the  campaigns  of  the  great  masters. 
Frederick's  strategy  was  often  poor.  Napoleon  made  errors,  for 
he  was  human,  but  he  stands  in  history  as  the  greatest  strategist 
the  world  ever  produced.  Jomini  still  stands  at  the  head  of 
theoretical  strategists,  but  his  work  needs  revision  to  meet  the 
conditions  of  to-day.  The  works  of  Blume,  Fix  and  Derrecagaix 
are  among  the  best  modern  treatises  of  the  subject,  and  I  would 
recommend  them  to  any  who  desire  to  pursue  the  study  of  this 
important  and  interesting  branch  of  military  science. 


OHAPTEE  XI. 


MILITARY  ENGINEERING. 

It  will  scarcely  be  possible  in  a  single  lecture  to  go  into  the 
history  of  military  engineei'ing  very  extensively  and  at  the  same 
time  give  an  outline  of  modern  engineering  as  applied  to  the  art 
of  war. 

As  men  have  always  devoted  a  large  part  of  their  time  and 
resources  to  conflict  with  their  fellow  men,  their  offensive  and 
defensive  works  have  kept  pace  with  their  progress  in  civil  pur- 
suits, and  have  indicated  their  intellectual  advancement  from 
time  to  time. 

The  military  engineer  undoubtedly  became  important  early  in 
the  history  of  mankind,  and  his  profession  has  increased  in 
importance  until  to-day  every  military  nation  is  obliged  to  have 
in  its  military  organization  an  engineer  corps,  composed  of  highly 
trained  men,  to  plan  and  supervise  the  construction  of  her  means 
of  defense,  and  the  destruction  of  those  of  her  enemy.  The  study 
of  the  history  of  fortification  is  a  necessary  part  of  the  training 
of  the  engineer,  that  he  may  understand  how  the  principles  of 
his  art  were  applied  in  past  ages  under  conditions  then  existing. 
It  is  especially  necessary  in  European  armies,  for  many  of  their 
old  cities  are  still  surrounded  by  works  built  centuries  ago. 

Before  the  invention  of  fire-arms  the  means  «f  attack  being 
very  cumbersome,  and  limited  to  battering  rams,  mines,  scaling 
ladders  and  towers,  the  fortifications  were  correspondingly  simple 
and  usually  consisted  of  high,  thick  stone  walls,  surrounded  by 
ditches  and  surmounted  by  towers  at  various  intervals.  As  con- 
flicts in  the  field  were  hand  to  hand,  field  fortifications  were 
unknown.  A  comprehensive  view  of  the  fortifications  of  the 
early  centuries  can  be  obtained  by  reading  Viollet-le-Duc's  works 
on  "Military  Architecture  of  the  Middle  Ages,"  and  "Annals  of 
a  Fortress." 


—166— 

Cannon  came  into  use  about  the  middle  of  the  fourteenth  cen- 
tury, but  it  was  many  years  before  they  attained  sufficient  power 
to  breach  stone  walls  and  seriously  modify  the  construction  of 
permanent  works.  The  castle  of  the  chief,  with  its  heavy  walls 
and  towers,  its  moat  and  drawbridge,  and  inner  citadel,  still  bade 
defiance  to  his  enemies,  and  could  endure  a  long  siege.  It  was 
usually  situated  on  high  rocky  ground,  inaccessible  to  the  engines 
of  the  besieger,  and  every  known  device  was  resorted  to  to  increase 
the  difliculty  of  the  approach  and  embarrass  the  attacker. 
Improvements  in  cannon  soon  made  them  very  formidable  and 
necessitated  an  advance  in  methods  of  fortification.  The  stone 
walls  were  backed  by  earth  embankments,  and  were  protected  in 
front  by  outer  works,  giving  rise  to  scarp  and  counterscarp,  para- 
pet, casemates,  bomb-proofs,  and  traverses,  and  the  many  other 
devices  known  to  engineers  in  the  art  of  defense.  About  1500 
the  bastion  appeared. 

During  the  wars  in  the  Netherlands  many  improvements  were 
made.  The  nature  of  the  country  made  the  use  of  wet  ditches 
very  convenient,  and  abolished  the  necessity  for  high  command. 
As  water  was  so  easily  obtained,  outworks  with  wet  ditches  were 
multiplied,  and  palisades,  fraises,  and  chevaux-de-frise  were 
brought  into  use.  The  art  of  fortification  was  progressing  rap- 
idly and  its  greatest  master  was  soon  to  appear  in  Marshal  Vauban, 
who  was  born  in  France  in  1633,  and  lived  "  to  repair  or  consti'uct 
more  than  160  places,  take  part  in  forty -eight  sieges,  forty  of 
which  he  directed  as  chief  engineer,  without  a  single  failure  ; 
twice  defended  fortresses,  and  was  present  in  more  than  130 
actions."  He  introduced  the  system  of  parallels  in  regular  suc- 
cession to  support  his  batteries  and  approaches,  and  his  system  in 
the  service  of  attack  and  defense  remained  with  some  minor 
modifications,  until  the  introduction  of  rifled  guns  and  the  advent 
of  this  age  of  iron  and  steel. 

Cormontaigne,  Montalembert,  Coehorn,  Dufour,  Noiset  and 
many  others  have  left  their  impress  on  the  records  of  engineering 
work,  each  having  a  system  or  a  modification  of  a  previous  one. 
The  expense  of  fortifying  a  large  city  by  one  of  these  systems 


—167— 

was  very  great — very  few  cities  were  rich  enough  to  use  the  most 
elaborate  of  them.  The  advent  of  heavy  rifled  cannon  and  steel 
projectiles  made  masonry  useless  when  exposed  to  their  fire,  and 
ushered  in  an  entirely  new  system  based  on  the  use  of  iron,  steel, 
earth  and  concrete.  Before  the  war  of  the  rebellion  our  govern- 
ment spent  millions  of  dollars  in  cut  stone  works  with  great  tiers 
of  casemates.  Fort  Lafayette,  in  New  York  harbor,  and  Fort 
Scott,  in  San  Francisco  harbor,  are  specimens  of  the  skill  of  our 
engineers  forty  years  ago,  now  only  valuable  as  monuments  of 
a  past  age. 

DUTIES  OF  ENGINEERS. 

The  duties  of  the  engineer  corps  are  to  construct  field  and  siege 
works,  sea-coast  defenses,  military  mines,  roads,  bridges,  conduct 
the  attack  and  defense  of  fortresses,  make  reconnoissances  and 
military  maps. 

In  these  lectures  I  shall  confine  myself  to  modern  field  fortifi- 
cations. 

The  object  of  fortifications  is  to  prepare  the  ground  so  that 
troops  may  use  their  weapons  with  the  greatest  possible  eifect, 
and  with  the  least  interruption  from  the  enemy. 

The  Woolwich  text-book  gives  the  following  points  to  be 
considered : 

"  1.  The  enemy  must  he  exposed  to  the  effects  of  the  weapons 
of  the  defense. 

"  2.  The  defenders  shoidd  he  protected  against  the  effects  of  the 
enemy^s  weapons. 

"5.  The  movements  of  the  enemy  should  be  hampered  hy 
ohstacles. 

"  Jf..  The  movements  of  the  defenders  should  he  unimpeded. 

"  These  requirements  are  somewhat  contradictory.  The  thing 
is  to  have  the  odds  on  one?s  own  sideP 

Field  works  are  such  as  can  be  constructed  in  a  short  time,  say 
under  three  days.  They  are  employed  in  intrenching  on  the  field 
of  battle,  and  for  supplementing  permanent  works,  and  vary  in 
detail  from  the  simple  intrenchments  to  the  elaborate  work  with 
parapet,  ditch,  glacis,  and  bomb-proof. 


—168— 

"  Field  fortifications  implies  all  measures  taken  for  the  defense 
of  positions  intended  only  to  be  temporarily  held  by  troops. 
Such  defenses  include  the  preparation  of  a  field  of  battle  and 
artificial  cover  obtained  durmg  combat  ;  the  more  deliberate 
intrenchment  of  isolated  posts,  camps,  depots  and  magazines,  the 
securing  of  defiles  and  bridge  heads,  the  slight  works  thrown  up 
by  advanced  guards  awaiting  reinforcements,  or  by  rear  guards  to 

cover  a  retreat It  also  includes  rapid  trenchwork  executed 

as  an  aid  to  an  assault  on  field  defenses," — (Woolwich  Text-book.) 

The  materials  used  in  their  construction  must  of  necessity  be 
confined  to  such  as  can  be  found  in  the  immediate  vicinity,  such 
as  earth,  wood,  brush,  sods,  etc.  The  tools  are  carried  in  the 
engineer  train  and  are  supplemented  by  the  picks  and  shovels 
carried  by  the  trains  of  the  other  arms  of  the  service.  The  greater 
part  of  the  work,  such  as  the  excavation,  the  construction  of 
abatis,  palisades,  the  cutting  of  brush  and  sods,  is  usually  done 
by  the  infantry  troops,  while  the  parts  requiring  technical  knowl- 

FlGURE   9. 


edge,  such  as  the  making  of  gabions,  fascines,  hurdles  and 
entanglements  are  done  by  the  engineer  troops.  In  our  service, 
where  the  number  of  trained  engineer  troops  is  small,  and  the 
number  of  skillful  men  found  in  the  line  very  great,  all  of  the 
labor  is  readily  performed  by  the  troops  who  are  to  man  the 
works  when  completed. 


—169- 


There  are  certain  approved  methods  for  using  the  various 
kinds  of  material,  but  the  skill  of  the  engineer  should  not  be 
narrowed  by  tradition.  If  much  needed  material  cannot  be 
obtained,  he  must  make  some  other  act  as  substitute.  He  can 
find  use  for  everything — raifroad  iron  and  ties,  empty  casks, 
lumber  from  an  old  building,  the  wire  along  a  telegraph  line,  etc. 
Stone  and  brick  are  of  little  use.     Brush-wood  is  very  useful. 

Gabions  are  cylindrical  rings  made  by  interlacing  green  withes, 
stripped  of  leaves  and  branches,  alternately  in  and  out,  about 
pickets  driven  into  the  ground.  They  are  usually  about  three 
feet  long  and  2  ft.  6  in.  in  diameter,  and  when  filled  with  sand, 
furnish  good  protection  against  infantry  fire. 


Figure  io. 


Fascines  are  bundles  of  these  withes  tied  together  in  the  form 
of  a  cylinder,  about  eighteen  feet  long  and  nine  inches  thick,  and 
are  used  for  revetment  and  for  building  roads  in  marshy  places. 

Hurdles  are  made  by  interlacing  the  withes  about  stakes  set 
in  either  a  straight  or  a  slightly  curved  line.  They  may  be  built 
against  the  interior  slope  as  it  progresses. 

I  can  only  refer  briefly  to  these  common  forms.  For  the  details 
you  must  consult  some  standard  work. 

Some  authorities  advocate  the  construction  of  gun-pits  and 
shelter  for  horses  and  caissons,  but  it  is  very  doubtful  if  they  are 
worth  the  labor  and  time  consumed  in  their  construction. 

The  entrenchment  protects  the  soldier  from  rifle  fire  while  he 
is  lying  down  behind  it;  as  he  must  fire  on  the  enemy,  it  must 


not  be  so  high  as  to  obscure  his  view.  The  interior  slope  is  made 
steep,  so  he  may  lean  against  it  and  be  covered  as  much  as  pos- 
sible while  firing.  The  superior  slope  is  arranged  so  as  not  to 
obstruct  his  field  of  view. 


OBSTACLES. 

The  enemy's  advance  should  be  delayed  as  long  as  possible,  so 
we  place  obstacles  in  his  way.  If  we  can  delay  his  progress 
while  in  close  range  of  our  rifles,  so  much  the  better,  and  in 
elaborate  works  we  put  a  ditch  just  outside  of  the  parapet,  with 
the  trace  of  the  work,  so  located  that  we  can  sweep  the  ditch  by 
flank  fire.  To  further  embarrass  his  movements  we  put  a  palisade 
or  wire  fence  in  the  ditch,  and  just  in  front  of  the  ditch  we  would 
clear  the  ground  and  put  in  wire  entanglements,  made  by  driving 
stakes  in  the  ground  short  distances  apart  and  stretching  wire  in 
different  directions,  or  abatis,  made  by  cutting  down  trees,  sharp- 
ening the  limbs  and  turning  them  toward  the  enemy,  fastened 
securely.  We  may  place  military  mines  in  front,  to  be  exploded 
when  trod  upon.  In  placing  these  obstacles  we  must  bear  in 
mind  that  they  will  impede  our  advance  in  a  return  offensive. 


—171— 

The  thickness  of  the  parapet  will  depend  on  what  it  is  expected 
to  resist;  if  rifle  fire  alone,  it  ought  to  be  about  two  feet  thick 
( a  little  more  if  made  of  clay) ;  if  field  artillery  is  to  be  resisted, 
it  ought  to  be  about  twelve  feet  thick.  The  parapet  may  be 
made  sufiiciently  high  to  protect  the  troops  from  artillery  and 
rifle  fire,  but  shell  and  shrapnel  may  be  thrown  over  the  parapet, 
to  explode  inside,  hence  we  must  gain  protection  against  them  by 
constructing  bomb-proofs.  We  have  now  explained  the  raison 
dPetre  of  the  profile.  There  are  of  course  many  variations  in  the 
details  of  the  works.  The  interior  slope  is  usually  reveted,  as 
the  natural  earth  will  not  assume  a  sufiiciently  steep  slope,  and 
revetment  strengthens  the  parapet.  Sand-bags,  gabions,  fascines, 
sods  and  hurdles  are  used,  depending  upon  the  resources  of  the 
vicinity.  Sometimes  the  height  of  the  parapet  is  increased  by 
putting  logs  or  sand-bags  along  the  interior  crest  with  loopholes. 
They  interfere  with  the  free  use  of  the  rifle  and  obstruct  the 
view,  and  are  not  often  used. 

The  strength  of  the  work  will  depend  upon  the  importance  of 
the  ground  it  occupies,  and  in  tracing  field  works  engineers  must 
keep  clearly  in  view  the  tactical  features  of  the  position.  Some 
points  may  be  so  important  as  to  demand  the  construction  of 


Figure  12. 


—172— 

redoubts,  with  the  lines  extending  around  to  the  flank  and  rear, 
and  shelter  inside  for  considerable  bodies  of  troops.  Other  parts 
of  the  line  may  be  strong  naturally  and  not  need  much  attention. 
He  must  also  use  good  judgment  in  placing  obstacles,  and  always 
bear  in  mind  that  they  will  become  obstacles  to  his  troops  if  an 
advance  is  to  be  made. 

The  two  illustrations  above  I'epresent  the  new  and  the  old 
forms  of  field  works.  The  new  (the  upper  one)  is  the  best,  for 
the  following  reasons : 

1st.  All  of  the  space  in  front  of  the  firer  is  within  his  view, 
which  removes  the  necessity  for  providing  flank  fire  for  the 
ditches. 

2d.  It  i^  more  easily  constructed. 

3d.  Its  shape  makes  it  more  indistinct  at  long  distances,  and  it 
does  not  offer  as  good  a  target  as  its  older  rival. 

4th.  "These  flat  slopes  are  also  good  against  howitzer  and 
mortar  shells,  for  though  these  may  be  falling  at  too  steep  an 
angle  to  turn  up,  yet  the  effect  of  the  burst  will  merely  be  to  dis- 
perse the  earth  over  the  slope,  and  successive  shells  are  as  likely 
to  fill  one  another's  craters  up  as  to  deepen  them." — (Woolwich 
Text-book.) 

Fortifications  may  be  subjected  to  the  following  kinds  of  fire  : 

Front — Delivered  straight  to  the  front. 

Oblique — Delivered  from  the  front,  but  obliquely. 

Enfilade — When  the  fire  is  delivered  parallel  to  the  crest  or  to 
a  line  of  troops. 

Reverse — When  it  strikes  the  object  in  rear. 

When  we  consider  the  elevation  of  the  piece  and  the  charge, 
we  have  : 

Direct — With  service  charges  at  elevations  not  exceeding  15°. 

Indirect — With  reduced  charges  at  angles  not  exceeding  15°. 

High  angle — At  angles  exceeding  15°. 

There  is  a  class  of  works  known  as  "hasty  intrenchments," 
illustrated  on  page  173.  They  can  be  constructed  in  a  very  few 
minutes  in  light  soil  and  offer  the  soldier  good  protection  against 
infantiy  fire  without  interfering  with  his  freedom  of  movement. 


—173— 

Our  troops  became  very  skillful  in  constructing  these  works 
during  the  war  and  invariably  intrenched  at  the  close  of  the 
march.     Gen.  Sherman  says  : 

"  It  was  one  of  Prof.  Mahan's  maxims  that  the  spade  was  as 
useful  in  war  as  the  musket,  and  to  this  I  will  add  the  axe." 

The  pick  and  spade  are  now  recognized  parts  of  the  soldier's 
equipment.  EflForts  have  been  made  to  introduce  an  "  intrench- 
ing tool "  into  our  service,  but  it  essayed  to  be  axe,  pick,  shovel, 
etc.,  combined.  It  is  perhaps  unnecessary  to  say  that  it  was  a 
failure.  The  proper  tools  are  a  light  steel  pick  and  shovel,  one 
of  each  to  be  assigned  to  each  set  of  fours,  and  extra  ones  carried 
in  carts  in  rear  of  the  command. 

During  the  war  of  the  rebellion,  intrenchments  were  frequently 
made  by  rolling  together  a  few  logs  and  throwing  earth  over 
them.  The  trace  of  the  works  should  be  made  to  conform  to  the 
necessities  of  the  position,  with  as  few  salient  and  reentrant 
angles  as  possible.     All  varieties  of  form  are  used  in  the  construc- 


FlGURE   13. 


J'/zhr 


tion  of  isolated  works.  We  have  the  simple  right  line  trace.  It 
has  its  flanks  exposed,  gives  fire  only  in  one  direction,  and  would 
be  useful  in  defending  a  road  or  narrow  pass.  The  Redan,  with 
two  faces,  inclined  at  an  angle  not  less  than  60°,  chiefly  used  in 
covering  bridges,  or  in  giving  flank  fire  to  portions  of  other  works. 
The  lunette,  with  three  sides,  giving  front  and  flank  fire  ;  also  the 
five-sided    lunette   with  the  gorge   closed  by  stockades.     The 


— 1Y4— 

redoubt  entirely  closed,  leaving  only  an  exit  which  is  protected 
from  the  rear  by  a  redan  or  other  form  of  cover.  The  trace 
should  be  as  simple  as  possible  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  position, 
and  to  give  powerful  fire  to  the  front  in  the  direction  from  which 
attack  is  to  be  expected.  The  length  should  be  proportioned  to 
the  number  of  men  it  is  to  contain.  The  flanks  ought  to  be  in 
effective  range  of  the  ground  they  are  to  cover  ;  sharp  salient 
points  should  be  avoided  ;  the  faces  should  be  secure  from  enfilade 
fire.  If  this  cannot  be  obtained  in  the  trace,  traverses  or  pai-ados 
must  be  built.     We  must  remember  that  the  tendency  of  men  is 


Figure  14. 


~  / \ 

*^ A        ,    )'^  ZDPrnL'recCout 


^\C- 


3?p<f  ft  rj 


'2{e>cLou't 


^uneff^ 


to  fire  straight  to  the  front,  perpendicularly  to  the  line  of  the 
crest,  and  the  trace  should  be  arranged  so  as  to  be  perpendicular 
to  the  probable  line  of  advance  of  the  enemy.  In  elaborate  field 
works  it  may  be  necessary  to  construct  caponieres  for  flanking  the 
ditches.  Field  casemates  or  "  bomb-proofs  "  offer  the  men  shelter 
from  fire  and  enable  them  to  preserve  their  moral  force  or  "  nerv- 
ous energy  "  until  they  are  called  out  to  repel  the  assault.  They 
are  consequently  fresher  and  cooler  than  the  attackers,  and  have  a 
great  moral  advantage. 


—175— 

On  the  other  hand,  the  constant  protection  of  troops,  by  field 
works,  creates  a  desire  for  protection  and  weakens  them  in 
offensive  movements,  making  them  anxious  to  seek  the  friendly 
shelter  of  the  parapets.  Most  positions  can  be  turned  by  superior 
forces  ;  if  the  works  are  closed  to  provide  for  this  contingency, 
they  may  be  completely  surrounded  and  the  troops  forced  to 
surrender,  by  starvation. 

If  the  position  is  well  protected  against  turning  movements  by 
strong  flank  positions,  and  is  open  to  rear,  it  may  wisely  be  forti- 
fied. The  matter  of  fortification  may  readily  be  overdone,  and 
the  commander  who  depends  upon  the  construction  of  elaborate 
field  works,  instead  of  upon  bold  offensive  movements  will  scarcely 
reap  great  rewards.  In  view  of  their  great  theoretical  strength, 
it  may  seem  strange,  but  fortified  places  have  nearly  always  been 
captured.     The  '*  Woolwich  Text-book  "  says  : 

"  With  regard  to  the  nature  of  the  fortified  supporting  points, 
strong  earthworks  require  much  time  and  many  men  for  their 
construction,  furnish  veiy  little  fire  in  comparison  Avith  the  labor 
expended,  and  do  not  admit  of  obstinate  defense  until  completed. 
For  those  reasons  defensive  localities  are  generally  to  be  preferred 
to  them.  When  they  are  favorably  situated  and  do  not  require 
too  large  garrisons,  no  time,  however  short,  need  be  ill-expended 
in  their  preparation  and  every  additional  hour's  work  renders 
them  stronger." 

By  "  localities "  is  meant  woods,  villages,  houses,  farms  sur- 
rounded by  stone  walls  which  can  quickly  be  put  in  condition  for 
defense.  The  most  important  line  of  defense  in  a  wood,  is  the 
edge.  The  ground  is  cleared  in  front  and  obstacles  are  located 
to  impede  the  progress  of  the  enemy.  Abatis  are  constructed 
just  in  front  of  the  edge,  and  if  the  wood  is  close,  communica- 
tions should  be  made  between  important  points.  The  irregular 
form  of  the  edge  of  the  wood  will  usually  give  facilities  for  flank 
fire. 

A  house  is  prepared  for  defense  by  barricading  the  doors  and 
windows  with  the  furniture  ;  wet  blankets  and  mattresses  are 
very  useful  in  this  connection.     The  doors,  windows  and  walls 


—ire- 
are  loopholed  for  infantry  fire,  sometimes  a  ditch  is  dug  around 
the  outside  near  the  building.  The  stairways  may  be  taken  down 
so  as  to  allow  the  second  ^tory  to  be  defended,  after  the  first  has 
been  captured.  Bow  windows  and  wings  give  good  flank  fire. 
Water  and  earth  should  be  carried  into  the  house  to  put  out  fires, 
and  for  use  of  the  occupants  if  they  are  to  undergo  a  siege. 
Villages  are  prepared  for  defense  by  first  preparing  the  houses. 
The  walls  of  gardens  are  loopholed,  hedges  that  might  screen  an 
enemy's  advance  are  cut  down,  abatis  and  palisading  may  be 
added  when  there  is  time  for  their  construction.  The  fight  for  a 
village  is  usually  bloody  and  desperate,  and  often  becomes  a  hand 
to  hand  conflict  from  house  to  house.  Frederick  would  not  attack 
villages,  "  for,"  said  he,  "  it  costs  many  of  my  very  bravest  men 
to  attack  a  village."  In  our  country,  villages  are  usually  com- 
posed of  light  frame  houses,  which  would  not  offer  great  protec- 
tion against  infantiy  fire,  and  none  against  modern  artillery  fire. 
The  trace  of  a  system  of  field  works  is  usually  made  under  the 
direction  of  the  chief  engineer.  If  the  position  is  in  sight  of  the 
enemy  or  within  range  of  his  artillery,  the  trace  should  be  made 
at  dusk,  and  the  works  would  have  to  be  constructed  after  night 
to  protect  the  working  pai-ties.  After  the  trace  is  laid  out, 
profiles  made  of  light  lumber  are  set  up  at  various  points  in  the 
line  to  guide  the  working  parties.  They  are  placed  perpendic- 
ularly to  the  trace,  and  at  intervals  of  about  30  feet.  The  earth- 
work is  usually  done  by  the  infantry — gabions,  fascines,  etc.,  are 
usually  made  by  the  engineers.  Guards  for  the  working  parties 
are  thrown  out  to  the  front,  and  if  necessary  they  may  protect 
themselves  by  "hasty  intrenchments."  The  working  parties  are 
divided  into  reliefs.  When  plenty  of  time  is  available  each 
relief  may  be  kept  on  eight  hours,  but  if  rapidity  of  execution  is 
necessary  the  parties  may  be  relieved  every  four  hours.  Work- 
ing parties  should  be  detailed  by  companies,  regiments,  brigades, 
etc.,  as  it  is  better  to  have  whole  units  in  each  relief,  than  to  have 
it  made  up  of  detachments  from  many  different  units.  When 
very  quick  work  is  desired  it  will  be  best  to  send  two  reliefs  to 
the  works  at  the  same  time  and  assign  two  men  to  each  task,  so 


—177— 

they  can  relieve  each  other.  "The  German  rule  during  1870, 
was  that  one  day  on  outpost,  the  next  day  working  party  and 
the  third  day  rest  should  be  considered  the  maxiraum.  of  effort 
for  each  man."  It  is  difficult  to  give  an  exact  statement  as  to 
the  amount  of  work  each  man  should  do.  It  will  depend  upon 
the  nature  of  the  soil,  the  weather,  and  the  distance  the  dirt  has 
to  be  thrown.  Ordinarily  a  healthy  man  ought  to  be  able  to 
excavate  nearly  one  cubic  yard  per  hour  for  four  hours.  If  the 
dirt  has  to  be  thrown  any  considerable  distance  there  must  be  a 
second  gang  of  shovelers  to  pass  it  on.  The  most  satisfactory 
method  with  soldiers  is  to  assign  them  a  certain  task  and  allow 
them  to  return  to  camp  when  they  finish  it.  In  detailing  working 
parties  an  allowance  of  about  10  per  cent,  must  be  made  for  casu- 
alties if  near  the  enemy,  and  for  sick  men.  Arms  are  placed  in  a 
row  just  in  rear  of  the  trench,  and  perpendicular  to  it.  If  the 
tools  have  not  been  laid  out  near  the  trace,  the  men  must  be 
marched  to  the  park,  or  to  the  wagon  trains,  with  rifles  slung  and 
canteens  filled  with  fresh  water.  The  engineer  in  charge  ought 
to  see  that  the  picks  and  shovels  are  placed  where  needed,  so  no 
time  will  be  lost  in  getting  to  work. 

The  English  regulations  for  working  parties  are  : 

"  1.  Each  man  is  to  be  shown  the  task  he  is  to  execute. 

"  2.  Arms  when  laid  down  to  commence  work  are  not  to  be 
taken  up  again,  even  in  case  of  attack,  except  by  order  of  the 
commanding  officer. 

"  3.  Strict  silence  is  to  be  kept  and  clashing  of  tools  or  arms 
avoided. 

"  4.  Words  of  command  are  to  be  given  in  an  undertone. 

"  5.  No  lights  or  smoking  are  allowed." 

These  regulations  are  particularly  applicable  in  the  construction 
of  trenches  in  siege  operations. 

Col.  Brackenbury  thinks  that  hasty  intrenchments  will  be  used 
extensively  in  future,  by  the  attack  as  well  as  by  the  defense, 
especially  by  the  part  of  the  line  which  is  to  hold  the  enemy 
while  the  principal  attack  is  made. 

A  front  attack  in  equal  numbers,  against  steady  troops,  behind 
intrenchments  or  obstacles,  will  have  but  few  chances  of  success. 
12 


—178— 

He  suggests  that  small  bodies  of  troops  may  be  pushed  forward 
to  drive  in  the  enemy's  outposts  and  throw  up  what  protection 
they  can^  others  may  be  pushed  forward  in  a  similar  manner  until 
a  sufficient  force  is  accumulated  near  the  enemy's  position  to 
warrant  an  attack.  Whether  this  will  be  possible  or  not  remains 
to  be  seen.  It  is  worth  trying.  It  emphasizes  the  fact  that  the 
spade  is  becoming  a  very  powerful  auxiliary  to  the  rifle,  and  pick 
and  shovel  must  form  part  of  the  infantry  equipment  in  future 
contests.  The  American  troops  during  the  war  of  the  rebellion 
became  very  skillful  in  the  construction  of  field  works  and  various 
kinds  of  shelter,  but  the  European  powers  were  very  slow  in 
learning  the  important  lessons  of  this  great  conflict.  At  Kon- 
nigratz  the  Austrians  did  very  little  to  strengthen  their  position. 
The  French  and  Italians  were  equally  ignorant  or  careless  in  this 
respect.  In  1870  the  French  and  Prussians  used  them  to  a  limited 
extent.  In  the  Russo-Turkish  war  they  again  rose  to  promi- 
nence. The  Turks  used  them  habitually.  Their  field  works 
around  Plevna  were  very  strong,  and  were  skillfully  constructed. 
Skobeleff  was  fully  aware  of  their  value,  and  his  men  frequently 
made  hasty  intrenchments,  using  their  dishes,  bayonets,  swords, 
anything  that  would  loosen  up  the  earth.  The  little  mound  of 
earth  in  front  of  the  soldier  not  only  offers  protection  but  increases 
the  accuracy  of  his  fire  by  giving  a  good  rest  for  the  rifle. 
Brackenbury  says  : 

"  In  all  field  works,  especially  shelter  trenches,  avoid  like  poison 
all  neatness,  which  takes  time  and  makes  a  better  target. 

"  Gen.  Skobeleff  armed  the  whole  of  his  force  with  large  spades 
after  the  siege  of  Plevna,  and  so  fully  had  the  men  become  con- 
vinced of  the  value  of  that  tool  that  they  made  no  difficulty  about 
carrying  their  spades  during  their  struggles  through  the  snow 
laden  passes  of  the  Balkans.  In  all  their  fatigues  the  spade  was 
the  last  article  they  would  part  with,  and  those  heavy  tools  were 
carried  to  the  gates  of  Constantinople." 

Vicksburg,  Richmond  and  Petersburg  were  great  intrenched 
camps,  surrounded  by  earthworks  with  heavy  traverses  and  bomb- 
proofs.     They  offered  great  resistance,  but  once  surrounded  by 


—179— 

superior  forces  with  no  hope  of  assistance  from  the  outside,  their 
fates  were  sealed.  It  is  hardly  possible  in  the  limits  of  this 
course  and  without  a  great  number  of  maps  and  plates,  to  give 
you  a  good  idea  of  modem  systems  of  permanent  fortifications  ; 
even  if  it  were,  I  doubt  the  utility  of  it. 

France  has  recently  added  to  her  system,  blockade  forts,  which 
are  located  along  the  railways  and  principal  roads.  They  are 
independent  works,  not  intended  for  a  large  number  of  guns  or 
heavy  garrisons. 

The  English  people  do  not  spend  great  sums  on  fortification. 
They  have  fortified  their  important  military  and  naval  depots  on 
the  coast.  Their  defense  is  arranged  to  be  partly  on  the  water 
and  partly  on  land.  Great  reliance  is  placed  on  her  powerful 
navy.  Some  of  her  able  men  are  seriously  recommending  the 
fortifying  of  London. 

Military  men  cannot  agree  upon  the  value  of  fortifications  in 
the  defense  of  a  country,  but  if,  perchance,  they  do  agree  upon 
this  point,  they  probably  disagree  as  to  the  best  form  to  be 
adopted.  A  detachment  may  be  left  to  observe  a  fortification 
which  only  contains  1000  men,  and  the  army  may  proceed  on  its 
way,  but  it  could  not  pass  a  great  intrenched  camp  with  a  heavy 
gaiTison  without  leaving  an  entire  army  to  besiege  it,  as  the 
Germans  did  at  Metz.  The  side  that  assumes  the  offensive  first 
in  the  next  war  will  probably  be  obliged  to  go  against  some  of 
these  great  intrenched  camps,  but  I  don't  think  the  French  will 
again  be  led  into  a  trap  as  at  Metz,  and  permit  an  army  of  170,000 
men  to  be  enclosed  in  a  box  and  surrendered  without  a  serious 
effort  to  free  themselves.  In  a  recent  work  on  fortifications 
Maj.  Clarke  of  the  British  army  breaks  a  lance  against  all  of  the 
present  systems,  and  condems  them  as  being  too  theoretical  and 
advocates  many  radical  changes.  Among  other  prophecies  we 
find  one  to  the  effect  that  all  field  guns  will  be  rapid  firing.  He 
has  brought  upon  himself  a  goodly  quantity  of  criticism,  from  a 
no  less  distinguished  engineer  than  Gen.  Brialmont.  After  all, 
the  major's  scheme  seems  to  be  as  purely  theoretical  as  the  others. 

Armies  must  be  trained  to  destroy  defenses  as  well  as  to  con- 


—180— 

struct  them,  and  the  art  of  the  engineer  finds  a  wide  scope  in  the 
attack  of  fortified  places.  Parallels  must  be  opened,  breaching 
batteries  set  up,  mines  be  dug,  and  assaults  planned.  The  science 
of  the  attack  is  more  intricate  than  that  of  the  defense. 

DEMOLITION. 

Troops  charged  with  the  work  of  demolition  should  be  divided 
into  two  fractions — one  to  execute  the  work — the  other  to  protect 
the  workers. 

The  victorious  army  aims  to  destroy  what  it  cannot  carry 
away.  Railroad  lines,  with  the  rolling  stock,  bridges,  telegraph 
lines,  arsenals,  dockyards,  anything  that  might  assist  the  enemy 
in  carrying  on  the  war  is  subject  to  demolition.  The  favorite 
method  of  destroying  a  railroad  line  is  to  take  up  the  rails  and 
ties,  make  a  fire  of  the  latter  and  put  the  rails  on  it.  As  soon  as 
they  get  red-hot  they  are  twisted  about  a  small  tree.  Rolling 
stock  is  usually  burned.  Engines  are  readily  disabled  by  break- 
ing the  cylinders  and  injectors  and  carrying  off  vital  parts. 
Telegraph  lines  may  be  destroyed  by  burning  the  poles,  breaking 
the  insulators  and  carrying  off  stretches  of  the  wire.  The  instru- 
ments at  the  station  are  easily  broken  up  and  the  batteries 
destroyed.  To  interrupt  the  service  of  a  telegraph  line  tempo- 
rarily, bind  all  the  wires  together  with  a  piece  of  one  and  bury 
the  free  end  in  the  ground. 

Bridges  suffer  heavily  in  war,  and  are  destroyed  by  friend  and 
foe.  A  suspension  bridge  is  of  no  further  use  after  the  cables  are 
cut — wooden  bridges  can  easily  be  burned  by  pouring  oil  on  them 
and  setting  fire  to  it.  If  pressed  for  time,  the  floor  planks  may  be 
removed  and  set  on  fire,  or  thrown  into  the  stream  when  it  will 
carry  them  away.  Iron  bridges  may  be  thrown  down  by  explod- 
ing dynamite  or  other  strong  explosives  at  some  of  the  principal 
joints  along  the  roadway.  A  masonry  bridge  may  be  rendered 
useless  by  placing  explosives  on  the  arches  along  the  keystone 
course. 

The  most  effective  way  of  treating  guns  that  cannot  be  carried 
away  is   to   destroy  the   breech   mechanism,  or   carry  it   away. 


—181— 

Small  arms  are  easily  broken  and  the  barrels  bent,  sword  blades 
are  snapped  in  two,  warehouses,  dockyards  and  arsenals  are 
usually  turned  over  to  the  flames,  ammunition  can  be  thrown  in 
the  water,  or  buried,  the  contents  of  caissons  may  be  exploded. 

Modern  warfare  seeks  to  throw  the  hardships  of  war  on  govern- 
ments, and  recognizes  many  of  the  rights  of  citizens  to  the  enjoy- 
ment of  their  homes  and  property.  We  must  bear  in  mind, 
however,  that  war  is  the  act  of  the  people  through  their  govern- 
ment and  we  need  not  hesitate  to  make  them  feel  the  burden  of  it 
when  necessary.  Churches,  libraries,  works  of  art,  charitable  and 
religious  institutions  are  spared,  unless  some  evident  military 
necessity  makes  their  destruction  imperative.  It  is  an  absolute 
rule  that  no  work  of  art  shall  be  destroyed  or  injured  without  an 
especial  order  from  the  commander-in-chief,  or  of  the  corps  com- 
mander." (Aide-Memoire.)  At  the  Geneva  convention  it  was 
agreed  "  that  ambulances  and  military  hospitals  should  be 
acknowledged  to  be  neuter,  and  as  such  shall  be  protected  and 
respected  by  belligerents,  so  long  as  any  sick  or  wounded  may  be 

therein Inhabitants  of  the  country  who  may  bring  help  to 

the  wounded  shall  be   respected   and  shall   remain   free 

Any  wounded  man  entertained  and  taken  care  of  in  a  house  shall 
be  considered  as  a  protection  thereto,"  etc. 

As  supplementary  reading  on  this  subject  I  suggest  the  follow- 
ing works. 

"  Woolwich  Text-Book  of  Fortification,"  2  vols. 

"Military  Engineering."  Part  I.  by  Prof.  Mahan.  Revised 
edition  by  Bvt.  J.  Wheeler. 

"Instructions  in  Military  Engineering."  (English.)  Parts 
I.  to  V. 


CHAPTER  XII. 


THE  BATTLE. 

The  battle  is  the  climax  of  war.  Drill,  training,  discipline  and 
mancEuvre  have  in  view  preparation  for  combat.  Bloodless  wars 
are  generally  barren  of  lasting  results  and  bring  unsatisfactory 
peace.  The  first  objective  is  the  enemy's  army,  and  until  that  is 
destroyed  or  placed  in  unfit  condition  to  continue  the  struggle, 
the  full  fruits  of  victory  cannot  be  reaped.  Success  on  the  battle- 
field is  the  best  gauge  of  the  efficiency  of  an  army  and  its  com- 
manders. 

Combats  between  detachments  are  of  frequent  occurrence,  but 
battles  only  occur  at  long  intervals.  The  greater  portion  of  the 
time  consumed  in  war  is  used  in  marching  and  manoeuvring  and 
preparing  for  battle.  During  the  four  years'  war  of  the  rebellion 
there  were  only  about  thirty-five  engagements  which  could  prop- 
erly be  called  battles,  while  there  were  numberless  combats. 

Battles  are  of  two  kinds,  viz:  premeditated,  dkudi  accidental, — 
(or  battles  of  ^^  rencontre^  ) 

When  the  two  armies  are  moving  towards  each  other  with  the 
cavalry  in  front,  each  being  aware  of  the  presence  of  the  other, 
they  soon  come  into  contact ;  the  advanced  guard  becomes 
engaged,  each  attempting  to  hold  its  ground  until  its  own  army 
is  in  position;  the  struggle  grows  until  both  armies  are  fully 
engaged,  and  we  have  the  premeditated  battle. 

Isolated  combats  often  compel  a  commander  to  send  up  rein- 
forcements, and  finally  to  engage  his  entire  command  in  battle 
at  an  unexpected  time  and  place,  and  we  have  a  battle  of 
"  rencontre.^'' 

All  of  the  battles  in  the  month  of  August,  1870,  except  Grave- 
lotte,  were  battles  of  rencontre. 

A  battle  of  this  kind  taxes  the  skill  of  the  commanders,  for 
time  is  all  important,  and  the  disposition  must  be  made  quickly, 


•  —184— 

usually  without  the  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  position  or  num- 
bers. The  battle  of  Spicheren  furnishes  a  good  illustration.  The 
Fourteenth  division  of  the  Seventh  corps  crossed  the  Saar  on  the 
morning  of  the  6th  of  August  and  encountered  what  was  thought 
to  be  the  French  rear  guard.  Gen.  von  Kameke  ordered  an- 
attack;  but  it  turned  out  that  Gen.  Frossard,  with  the  entire 
Second  corps,  was  intrenched  at  Spicheren,  with  the  Third,  Fourth 
and  Fifth  corps  from  two  to  four  miles  in  rear.  The  German 
troops  were  brought  up  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  a  bloody 
battle  began  which  lasted  into  the  night.  Meckel  says:  "The 
battle  of  rencontre  is  a  proof  of  the  activity  and  vigor  of  the 
troops." 

"  The  chances  are  always  on  the  side  of  the  audacious;  a  lively 
attack  is  already  half  successful." 

The  above  classification  in  no  way  conflicts  with  a  further 
division  into  offensive  and  defensive  battles,  which  is  really  a 
temporary  classification,  as  both  sides  may  pass  through  the  two 
conditions  several  times  during  the  fight.  We  may  assume  the 
offensive  in  the  morning  and  be  on  the  defensive  before  noon, 
and  vice  versa. 

A  vigorous  commander  will  assume  the  offensive  when  possible, 
but  a  defensive  r61e  maybe  imposed  on  him;  in  this  case  he  must 
of  course  accept  it  with  the  avowed  intention  of  assuming  the 
offensive  at  the  first  favorable  opportunity. 

"  The  offensive  has  the  following  advantages : 

"  1 — In  the  morale  effect. 

"  2 — In  selecting  the  point  of  attack,  also  the  time  and  method. 

"  3 — Decisive  results  can  only  be  obtained  by  the  offensive." 

The  defensive  has  choice  of  position,  better  cover,  easier  supply 
of  ammunition,  better  fire  and  less  exertion.  A  battle  is  won  by 
the  defense,  when  it  has  held  its  position  throughout;  it  is  lost  if 
the  enemy  breaks  through  at  any  point  and  holds  any  part  of  the 
line.  You  will  see  that  even  when  the  defensive  wins  it  does  not 
win  much,  while  if  it  loses,  it  may  lose  all.  We  should  take  the 
offensive  whenever  possible — history  is  full  of  glorious  accounts 
of  great  victories  won  by  the  smaller  forces  through  bold  offen- 
sive movements  and  great  audacity. 


—185— 

"The  most  advantageous  kind  of  battle  is  the  offensive- 
defensive,  in  which  we  assume  the  defensive  at  first,  and  allow 
the  enemy  to  exhaust  his  strength,  then  we  assume  the  offensive 
with  troops  comparatively  fresh  and  gain  the  victory.  Such 
battles  are  rare,  however,  as  circumstances  rarely  combine  so 
largely  in  favor  of  one  side." 

"In  offensive  battles  the  point  of  attack  will  be  decided  by 
strategical  and  tactical  considerations.  One  important  principle 
in  strategy  is  to  strike  your  enemy's  line  of  communication  when- 
ever possible  without  endangering  your  own.  If,  by  attacking 
on  one  flank,  we  can  imperil  his  communications,  we  ought  to 
attack  that  flank,  unless  the  tactical  considerations  are  such  as  to 
render  success  improbable.  When  the  tactical  and  strategical 
conditions  are  favorable  to  an  attack  on  some  particular  point, 
the  decision  is  easy.  There  is  usually  a  key-point  to  most  posi- 
tions, which  may  be  deOned  as  that  point  which,  if  captured,  will 
necessitate  the  abandonment  of  the  rest  of  the  line.  It  is  not 
necessarily  the  strongest  point  topographically.  It  may  be  either 
the  center  or  one  of  the  flanks." — (Mercur.) 

If  the  enemy's  line  is  too  extended,  his  center  will  probably  be 
weak  and  ought  to  be  attacked.  If  we  can  discover  that  he  has 
strengthened  the  center,  or  one  flank,  we  ought  to  attack  the 
weaker  flank.  If  much  stronger  in  number  than  our  opponents, 
we  may  successfully  engage  him  along  his  front  to  hold  his  troops, 
and  then  envelop  a  flank  and  threaten  the  rear  of  his  position. 
If  greatly  superior  in  numbers  we  may  envelop  both  flanks.  At 
Fredericksburg  the  original  design  of  the  Union  commander  was 
to  make  the  main  effort  on  the  left  and  confine  the  right  wing  to 
demonstration  until  a  favorable  opportunity  should  offer  for  con- 
verting the  feigned  attack  into  a  real  one.  It  was  not  carried 
out.  At  Gravelotte  the  Germans  engaged  the  French  line  in 
front  from  St.  Privat  to  its  extreme  left,  while  one  corps  made  a 
turning  movement  against  the  French  right  and  decided  the 
battle.  At  Austerlitz,  Napoleon  felt  that  the  enemy  would 
attempt  to  turn  his  right,  and  gain  the  road  to  Vienna.  He 
decided  to  allow  him  to  engage  fully  in  this  movement,  and  at 


—186— 

the  proper  time  to  attack  his  center  and  capture  his  left  wing  at 
least.  It  turned  out  as  he  expected.  The  allies  were  completely 
repulsed  and  routed,  losing  15,000  men  killed  or  wounded,  20,000 
prisoners,  180  cannon,  and  immense  quantities  of  stores.  At 
Leuthen,  Frederick  the  Great  marched  along  the  front  of  the 
Austrian  army  and  took  an  oblique  position  across  their  left 
flank,  and  won  a  great  victory,  A  quick  and  correct  apprecia- 
tion of  the  situation,  tactically  and  sti'ategically,  and  the  cour- 
age to  act  promptly  and  vigorously,  are  qualifications  of  great 
generals. 

OKDEES    OF    BATTLE. 

Jomini  gives  twelve  orders  of  battle,  but  they  have  more 
geometrical  than  military  significance. 

When  both  armies  are  engaged  along  their  entire  front,  we 
have  the  parallel  order. 

We  may  make  a  front  attack  on  one  or  both  flanks,  or  on  the 
center.     We  may  envelop  one  or  both  flanks. 

The  front  attack,  if  successful,  may  divide  the  enemy's  army, 
as  at  Austerlitz,  and  allow  it  to  be  beaten  in  detail.  The  attack 
on  a  flank,  if  made  in  oblique  order,  may  roll  up  the  enemy's  line, 
cut  his  communications,  and  completely  rout  his  army. 

While  infantry  must  bear  the  brunt  of  the  fight,  success  is  only 
obtained  by  a  proper  and  harmonious  use  of  the  three  arms  com- 
bined. It  would  be  folly  to  place  the  artillery  on  low  ground 
with  limited  view  of  the  field,  or  to  put  cavalry  in  boggy  or 
rocky  ground.  Owing  to  the  great  size  of  modern  armies,  the 
commanding  general  can  see  but  little  of  the  field.  He  must  rely 
on  the  reports  of  staff  officers,  or  upon  the  field  telegraph  train. 

The  front  of  action  of  an  army  corps  is  about  3500  yards;  its 
depth  will  vary  with  the  size  of  the  armies.  On  the  offensive, 
the  depth  of  an  army  corps  will  vary  from  nine  to  twelve  men 
per  yard  of  front,  and  from  six  to  eight  on  the  defensive. 

On  the  offensive,  the  troops  are  usually  arranged  in  at  least 
three  lines — first,  the  firing  line  and  its  support;  the  second  and 
third  lines  support  and  reinforce  the  first  line  and  assist  in  the 


—187— 

attack;  they  must  also  form  a  reserve  behind  which  the  beaten 
troops  may  rally,  and  must  also  be  prepared  to  check  a  counter- 
offensive.  In  addition,  the  general  keeps  under  his  own  control 
a  general  reserve,  which  is  put  into  action  only  by  his  order,  to 
retrieve  disaster  or  to  give  the  final  blow;  to  cover  the  retreat  in 
case  of  defeat,  or  to  pursue  the  enemy.  Many  generals  fail  to 
utilize  their  reserves.  Bazaine  had  a  good  reserve  at  Gravelotte, 
and  had  he  sent  it  to  the  assistance  of  his  right  wing  as  he  was 
urged,  he  might  have  saved  the  day. 

McClellan  had  two  army  corps  practically  fresh  after  Antietam, 
yet  he  allowed  Lee's  entire  army  to  cross  the  Potomac. 

Troops  on  the  defensive  are  arranged  in  the  same  manner  as 
on  the  offensive,  when  the  ground  is  favorable  for  the  action  of 
the  lines.  Weak  parts  of  the  line  must  have  greater  density, 
while  positions  naturally  strong  or  artificially  strengthened  may 
be  held  by  thinner  lines.  When  the  ground  is  favorable,  a  second 
position  may  be  occupied  in  rear  of  the  first.  Obstacles  may  be 
placed  in  front  of  the  intrenchments  to  impede  the  advance  of  the 
enemy;  woods  and  villages  be  prepared  for  defense,  and  objects 
removed  which  might  offer  protection  to  the  enemy  during  his 
advance. 

The  combined  front  and  flank  attack  seems  to  be  the  most 
favored  now.  It  was  frequently  adopted  by  the  Germans  with 
great  success.  Both  attacks  should  be  made  at  the  same  time, 
and  if  the  ground  permits  the  flank  movement  to  be  made 
unobserved,  the  chances  of  success  will  be  increased. 

There  are  some  objections  to  it.  Unless  the  attacker  is  greatly 
superior  in  numbers,  his  line  may  be  made  dangerously  thin; 
again,  connection  must  be  kept  up  between  the  flanking  columns 
and  the  main  body,  otherwise  the  enemy  might  slip  in  at  the 
angle.  It  requires  celerity  of  movement  and  favorable  ground, 
and  more  or  less  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  enemy's  cavalry. 
We  would  usually  employ  cavalry  and  horse  artillery  to  effect 
such  a  movement  on  the  battlefield.  But  the  race  is  not  always 
to  the  swift  nor  the  battle  to  the  strong.  Battles  have  been  won 
and  lost  under  similar  circumstances,  many  times.  Napoleon 
could  beat  his  enemies  in  any  formation ;  so  could  Frederick. 


—188— 

There  is  an  old  adage,  "  Fortune  smiles  on  the  audacious." 
The  celebrated  Scharnhorst  said  :  "  The  important  thing  in 
war  is  not  how  we  do  it,  but  in  acting  in  unison  and  with  a  strong 
will  to  accomplish  it."  And  Baron  Vonder-Goltz  says  :  "  It  is 
essential  that  the  commander-in-chief,  as  well  as  the  troops,  have 
a  firm  intention  and  will  to  conquer  their  enemy."  In  the 
eighteenth  century,  with  its  heavy  columns  and  deep  lines  and 
fondness  for  parade  ground  manoeuvres  on  the  battlefield,  orders 
of  battles  were  all-impox'tant.  Their  artillery  and  cavalry  were 
cumbersome  and  poorly  handled,  until  the  genius  of  Frederick 
shed  a  new  light  on  war  and  enabled  him  to  withstand  the  com- 
bined might  of  Austria,  Russia  and  France  for  seven  years. 
Energy,  celerity  and  a  firm  determination  to  conquer,  in  officers 
and  men,  will  win  as  many  battles  in  the  future  as  they  have  won 
in  the  past. 

THE    DIFFERENT    ARMS. 

Infantry  is  the  king  of  battles.  It  can  fight  on  any  kind  of 
ground;  it  can  defend  itself  against  all  other  arms — artillery  can- 
not stand  against  protected  infantry  fire,  and  cavalry  rides  to 
certain  death  against  unshaken  lines  of  footmen.  It  moves 
steadily  to  the  front,  withholding  its  fire  until  within  the  effective 
zone,  when  it  opens  fire  on  the  enemy's  lines,  its  pace  increases, 
and  the  fire  is  augmented  by  reinforcing  the  line  until  the  posi- 
tion for  the  final  attack  is  reached,  when  a  heavy  fire  is  poured 
into  the  defense  for  a  few  minutes,  then  with  cheers  and  the 
bayonet  it  rushes  upon  the  enemy. 

The  artillery  may  be  said  to  be  the  queen  of  battle.  It  enters 
the  fight  first  at  from  3000  to  5000  yards  from  the  enemy's  artil- 
lery, and  opens  fire  on  it;  it  also  pays  its  respects  to  any  masses 
of  the  enemy's  infantry  or  cavalry  that  may  be  within  range. 
At  this  stage  it  is  entitled  to  choice  of  position.  Having  silenced 
the  enemy's  batteries,  it  moves  forward  to  within  1800  yai'ds  of 
his  infantry,  and  opens  fire  on  the  intrenchments  at  the  point  to 
be  attacked.  From  this  time  on  its  duty  is  to  assist  the  infantry, 
advancing  with  it  sometimes  to  close  ranges.  When  the  position 
is  captured  it  should  move  up  and  locate  its  guns  for  pursuing 


—189— 

the  enemy  with  its  fire.  If  the  troops  are  defeated,  it  must  assist 
in  covering  the  retreat,  and  redouble  its  fire  on  the  advanc- 
ing lines  of  the  enemy.  Infantry  must  not  attack  a  strengthened 
position  until  it  has  been  shaken  by  artillery  fire.  If  the  batteries 
of  the  attack  cannot  overcome  those  of  the  defense,  an  infantry 
attack  will  probably  fail. 

The  value  of  cavalry  in  battle  seems  not  definitely  determined. 
Its  place  is  on  the  flanks,  watching  the  enemy's  cavalry,  screening 
the  deployment  of  the  troops  and  seeking  favorable  opportunities 
for  charging  the  enemy's  shaken  infantry,  or  surprising  it  in 
flank  and  rear.  In  pursuit,  its  duty  is  plain.  If  we  are  forced 
to  retreat,  our  cavalry  must  assist  in  covering  the  movement  by 
engaging  the  enemy's  cavalry  and  even  charging  his  infantry 
when  a  little  time  is  very  necessary  to  the  retreating  troops. 

The  long  lines  of  battle  of  great  modern  armies  make  it  impos- 
sible for  a  general  to  exercise  more  than  a  general  control,  and 
the  fate  of  the  day  rests  largely  in  the  hands  of  the  commanders 
of  regiments  and  battalions  who  are  on  or  near  the  fighting  line. 
The  signal  for  the  final  advance  will  frequently  come  from  the 
men  themselves,  who  will  be  the  first  to  realize  that  the  crisis  has 
arrived,  and  they  must  either  move  forward  with  the  bayonet  or 
retire  to  seek  shelter  from  the  murderous  hail  of  lead  which  will 
be  poured  on  them  from  the  magazines  of  the  defense.  They 
will  also  see  that  an  advance  will  be  no  more  dangerous  than  a 
retreat,  and  the  bravest  and  most  adventurous  will  give  the  signal 
which  will  carry  the  line  forward. 

A  battle  is  divided  into  phases  about  as  follows  : 

FIRST    PHASE. 

The  preparatory  disposition  of  the  troops  before  the  positions 
they  are  to  occupy  on  the  field. 

The  general  commanding  indicates  to  the  corps  of  the  first  line 
their  points  of  assembly,  which  ought  to  be  in  rear  of  the  center 
of  the  zone  they  are  to  occupy.  He  designates  the  general  reserve 
and  indicates  its  position.  Each  corps  moves  to  its  position  on 
as  broad  a  front  as  possible,  with  advanced  guards  thrown  out, 


—190— 

the  artillery  marching  on  the  roads.  A  good  illustration  of  this 
phase  will  be  found  in  the  preparatory  formation  of  the  German 
army  before  Gravelotte. 

SECOND    PHASE. 

On  opening  of  the  fight  by  the  advanced  guards,  the  cavalry 
covers  the  wings,  precedes  the  advance  guards  and  endeavors  to 
determine  the  enemy's  position.  The  artillery  of  the  advanced 
guard  and  of  the  leading  division  moves  forward  rapidly  and  opens 
fire  at  from  2500  to  3500  yards.  Part  of  the  infantry  of  the 
advanced  guard  deploys  and  tries  to  drive  in  the  advanced  posts 
of  the  enemy;  the  remainder  forms  on  the  flanks  and  in  rear 
of  the  artillery. 

THIRD    PHASE THE    DEMON8TBATION. 

The  artillei'y  to  be  used  in  the  demonstration  is  hurried  into  the 
line,  and  the  leading  divisions  are  pushed  rapidly  forward.  The 
commanding  general  takes  his  chief  of  artillery,  goes  forward 
to  where  the  batteries  of  the  advanced  guard  are  in  action,  and 
selects  his  dispositions  for  combat.  He  indicates  the  positions  for 
the  batteries  of  the  leading  divisions — for 'the  corps  artillery — 
and  designates  the  front  to  be  occupied  by  the  leading  infantry 
division.  The  time  consumed  in  the  deployment  will  depend 
upon  the  number  of  roads  available.  If  the  artillery  cannot 
advance  across  the  country  on  a  broad  front,  the  infantry  must 
move  to  one  side  of  the  road  and  leave  it  for  the  artillery.  The 
divisional  artillery  comes  into  line  alongside  that  of  the  advanced 
guard,  and  the  corps  artillery  at  the  place  designated  by  the 
commanding  general.  The  first  fire  is  against  the  enemy's  artil- 
lery, and  no  advance  of  the  artillery  is  made  until  the  corps 
artillery  is  in  line.  The  infantry  is  getting  into  position  to 
advance  to  the  attack,  and  as  soon  as  the  enemy's  infantry  is 
engaged,  the  artillery  moves  forward  to  its  second  zone,  at  about 
1,800  yards  from  the  enemy's  batteries.  If  the  batteries  of  the 
defense  are  silenced  it  now  turns  its  fire  on  the  point  selected  by 
the  general  for  the  attack.     If  the  batteries  are  not  overcome,  it 


—191— 

must  redouble  its  efforts  against  them.  As  soon  as  this  superior- 
ity is  obtained,  the  infantry  moves  forward  to  the  attack,  and 
the  artillery  moves  up  to  its  third  position,  at  from  1200  to  1500 
yards  from  the  enemy's  batteries. 

FOURTH    PHASE — THE    ATTACK. 

If  the  general  desires  to  make  an  enveloping  attack,  he  will 
probably  mass  part  of  his  general  reserve  behind  the  flank  he 
intends  to  assail,  and  form  part  of  his  cavalry  in  echelon  on  its 
exterior.  All  of  the  artillery  will  concentrate  its  fire  on  the 
threatened  point. 

As  the  infantry  marches  forward  to  the  final  effort,  the  general 
gives  the  order  for  a  general  attack  along  the  front.  The  bat- 
teries move  still  closer  to  the  enemy's  line  ;  if  his  artillery  is  still 
in  action,  part  of  the  artilleiy  of  the  attack  engages  it  and  the 
remainder  fires  on  the  point  of-  the  attack.  The  cavalry  keeps 
near  the  enemy's  flank,  engaging  his  cavalry  and  watching  for 
favorable  opportunities  for  charging  his  shaken  infantry. 

As  soon  as  the  fire  of  the  batteries  is  masked  by  their  own 
troops,  they  turn  their  attention  to  the  enemy's  reserves.  The 
infantry  is  now  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy's  line, 
the  battle  is  at  its  height  and  in  a  few  minutes  the  signal  for  the 
assault  must  be  given,  and  the  last  phase  of  the  fight  closes.  If 
victorious,  pursuit  follows.  The  artillery  moves  up  to  the  cap- 
tured position  to  shell  the  retreating  foe  ;  the  infantry  pursues 
by  fire  until  the  regular  pursuit  is  organized. 

A  battle  seems  simple  enough  on  paper,  but  it  is  full  of  com- 
plications and  entanglements ;  wrong  interpretations  of  orders 
by  subordinate  chiefs,  tardiness  of  movement  in  a  brigade  or 
division,  failure  of  a  division  to  keep  its  direction,  may  throw 
confusion  into  the  entire  line  and  neutralize  the  plans  of  the 
general.  As  these  troubles  are  constantly  occurring,  it  is  not 
advisable  to  prepare  an  elaborate  plan  of  battle  beforehand,  even 
if  it  were  possible. 

The  general  must  rely  on  his  judgment,  and  his  ability  to 
grasp  the  situation  quickly,  and  to  keep  in  mind  the  positions  of 
the  troops  and  the  progress  of  the  action  along  the  entire  line. 


—192— 


EXAMPLES. 


We  will  complete  this  outline  study  of  battle  by  illustrations 
of  some  of  the  famous  battles  in  history.  Figure  15  represents 
one  of  the  most  remarkable  of  Frederick's  battles,  that  of  Hoss- 
bach,  November  5,  1757. 

The  Austrians,  while  located  at  b,  conceived  the  beautiful  plan  of 
marching  around  Frederick's  left  flank,  and  by  attacking  him  on 
flank  and  rear  they  confidently  expected  to  capture  his  entire  army 
and  Frederick  himself.  "  The  success  of  their  plan  depended  upon 
catching  the  wily  Frederick  napping.  In  devising  their  strategy 
they  strangely  ignored  the  fact  that  they  were  dealing  with  the 
greatest  general  of  the  day.  Frederick  watched  their  heavy 
columns  get  into  motion  and  thought  they  were  going  to  Frei- 
burg. At  noon  he  sat  down  to  dinner  and  remained  two  hours 
at  table."     (Hozier.) 

Figure  15. 

^'^-^  / 


-  V 

About  2  p.  m.  an  adjutant  informed  him  that  the  Austrians 
had  turned  to  the  left  ;  at  2.30  the  army  was  ordered  to  march  ; 
at  3  p.  m.  it  was  in  motion.  The  cavalry  had  already  disap- 
peared behind  the  Janus  and  Polzen  hills  and  the  infantry 
followed  at  the  double.  Soubise,  fearing  Frederick  might  escape, 
ordered  the  pace  quickened.  A  Prussian  battery  of  18  guns  was 
soon  established  on  Janus  Hill  and  Seidlitz  pressed  on  with  his 
cavalry  until  he  was  ahead  of  the  Austrian  column,  which  was 
moving   without  an  advanced   guard,  then  he  wheeled  to   the 


—193— 

right,  advanced  to  the  top  of  Polzen  Hill  and  charged  down  on 
the  flank  of  the  allied  cavalry,  and  went  through  it  four  times. 
In  half  an  hour  the  entire  allied  cavalry  was  ruined  and  thrown 
back  on  its  infantry.  The  Prussian  artillery  opened  fire  and  did 
terrible  execution.  The  infantry  attacked  and  completed  the 
disaster.  The  entire  allied  army  was  routed  and  fled  from  the 
field  of  battle.  Frederick's  forces  were  greatly  inferior  to  those 
of  the  allies.  He  had  but  4000  horses,  18  guns  and  seven  bat- 
talions of  infantry  in  action  against  50,000  allied  troops.  It  is  a 
striking  example  of  the  effects  of  good  leadership  and  discipline 
against  vastly  superior  numbers  of  mixed  nationalities  poorly  led. 

LEUTHEN. 

Figure  i6. 


>,^      SI?    £• 


Shortly  after  Rossbach,  Frederick's  army  was  at  Berne  on  the 
road  to  Breslau.     He  found  some  Saxon  cavalry  drawn  up  across 
18 


—194— 

the  road  in  his  front ;  he  attacked  at  once  and  drove  it  back  to 
the  right  flank  of  the  Austrians.  Frederick  halted  his  army, 
rode  to  a  knoll  in  front  and  saw  the  entire  Austrian  army  drawn 
up  in  a  strong  position.  Its  right  rested  on  a  swamp,  and  the 
left  on  a  hill  behind  Sagschutz,  protected  by  abatis. 

The  Austrians,  though  three  times  Frederick's  strength,  were 
prepared  to  fight  a  defensive  battle.  Frederick  at  once  decided  to 
deliver  an  oblique  attack  upon  their  left.  The  Saxon  cavalry 
having  fallen  back  upon  the  right  flank,  gave  the  Austrians  the 
impression  that  Frederick  would  attack  that  flank,  and  their 
reserve  cavalry  and  part  of  the  cavalry  from  the  left  wing  were 
sent  to  strengthen  the  right. 

Frederick's  movements  were  concealed  by  a  chain  of  hills,  and 
with  his  usual  celerity  he  surprised  the  Austrian  left  and  after  a 
severe  struggle  rolled  it  back  on  the  center  in  great  confusion. 
The  Austrian  right  now  swung  around  to  the  south  and  a  new 
front  was  established. 

Frederick's  left  seemed  to  be  exposed,  and  Luchessi,  with  the 
right,  which  was  strong  in  cavalry,  led  a  charge  on  it,  but 
Frederick  had  foreseen  this  emergency  and  had  given  Driesen 
orders  to  keep  that  flank  protected.  Driesen  concealed  his 
cavalry  in  a  hollow  and  allowed  the  Austrians  to  pass  him.  He 
then  charged  them  in  the  rear,  and  with  the  aid  of  infantry  fire 
he  completely  routed  them.  Luchessi's  charge  left  the  Austrian 
right  unprotected.  Driesen  saw  his  opportunity,  and  charged  it, 
completely  smashing  it,  and  throwing  it  into  hopeless  confusion. 
The  whole  army  was  now  in  disorder  and  soon  became  a  mass  of 
fugitives.  In  three  hours  Frederick,  with  32,000  men,  had  com- 
pletely routed  an  army  of  80,000.  Discipline,  celerity  and 
confidence  in  their  commander  won  these  two  great  battles  for 
Frederick's  army.  His  opponents'  errors  of  course  assisted  him. 
It  is  not  worth  while  to  discuss  the  possibility  of  a  flank  march 
under  modern  conditions  such  as  Frederick  made  at  Leuthen  in 
sight  of  his  enemy. 

We  can  learn  a  valuable  lesson  from  studying  Frederick's  cam- 
paigns, one  that  is  particularly  applicable  to  our  military  condi- 


—195— 

tion,  viz:  Superiority  of  numbers  without  discipline,  training  an^ 
good  leadership  will  rarely  win  battles  against  armies  possessing 
these  qualities,  and  yet  our  military  policy — if  we  may  be  said  to 
have  one — is  based  upon  our  great  material  strength,  which,  under 
present  conditions,  will  be  our  weakness  in  hour  of  need.  The 
great  battles  of  the  war  of  the  rebellion  furnish  an  inexhaustible 
supply  of  information,  but  it  has  not  yet  been  thoroughly  digested 
and  put  into  good  compact  shape  for  the  military  reader.  It  is 
not  likely  that  we  will  see  any  more  battles  of  seven  days'  dura- 
tion, or  even  of  three  days,  as  at  Gettysburg,  where  both  sides 
were  completely  exhausted  and  in  which  nearly  50,000  men  fell. 
The  famous  and  heroic  charge  of  Pickett's  brigade  was  one  of  the 
last  acts  in  the  great  tragedy.  Of  the  4000  men  which  started 
on  that  famous  movement  but  a  few  hundred  reached  the  federal 
line,  the  remainder  fell  on  the  way.  One-fourth  of  this  percent- 
age in  loss  stopped  the  famous  Prussian  guard  corps  at  St.  Privat. 
Meagher's  brigade  lost  nearly  1000  out  of  1200  men  in  their 
attack  on  the  stone  fence  at  Fredericksburg  behind  which  the 
confederates  were  standing  six  deep. 

Orders  of  battle  were  not  noticeable  during  our  war,  the  coun- 
try was  often  closely  wooded,  full  of  marshes,  sti'eams  and  ravines, 
with  limited  view,  consequently  artillery  and  cavalry  were  often 
of  but  little  use. 

Antietam. — The  Confederate  position  at  Antietam  was  convex. 
The  right  flank  rested  on  the  high  ground  near  the  big  bend  of 
Antietam  creek.  The  left  was  protected  by  the  Potomac  river. 
It  was  covered  in  front  by  the  rugged  banks  of  the  creek.  The 
stream  could  be  crossed  by  three  narrow  bridges  and  a  few 
difficult  fords.  Good  communication  between  the  flanks  was 
assured  by  the  Hagerstown  road  which  was  just  in  rear  of  the 
confederate  position.  An  inspection  of  the  map  will  show  that 
Lee's  position  was  strategically  weak  and  tactically  strong.  He 
accepted  battle  with  a  large  river  at  his  back,  and  if  the  Union 
troops  succeeded  in  rolling  up  his  right  wing — his  line  of  commu- 
nications would  be  lost  and  his  entire  army  would  be  at  the 
mercy  of  the  victor, — with  greatly  superior  forces  it  was  a  glori- 
ous opportunity  for  the  Federal  commander. 


—196- 


McClellan's  plan  of  battle  contemplated  a  strong  attack  on 
Lee's  left  in  the  hope  that  Lee  would  weaken  his  right  and  center 
to  strengthen  his  left,  then  a  crushing  blow  on  the  [right  and 
center  would  bring  a  most  decisive  victory.  The  plan  was  excel- 
lent but  as  is  often  the  case,  the  execution  was^not  so  brilliant. 

Figure  17. 


There  was  no  unity  of  action.  The  attacks  were  made  succes- 
sively instead  of  together.  The  opening  of  the  attack  was 
delayed  until  the  confederates  received  reinforcements.  After  a 
severe  and  bloody  struggle  lasting  many  hours,  the  confederates 
withdrew  under  cover  of  dai'kness,  and  crossed  the  Potomac. 

Fredericksburg. — At  Fredericksburg  the  Union  line  was 
practically  parallel  to  the  Rappahannock  with  its  left  formed  en 
potence  of  which  Jomini  says  :  "  A  crochet,  or  the  order  en 
potence,  if  used  to  protect  a  flank  against  an  enemy  that  can 
manoeuvre  is  a  remedy  worse  than  the  disease  it  is  used  to  cure." 


—197— 

< 
Pig.  18  illustrates  the  positions  in  outline.     Burnside's   plan   of 

battle  was  to  turn  Lee's  right,  which  he  rightly  judged  to  be  his 
weakest  point,  but  before  Burnside  carried  his  plan  into  execu- 
tion, Lee  recalled  Early  and  Hill  from  Port  Royal  lower  down  on 
the  river,  and  this  strengthened  his  right.  I  have  not  space  to  go 
into  the  details  of  the  battle.  It  is  memorable  in  many  ways. 
A  short  time  before,  Lee,  at  Antietam,  had  fought  with  the 
Potomac  at  his  back,  and  McClellan  allowed  him  to  steal  away 
in  the  night  and  recross  the  river.  Burnside  was  in  a  similar 
position  at  Fredericksburg,  and  Lee,  forgetful  of  the  trick  he  had 
played  on  McClellan,  allowed  Burnside  to  recross  the  Rappahan- 
nock in  the  night  and  without  his  knowledge.  Lee's  defensive 
position  was  well  chosen  and  tactically  well  occupied,  but  it  was 
not  particularly  well  adapted  for  a  return  offensive.  Burnside's 
plan  might  have  been  successful  if  it  had  been  carried  out  with 
vigor  and  alacrity,  but  he  hesitated  at  a  critical  time,  and  the 
efforts  were  weak  and  lacked  unity  and  cohesion.  Lee's  troops 
were  tactically  arranged,  in  accordance  with  principles  now  rec- 
ognized as  fundamental  in  all  infantry  drill  books  ;  his  first  and 
second  lines  were  parts  of  the  same  division,  and  his  reserves 
instead  of  being  massed  at  one  point,  were  divided  and  stationed 
behind  different  parts  of  the  line,  and  belonged  to  the  corps  or 
division  which  were  in  front  of  them. 

His  firing  line  and  supports  were  at  each  point  under  the  com- 
mand of  a  single  officer,  and  as  the  reserves  belonged  to  the 
same  corps  he  secured  unity  of  command  throughout,  a  very 
important  element  of  success.  After  thirty  years  have  passed 
we  have  adopted  similar  formations,  with  many  variations  in  the 
details.  There  are  also  many  points  of  similarity  between  Fred- 
ericksburg and  Gravelotte.  The  Germans  intended  to  turn  the 
French  right  and  to  hold  the  French  center  and  left  by  demon- 
strations until  the  turning  movement  could  be  effected,  but  like 
Burnside  at  Fredericksburg,  their  right  became  deeply  engaged 
with  the  French  left  where  the  ground  was  entirely  favorable  for 
the  defensive  action  of  the  French.  The  Germans  lost  many  men 
uselessly  and  made  but  little  impression  on  the  French  position. 


— 199— 

They  advanced  against  St.  Privat  before  it  was  properly  prepared 
by  the  artillery.  Thus  far  the  battles  are  parallels.  Had  the 
French  followed  Lee's  course  and  reinforced  their  right  at  the 
beginning  of  the  engagement  or  even  sent  part  of  their  large 
reserves  to  it  when  they  were  called  for,  it  is  altogether  probable 
that  they  would  have  held  their  ground  for  that  day  at  least,  and 
if  they  had  delivered  a  counter-offensive  when  the  guard  corps 
was  stopped  at  St.  Privat  they  might  have  broken  a  long  chain 
of  defeats  by  a  glorious  victory.  Much  time  is  lost  in  talking  of 
"  what  might  have  happened."  The  wise  and  successful  general 
seizes  every  opportunity,  neglects  no  precaution,  has  a  clear  per- 
ception of  what  he  wants  to  do  and  does  it  with  vigor,  and  then 
allows  the  enemy  to  talk  of  "what  might  have  happened." 
Napoleon  said  "the  lost  moment  never  returns,"  and  this  is 
especially  applicable  to  battle  ;  often  there  is  but  the  turn  of  a 
hand  between  victory  and  defeat.  If  Grouchy  could  only  have 
delayed  Blucher  an  hour,  Waterloo  would  have  been  a  great 
victoiy  for  Napoleon,  and  what  would  have  been  his  future  ?  If 
Lee's  ideas  and  intentions  had  been  carried  out  at  Gettysburg  it 
is  thought  he  would  have  won.  What  would  have  been  the 
effect  on  our  country  ? 

The  destiny  of  a  nation  may  rest  in  the  hands  of  a  brigade,  and 
when  we  think  of  all  that  is  required  to  make  a  great  general  it 
is  not  surprising  that  you  can  count  upon  your  fingers  the  number 
of  great  generals  since  the  beginning  of  the  Christian  era. 

For  supplementary  reading  see — 

"  Major  Henderson's  "  Campaign  of  Fredericksburg "  and 
"  Spicheren." 

Colonel  Hozier's  "  Frederick  the  Great." 

General  Doubleday's  "  Antietam,  Gettysburg." 

"  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War." 

Sir  Ed.  Hamley's  "  Crimea."  , 

Von  Moltke's  Memoirs. 

Greene's  Russo-Turkish  War. 


This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below 


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